THE science of international politics is in its infancy. Down to 1914, the conduct of international relations was the concern of persons professionally engaged in it. In democratic countries, foreign policy was traditionally regarded as outside the scope of party politics; and the representative organs did not feel themselves competent to exercise any close control over the mysterious operations of foreign offices. In Great Britain, public opinion was readily aroused if war occurred in any region traditionally regarded as a sphere of British interest, or if the British navy momentarily ceased to possess that margin of superiority over potential rivals which was the deemed essential. In continental Europe, conscription and chronic fear of foreign invasion had created a more general and continuous popular awareness of international problems. But this awareness found expression mainly in the labour movement, which from time to time passed somewhat academic resolutions against war.
The constitution of the United States of America contained the unique provision that treaties were concluded by the President メby and with the advice and consent of the Senateモ. But the foreign relations of the United States seemed too parochial to lend any wider significance to this exception. The more picturesque aspects of diplomacy had a certain news value. But nowhere, whether in universities or in wider intellectual circles, was there organised study of current international affairs. War was still regarded mainly as the business of soldiers; and the corollary of this was that international politics were the business of diplomats. There was no general desire to take the conduct of international affairs out of the hands of the professionals or even to pay serious and systematic attention to what they were doing. (Page one)
The war of 1914 ミ 18 made an end of the view that the war is a matter which affects only professional soldiers and, in so doing, dissipated the corresponding impression that international politics could safely be left in the hands of professional diplomats. The campaign for the popularisation of international politics began in the English-speaking countries in the form of an agitation against secret treaties, which were attacked, on insufficient evidence, as one of the causes of the war. The blame for the secret treaties should have been imputed, not to the wickedness of the governments, but to the indifference of the peoples. Everybody knew that such treaties were concluded. But before the war of 1914 few people felt any curiosity about them or thought them objectionable. The agitation against them was, however, a fact of immense importance. It was the first symptom of the demand for the popularisation of international politics and heralded the birth of a new science.
War was still regarded mainly as the business of soldiers; and the corollary of this was that international politics were the business of diplomats. (1914以前は)戦争は兵士の仕事、国際政治は外交官の仕事。
戦略論といえば、 Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age Author: Paret, Peter et al. Publisher: Princeton University Press なんかもありますな。積読状態です・・・。
つづき そのあとアメリカの憲法に言及してるんですが、 The constitution of the United States of America contained the unique provision that treaties were concluded by the President "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate". どなたか合衆国憲法に詳しい方、助けて下さい。(w "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" 「上院の助言と承認によって」ですが、助言と承認は別々の機会なんですかね? これはまるで日本国憲法の第七条、天皇の国事行為の条文のようなんですよ。 天皇の国事行為も「内閣の助言と承認により」ですが、助言の時点で承認も 終わってると考えるんだったはずです。(うろ覚え)とりあえず、天皇は第七条に かかれた国事行為を自分の意志で行うことはできないんです。ロボットですね。 これを合衆国に字づらであてはめると、外交に関しては大統領はAlmighty では なくて、上院の縛り(というか、上院の言うことそのまま)と考えるべきなのか(ロボット説) それとも「上下院」ではない分、むしろ一般の政策よりも大統領の権利が強いのか。 どっちなんでしょうか? どなたかよろしく。 マッカーサーとGHQはこのフレーズをそっくり天皇の国事行為に当てたところが、 なかなか意味深いと思うのですよ。
ちなみに日本国憲法では The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of state on behalf of the people:
であり、合衆国憲法第2条2節 (二)大統領は、上院の助言と同意を得て、条約を締結する権限を有する。 ただしこの場合には、上院の出席議員の三分の二の賛同が必要である。 He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;
But the foreign relations of the United States seemed too parochial to lend any wider significance to this exception. 『しかし、合衆国の対外関係は、この他に見られない条文に大きな意味を与えるには偏狭に過ぎた。』 と、あるのでカー自身は、結局あまりこの制度は有効に動いていなかったとみていたようですね。
カーは言い出しっぺ氏が指摘されたように; "...the representative organs did not feel themselves competent to exercise any close control over the mysterious operations of foreign offices." と言及しています。
しかし、1914年前に既に出来上がっていた、アメリカ合衆国憲法を覗いてみると、 "The constitution of the United States of America contained the unique provision that treaties were concluded by the President 'by and with the advice and consent of the Senate'. とあったということです。
>>54 本全体の主張としては「関わるべきだ」ですね。 But nowhere, whether in universities or in wider intellectual circles, was there organised study of current international affairs. といってるわけです。 「どこにも、大学とかもっと広い範囲のいわゆる知識層のなかにも、 ちゃんとした国際関係の議論はない」 大学にすらないわけだから、ましてや政治家がそんな事気にしてるはずはないと、 選挙に右往左往する内向きの議員達を暗に皮肉っているわけですわ。 イギリス人ですね。(w
* 最初は"The Real War:1914-1919"として1930年に本家イギリスではFABER & FABER社から、 某大国ではLITTLE, BROWN社から出版されて、
* 1934年に一度改訂されて、"A history of the World War, 1914-1918"となり(それでも多 分副題か何かで"The Real War"の記載はあるはず・・・)、イギリスではこの改訂版が同じく FABER & FABER社から、某大国ではLITTLE, BROWN社からそれぞれ出版されたと。
* 1963年にこの改訂版の増刷版から再び"The Real War: 1914-1919"として某大国でLITTLE, BROWN社から独自に出版されたようです。(これが私が>>55の2番目のリンクで示した奴ですね。)
* イギリスでは、1970年にCASSELLという出版社から同様の版が増刷され、
* 1982年に>>57で示していただいたPAN MACMILLANから"History of the First World War"として 増刷版が再版されたというところでしょうか。
>>61 戦略家志望氏 Thnx です。なるほど、戦前は Real War でよかったわけだ。 戦後は区別が必要になったので、タイトル変えたんでしょうかね? 出版の世界では、アメリカとイギリスは不思議にも独自で動いていて、 内容違うなんて事も日常茶飯事ですから。 アメリカ側は版権持ってるLITTLE BROWN が このタイトルでしか出版しない(できない?) と言う事でしょう。
>The Real War どうして名前が変わったんだろう? アメリカで受けが悪かったとかかな。 イギリスが一世紀近く近代戦を戦っていなかったのに比べて、アメリカは、南北戦争という 戦争中当時は最も熾烈であった戦いを経験済みでしたから。 けっ 何がりあるうぉーだよ、自分の庭すら戦場にならなかったのになに逝ってんだか。 ッテ感じに。うがちすぎか。。イギリスでも名前が変更になってるなら意味無いし。
Purpose and Analysis in Political Science The science of international politics has, then, come into being in response to a popular demand. It has been created to serve a purpose and has, in this respect, followed the pattern of other sciences. At first sight, this pattern may appear illogical. Our first business, it will be said, is to collect, classify and analyse our facts draw our inferences; and we shall then be ready to investigate the purpose to which our facts and our deductions can be put. The processes of the human mind do not, however, appear to develop in this logical order. The human mind works, so to speak, backwards. Purpose, which should logically follow analysis, is required to give it both its initial impulse and its direction. "If society has a technical need", wrote Engels, "it serves as a greater spur to the progress of science than do ten universities." The first extant text-book of geometry "lay down an aggregate of practical rules designed to solve concrete problems: 'rule for measuring a round fruitery'; 'rule for laying out a field'; 'computation of the fodder consumed by geese and oxen'". (Page 2)
Reason, says Kant, must approach nature "not......in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose". "We cannot study even stars or rocks or atoms", writes the modern sociologist, "without being somehowdetermined, in our modes of systematisation, in the prominence given to one or another part of our subject, in the form of the questions we ask and attempt to answer, by direct and human interests." It is the purpose of promoting health which creates medical science, and the purpose of building the bridges which creates the science of engineering. Desire to cure the sickness of body politic has given its impulse and its inspiration to political science. Purpose, whether we are conscious of it or not, is a condition of thought; and thinking for thinking's sake is as abnormal and barren as the miser's accumulation of money for its own sake. "The wish is father to the thought" is a perfectly exact description of the origin of normal human thinking.
If this is true of the physical sciences, it is true of political science in a far more intimate sense. In the physical sciences, the distinction between the investigation of the facts and the purpose to which the facts are to be put is not only theoretically valid, but is constantly observed in practice. The laboratory worker engaged in investigating the causes of cancer may have been originally inspired by the purpose of eradicating the disease. But this purpose is in the strictest sense irrelevant to the investigation and separable from it. His conclusion can be nothing more than a true report on facts. It cannot help to make the facts other than they are; for the facts exist independently of what anyone thinks about them. In the political sciences, which are concerned with human behaviour, there are no such facts. The investigator is inspired by the desire to cure some ill of the body politic. Among the causes of the trouble, he diagnoses the fact that human beings normally react to certain condition in a certain way. (P3)
But this is not a fact comparable with the fact that human bodies react in a certain way to certain drugs. It is the fact which may be changed the desire to change it; and this desire, already in the mind of the investigator, may be extended, as the result of his investigation, to a sufficient number of other human beings to make it effective. The purpose is not, as in the physical sciences, irrelevant to the investigation and separable from it: it is itself one of the facts. In theory, the distinction may no doubt still be drawn between the role of the investigator who establishes the facts and the role of the practitioner who considers the right course of action. In practice, one role shades imperceptibly into the other. Purpose and analysis becomes part and parcel of a single process.
A few examples will illustrate this point. Marx, when he wrote Capital, was inspired by the purpose of destroying capitalist system just as the investigator of the causes of the cancer is inspired by the purpose of eradicating cancer. But the facts about capitalism are not, like the facts about cancer, independent of the attitude of people towards it. Marxユs analysis was intended to alter, and did in fact to alter, that attitude. In the process of analysing the facts, Marx altered them. To attempt to distinguish Marx the scientist and Marx the propagandist is idle hair splitting. The financial experts, who in the summer of 1932 advised the British Government that it was possible to convert 5 per cent War Loan at the rate of 32/1(three and a half) per cent, no doubt based their advice on an analysis of certain facts; but the fact that they gave this advice was one of the fact which, being known to the financial world, made the operation successful.
Analysis and purpose were inextricably blended. Nor is it only the thinking of professional or qualified students of politics which constitutes a political fact. Every one who reads a political columns of a newspaper or attends a political meeting or discusses politics with his neighbour is to that extent a student of politics; and the judgment which he forms becomes (especially, but not exclusively, in democratic countries) a factor in the course of political events. Thus a reviewer might conceivably criticise this book on the ground, not that it was false, but that it was inopportune; and this criticism, whether justified or not, would be intelligible, whereas the same criticism of a book about the causes of the cancer would be meaningless. (P4) Every political judgment helps to modify the facts on which it is passed. Political thought is itself a form of political action. Political science is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be.
* 動機以降のプロセスを科学的手法(Scientific Method)と呼びますよね。 * 第一の目的が第二の目的の結果(仮説の証明の結果)とは(直接的には)無関係であるということ。 * ただし、動機(第一の目的)は機動力として科学的手法の開始には必須。 * 例) 『癌を治療したい!!(第一の目的)』→『データの収集』→『データの分析・帰納』→『癌の性質の一つにこれこれこういうものがある!!(第二の目的)』 →実験→『レポート(第二の目的の達成)』: 『癌を治療したい!!』と『癌の性質についての実験レポート』は基本的に無関係。 * 動機がない科学的手法の不自然さ: "Purpose(動機), whether we are conscious of it or not, is a condition of thought(科学的手法); and thinking for thinking's sake is as abnormal and barren as the miser's accumulation of money for its own sake. 'The wish is father to the thought" is a perfectly exact description of the origin of normal human thinking.'"
* 科学的手法と実践を二段階として厳密に区別することは可能だが、通常は一つのプロセスとして現れる。(例: マルクス) * 従って、"Political science is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be."ということです。
The financial experts, who in the summer of 1932 advised the British Government that it was possible to convert 5 per cent War Loan at the rate of 32/1(three and a half) per cent, no doubt based their advice on an analysis of certain facts; but the fact that they gave this advice was one of the fact which, being known to the financial world, made the operation successful. (意訳要約:錬金術的に人をダマクラかして、5%の戦時国債の支払い利率を3.5%にして しまったのは見事なお手並みだ)
>>77の以下のセンテンスに注目してみます。 "The purpose is not, as in the physical sciences, irrelevant to the investigation and separable from it: ★it is itself one of the facts.★" つまり、カーは目的・動機さえも分析の対象であると説いたわけです。
"...but the fact that they gave this advice was one of the fact which, being known to the financial world, made the operation successful."
つまり、『金融のエキスパートが政府に助言を与えることで目的を達成しようとしている』という事実そのものは、 既に金融界には通じていた事実であって、カーの言う『...this desire(=PURPOSE), already in the mind of the investigator, may be extended...to a sufficient number of other human beings ★to make it effective. ★』(>>77)がこの例によって証明されたわけです。
次に、これを2回読め。 地ならし:War and Change in World Politics/Robert Gilpin After Hegemony/Robert O. Keohane Long Peace/John Lewis Gaddis The Growth of the International Economy/A.G.Kenwood,A.L.Lougheed The Political Economy of International Relations/Robert Gilpin
* Structural realism I: International politics is driven by an endless struggle for power which has its roots in human nature. Justice, law, and society have either no place or are circumscrived. (e.g. Thucydides, Morgenthau)
* Histrical or practical realism: Political realims recognizes that principles are subordinated to politics; the ultimate skill of the state leader is to accept, and adapt to, tha changing power political configurations in world politics. (e.g. Machiavelli, Carr)
* Structural realism II or Neo-realism: It is not human nature, but the anarchical system which fosters fear, jealousy, suspicion, and insecurity. Conflict can emerge even if the actors have benign intent towards each other. (e.g. Rousseau, Waltz)
* Liberal realism: The international anarchy can be cushioned by states who have the capability to deter other states from aggression, and who are able to construct elementary rules for their coexistence. (e.g. Hobbes, Bull)
If therefore purpose precedes and conditions thought, it is not surprising to find that, when the human mind begins to exercise itself in some fresh field, an initial stage occurs in which the element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly strong, and the inclination to analyse facts and means weak or non-existent. Hobhouse notes as a characteristic of the "most primitive peoples" that "the evidence of truth of an idea is not yet separate from the quality which renders it pleasant". The same would appear to be conspicuously true of the primitive, or "utopian", stage of the political science. During this stage, the investigators will pay little attention to existing "facts" or to the analysis of cause and effect, but will devote themselves whole-heartedly to the elaboration of visionary projects for the attainment of the ends which they have in view - projects whose simplicity and perfection give them an easy and universal appeal.
It is only when these projects break down, and wish or purpose is shown to be incapable by itself of achieving the desired end, that the investigators will reluctantly call in the aid of analysis, and the study, emerging from its infantile and utopian period, will establish its claim to be regarded as a science. "Sociology", remarks Professor Ginsburg, "may be said to have arisen by way of reaction against sweeping generalisations unsupported by detailed inductive enquiry."
It may not be fanciful to find an illustration of this rule even in the domain of physical science. During the Middle Ages, gold was a recognised medium of exchange. But economic relations were not sufficiently developed to require more than a limited amount of such a medium.
When the new economic conditions of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries introduced a widespread system of money transactions, and the supply of gold was found to be inadequate for the purpose, (p5) the wise men of the day began to experiment in the possibility of transmuting commoner metal into gold. The thought of the alchemist was purely purposive. He did not stop to enquire whether the properties of lead were such as to make it transmutable into gold. He assumed that the end was absolute (i.e. that gold must be produced), and that means and material must somehow be adapted to it. It was only when this visionary project ended in failure that the investigators were prompted to apply their thought to an examination of "facts", i.e. the nature of matter; and though the initial utopian purpose of making gold out of lead is probably as far as ever from fulfilment, modern physical science has been evolved out of this primitive aspiration.
Hobhouse notes as a characteristic of the "most primitive peoples" that "the evidence of truth of an idea is not yet separate from the quality which renders it pleasant".
If therefore purpose precedes and conditions thought, it is not surprising to find that, when the human mind begins to exercise itself in some fresh field, an initial stage occurs in which the element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly strong, and the inclination to analyse facts and means weak or non-existent. Hobhouse notes as a characteristic of the "most primitive peoples" that "the evidence of truth of an idea is not yet separate from the quality which renders it pleasant."
Other illustrations may be taken from fields more closely akin to our present subject.
It was in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. that the first serious recorded attempts were made to create a science of politics. These attempts were made independently in China and in Greece. But neither Confucius nor Plato, though they were of course profoundly influenced by the political institutions under they lived, really tried to analyse causes of the evils they deplored. Like the alchemist, they were content to advocate highly imaginative solutions whose relation to existing facts was one of flat negation. The new political order which they propounded was as different from anything they saw around them as gold from lead. It was the product not of analysis, but of aspiration.
In the eighteen century, trade in Western Europe had become so important as to render irksome the innumerable restrictions placed on it by governmental authority and justified by mercantilist theory. The Protest against these restrictions took the form of a wishful vision of universal free trade; and out of this vision the physiocrats in France, and Adam Smith in Britain, created a science of political economy. The new science was based primarily on a negation of existing reality and on certain artificial and unverified generalisations about the behaviour of a hypothetical economic man. (p6) In practice, it achieved some highly useful and important results. But the economic theory long retained its utopian character; even to-day some "classical economists" insist regarding universal free trade - an imaginary condition which has never existed - as the normal postulate of economic science, and all reality as a deviation from this utopian prototype.
In the opening years of the nineteenth century, the individual revolution created a new social problem to engage human thought in Western Europe. The Pioneers who first set out to tackle this problem were the men on whom posterity has bestowed the name of "utopian scientists": Saint-Simon and Fourier in France, Robert Owen in England. These men did not attempt to analyse the nature of class-interests or class-consciousness or of the class-conflict to which they gave rise. They simply made unverified assumptions about human behaviour and, on the strength of these, drew up visionary schemes of ideal communities in which men of all classes would live together in amity, sharing the fruits of their labours in proportion of their needs. For all of them, as Engels remarked, "socialism is the expression of absolute truth, reason and justice, and needs only by discovered in order to conquer all the world in virtue of its own power". The utopian socialists did valuable work in making men conscious of the problem and of the need of tackling it. But the solution propounded by them had no logical connexion with the conditions which created the problem. Once more, it was the product not of analysis, but of aspiration.
まだ本調子ではありませんが、とりあえず続きをうpしました。 第一章の議論の大事な前ふりの部分になります。 前段の錬金術を読んだものがわかりよいように構成されています。 いわゆる "Utopians" とはどのような人々の叙述がはじまっています。 古くは孔子やプラトン、アダムスミス、 そしていわゆる「空想的社会主義」の思想家たちをあげて it was the product not of analysis, but of aspiration. 「事実の分析ではなく、野心の産物だ」とばっさり切っています。 この辺りは高校の世界史でも習う事ですので、どなたも理解しやすいと思います。 エンゲルスによる批判もよく知られているところですね。
アダムスミスのところでは universal free trade - an imaginary condition which has never existed - as the normal postulate of economic science. 「自由貿易ー実際には一度もあった事のない想像上の条件ーを通常の基準として(考える事)」 という部分で、ここでも社会科学は自然科学とは違うんだと言う事をもう一回ダメ押ししてる。 物理学などは自然界ではありえない条件、例えば「真空」のもとで実験したりするわけで、 社会科学ではそれはご法度と言う事をはっきりさせたい意図があります。
>>145-6 館塾君 御心配ありがとう。Chap 1 はもう既にタイプは終わってるのですが、 Word 文書なので、そのまま貼ると文字化けしたりするんで Punctuation なんかを打ち直す必要があるんですが、体調が悪いとメンドいんです(w
the economic theory long retainedits utopian character 経済理論には長くユートピア的な性格があり、 all reality as a deviation from this utopian prototype. 元になるのはユートピア的なものであり、現実の方がそれから外れているのである。 と、いう考えが「古典的経済学者 "classical economists"」の中にはあるのである。
These men did not attempt to analyse the nature of〜 彼らもまた、〜という問題や性質についての分析を行おうとはしなかった。ということを批判してますね。 その結果として、 They simply made unverified assumptions about human behaviour and, on the strength of these, drew up visionary schemes of ideal communities 彼らはただ人間の行動について立証なしの推定だけを行い、理想的な社会像を描いた。 そしてこのあとエンゲルスの自信たっぷりなセリフが入り、これを受けてカーは、 But the solution propounded by them had no logical connexion with the conditions which created the problem. これらの解決策はなんら問題の原因との論理的結合性を欠いていた。 とバッサリ切っていますね。 it was the product not of analysis, but of aspiration. ただ、分析ではなく願望によってつくられたものである。と。 ここで先のホブハウスの言葉が生きてきてますね。
Schemes elaborated in this spirit would not, of course, work. (p7) Just as nobody has ever been able to make gold in a laboratory, so nobody has ever been able to live in Plato's republic or in a world of universal free trade or in Fourier's pharansteries. Bit it is, nevertheless, perfectly right to venerate Confucius and Plato as the founders of political science, Adam Smith as the founder of political economy, and Fourier and Owen as the founders of socialism. The initial stage of aspiration towards an end is an essential foundation of human thinking. The wish is father to the though. Teleology precedes analysis.
The teleological aspect of the science of international politics has been conspicuous from the outset. It tool its rise from a great and disastrous war; and the overwhelming purpose which dominated and inspired the pioneers of the new science was to obviate a recurrence of this disease of international body politic. The passionate desire to prevent war determined the whole initial course and direction of the study. Like other infant sciences, the science of international politics has been markedly and frankly utopian. It has in the initial stage in which wishing prevails over thinking, generalisation over observation, and in which little attempt is made at a crucial analysis of existing facts or available means. In this stage, attention is concentrated almost exclusively on the end to be achieved. The end has seemed so important that analytical criticism of the means proposed has too often branded as destructive and unhelpful.
When president Wilson, on his way to the Peace Conference, was asked by some of his advisers whether he thought his plan of a League of Nations would work, he replied briefly: "If it wonユt work, it must made to work". The advocate of a scheme for an international police force or for "collective security", or of some other project for an international order, generally replied to the critic not by an argument designed to shew how and why he thought his plan will work, but either by a statement that it must be made to work because the consequences of its failure to work would be so disastrous, or by a demand for some alternative nostrum. This must be the spirit in which the alchemist or the utopian socialist would have answered the sceptic who questioned whether lead could be turned into gold or men made to live in model communities. (p8) Thought has been at a discount.
Much that was said and written about international politics between 1919 and 1939 merited the structure applied in another context by the economist Marshall, who compares "the nervous irresponsibility which conceives hasty utopian schemes" to the "bold facility of the weak player who will speedily solve the most difficult chess problem by taking on himself to move the black men as well as the white". In the extenuation of this intellectual failure, it may be said that, during the earlier of these years, the black pieces in the international politics were in the hands of such weak players that the real difficulties of the were scarcely manifest even to the keenest intelligence. The course of events after 1931 clearly revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis for a science of international politics, and made it possible for the first time to embark on serious critical and analytical thought about international problems.
まず、>>156では、当然、そうして作られた計画は役に立たたず、そのような(想像のみの)世界では誰も実際に生きていくことはできない。 としつつも、彼らをそれぞれの学問の<the founder>第一人者(?)であるとすることは<perfectly right>正しい、としています。 あれ、少し流れが変わったかな?なんでかな、とその理由が述べられているのが次の文章の <The initial stage of aspiration towards an end>目的に向けた願望の初期状態が、人間の思考の基盤に必要不可欠なのだから。 (つまり、願望こそが人間の思考を生み出すのだ、ということですね) これは次の<The wish is father to the thought>というおなじみのことわざに要約されています。 そして、<Teleology precedes analysis>目的論は分析に先立つのだ、としめくくっています。
>>167 おきゅきゅきゅきゅ氏 「モデル」についてのCarrの考え方はアチコチにありますが、たとえばPart15の Just as nobody has ever been able to make gold in a laboratory, so nobody hasever been able to live in Plato's republic or in a world of universal free trade or in Fourier's pharansteries. 要するにモデル的な世界に住んでる人はいないとはっきり言ってるんですね。 Carr の考えによれば、いわばアタマの中で構築された構造をモデルとして 議論するのは Analysis ではないと言うことです。(すくなくともCarr による ところの国際政治においては)ここがいわば「数量化可能な学問とそうでない 学問の違いなのか。(自分としても今はやりの Quantitative は抵抗あり) ゲームの理論なんかも一時期はやったんですけどね。
>>157 Part 16です。まずタイポ訂正スマソ(スペルチェックにかからんんかった) 二行目 It tool its rise from a great and disastrous war; ↓↓↓↓ It TOOK its rise from a great and disastrous war; ですた。
館塾クン>>161の >>そして、<Teleology precedes analysis>目的論は分析に先立つのだ、 >>としめくくっています。これまでのユートピアン批判が急にやんだかのように見えます。 つづき It (telelogical aspect) took its rise from a great and disastrous war; あの悲惨で大規模な戦争が目的にしたがった政策立案を育てたんだ。 戦争回避が究極の「目的」となったわけです。それが国際政治の方向性にも 大きな影響を与えた。こうなってほしいと言う思いが冷静な思考に先立ち、 観察よりも一般化が急がれ、現状の解析や実行可能な手段については 顧みられなかった。「目的を達成する事」のためこそが「大義名分」であり、 人々はそれに向かって奔走した。
This must be the spirit in which the alchemist or the utopian socialist would have answered the sceptic who questioned whether lead could be turned into gold or men made to live in model communities. これは疑問を持つ人々が錬金術者に「鉛は金に本当になるのか」とたずねたり、 空想的社会主義者が「人間はモデルどおりの社会に住むことができるのか」とか 尋ねられたときに、彼等が答えたときの心の持ちようと同じに違いない。
>>159 Part 18 まず英文の難しいところ和訳 Much that was said and written about international politics between 1919 and 1939 merited the structure applied in another context by the economist Marshall, 1919ねんから39年にいたる国際政治について言及されたり書かれたことの多くは 経済学者のマーシャルが別の背景において構築した構造をそのまま当てはめられる。
the economist Marshall, who compares (1)"the nervous irresponsibility which conceives hasty utopian schemes" to (2)the "bold facility of the weak player who will speedily solve the most difficult chess problem by taking on himself to move the black men as well as the white". 経済学者マーシャルは1)神経質な無責任さ(2)弱者の大胆な器用さ を比較した。 (1)軽率な理想主義的計画を内包する神経質な無責任さ。 (2)難しいチェスの問題(詰め将棋)を手っ取り早くやっつけるために、黒も 白も自分で動かしてしまうヘタクソなプレーヤーの大胆なる器用さ。
>>the real difficulties of the were scarcely manifest even to the keenest >>intelligence. タイポ スマソ。 the real difficulties of the GAME were ゲーム(ここの場合はInternational Politics) の本当に困難な事柄については 非常なる碩学にとってさえほとんど明白ではなかったのである。
ここでこのセクションのアタマの部分と最後とから文章をとり出して 読み比べてみましょう。 >>156 のラスト The initial stage of aspiration towards an end is an essential foundation of human thinking. The wish is father to the thought. Teleology precedes analysis. 結果に向かって進もうとする野心の最初の段階は人間の思考にとって重要な基礎となる。 願望は思考の父である。目的論は分析に先立つ。 >>159 のラスト The course of events after 1931 clearly revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis for a science of international politics, and made it possible for the first time to embark on serious critical and analytical thought about international problems. 1931年以後の出来事をみると、国際関係学と言う科学の基礎となるべき純粋な野心が 不十分であったことがはっきりしており、その一連の出来事が(史上)初めて国際問題に 関する真摯な批判的分析的思考を開始することを可能にしたのだ。
No science deserves the name until it has acquired sufficient humility not to consider itself omnipotent, and to distinguish the analysis of what is from aspiration about what should be. Because in the political sciences this distinction can never be absolute, some people prefer to withhold from them the right to the title of science. In both physical and political sciences, the point is soon reached where the initial stage of wishing must be succeeded by a stage of hard and ruthless analysis. The difference is that political sciences can never wholly emancipate themselves from utopianism, and that the political scientist is apt to linger for a longer initial period than the physical scientist in the utopian stage of development. This is perfectly natural. For while the transmutation of lead into gold would be no nearer if everyone in the world passionately desired to it, it is undeniable that if everyone really desired a "world-state" or "collective security" (and meant the same thing by those terms), it would be easily attained; and the student of international politics may be forgiven if he begins by supposing that his task is to make everyone desire it.
It takes him sometime to understand that no progress is likely to be made along this path, and that no political utopia will achieve even the most limited success it grows out of political reality. Having made the discovery, he will embark on that hard ruthless analysis of reality which is the hallmark of science; and one of the facts whose causes he will have to analyse is the fact that few people do desire a "world-state" or "collective security", and that those who think they desire it mean different and incompatible things by it. He will have reached a stage when purpose by itself is seen to be barren, and when analysis of reality has forced itself upon him as an essential ingredient of his study.
The impact of thinking upon wishing which, in the development of a science, follows the breakdown of its first visionary projects, and marks the end of its specifically utopian period, is commonly called realism. Representing a reaction against the wish-dreams of the initial stage, realism is liable to assume a critical and somewhat cynical aspect. In the field of thought, it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences. It tends to depreciate the role of purpose and to maintain, explicitly or implicitly, that the function of thinking is to study a sequence of events which it is powerless to influence or to alter. In the field of action, realism tends to emphasise the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, these forces and these tendencies.
Such an attitude, though advocated in the name of "objective" thought, may no doubt be carried to a point where it results in the sterilisation of thought and negation of action. But there is a stage where realism is the necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism, just as in other periods utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism. Immature thought is predominantly purposive and utopian. Thought which rejects purpose altogether is the thought of old age. Mature thought combines purpose with observation and analysis. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place.
リアリズムのインパクトでつか。そろそろ佳境に入るのかな no political utopia というふうに何度も同じように強調してますね。 その上で、リアリズム的な(?)考え方がどのようなものかについて書いてあるのかな。 function of thinking is to study a sequence of events which it is powerless to influence or to alter でつか。 チラッと英文を見た(つうか読めてないw)だけなので判然としませんが。
最初は科学という名を持つに足る資格として to distinguish the analysis of what is from aspiration about what should be を挙げていますね。またここでも「願望と現実の分析を区別すること」の重要性が述べられていますが。 以下、 しかし、政治科学においては完全な分離をすることはNEVERであるので、一部の人達は、政治学は科学とは呼べないとしている。 自然科学と政治科学の両者とも、そのうち初期状態にあたる願望の段階から、分析の段階へと移るのである。 その違いは、政治科学はユートピアニズムから自身を完全に抜け出すことが出来ないことである。 更に、政治科学者は自然科学者よりも、長く発展状態におけるユートピアニズムの段階に手間取る傾向がある。 しかし、これはとても自然なことである。 もし世界中の人が望んだとしても、鉛を金に変えることはできないが、もし世界中の人々が真に「世界国家(政府?)」や「集団保障」を望めば、 (それらが同じ意味でつかわれたらば)それらがより容易に達成されることは否定できないからである。 そして、もし国際政治学の研究者が supposing that his task is to make everyone desire it 皆がそれらを望むようにすることが自分の使命であると考えて研究を始めても それは許されることである。
それで、↑の部分はようはこの後そのユートピアンな研究者が現実の厳しさを知り、 そしてリアリストへと成長していく過程を描く前振りなのでしょうか。 その後、リアリズムの特徴を述べ、そして最終的に <where both have their place>ユートピアニズムとリアリズムの共生を勧める方向へと向かっていますね。
http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_746870.html?menu= [ German eel won't be evicted ] German officials have ruled that an eel can stay in a family bathtub. The decision in the city of Bochum means Aalfred the eel can continue to live with Richter family who have looked after him for 33 years. Animal rights activists had called for him to be set free. <ドイツのウナギは退去させられず> ドイツの当局はウナギは今までどうりある家族の風呂にいれると言った。 これによりウナギのアルフレッド君は33年の長きにわたって住み慣れた リヒター家を立ち去らなくても住むようになった。動物愛護運動家は 逃がしてやれと要求していた。 パウル・リヒターはこのウナギを捕まえたとき食べるつもりだったが 子供達に諭されて思いとどまった。一家は今もし彼を外に逃がせば 生きていけないと考えており、市当局はそれを認めた格好。 「風呂の中に雨樋パイプを入れたので、これでどっか隠れようと思えば そうできるわね。」と市の報道官はいった。
>>231 おきゅきゅきゅきゅ氏〜 それでも Lower Saxony で負けたのは痛かったようですよ。 自分が二期も知事をしていたところだし。 400万人の失業者抱えてしんどいでしょう。 そもそもグリーンの外務大臣が変すぎる。外交で点も稼ぎにくいですよー。 しかし国民には危機感がかけていると。エコノミストのこの表現がなんとも http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1563066 Some Germans say that worries about the country's economy are exaggerated and that calls for reform are led by outsiders who fail to recognise that life, for many Germans, remains relatively comfortable. It is this very lack of urgency which some economists have begun to compare with attitudes in sickly Japan. ドイツ人のなかには経済が悪い悪い、改革だと叫ぶのはよそ者が騒いでいるだけだ、 事実生活はだいたいにおいて快適だ、と言うものも多い。実はこの危機感のなさこそを 何人かのエコノミストが不況に喘ぐ日本人の態度と比較しはじめている点である。
The utopian is necessarily voluntarist:(ユートピアンは、必然的に自発的自由論者になる(??)) he bilieves in the possibility of more or less radically rejecting reality, and substituting his utopia for it and by an act of will. (彼は、強く現実を否定し、そして彼の理想を、意思の遂行によって現実に代えることのできる可能性を信じている。)
そこで 「Free Will か Derminism か」だが、 これはもう太古の昔から争われてきた西洋哲学の難問のひとつ。 是非下のリンクを読むことをおすすめしますです。 非常によくまとまっていていいですよ。 易しい英語で書いてあるので(哲学では稀なことです(^_^) 英語が苦手な方は翻訳サイトでも大丈夫かもしれません。 [ Free Will versus Determinism ] http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A776117
決定論の方は高校のときに宗教改革でカルヴァンの恐怖の「予定説」と 言うのをおぼえていますかね?あれもひとつの「決定論」ですね。 One might express determinism metaphorically by saying that there is a book in which everything that will happen is already written, or that the future already exists in the mind of God. メタな言い方をすれば一冊の本があって、 そこには全て起こることはもうかかれているとか、 あるいは神はもう既に全てを決定済みだとか言うこと(つまり変えようがない)
自由意志の方が実は定義が難しい、 っつーか自由意志は決定論があって始めてその定義が可能になるんですな。 Using some of the language from above, the 'book in which everything is written' is not already complete, but is only filled in as we make choices in the world. God's mind may contain some overall plan of the universe, but there is room within that plan for humans to decide their own fates. 全てが書かれている本と言うのは実は未完成で、 我々が自由意志で選ぶことによって完成する。 あるいは神はだいたいのものの有り様を決めているが、 そこには人間側が自分の運命を決める余地がある。
パキスタン解体はないでしょう、インドがある限りにおいてですが。 いつもながらにアメリカのむとんちゃくにはあきれます。 CIA とか何を見てるのかと思うことが多い(w 真実アメリカもタリ板の厨房ともども何もわかってないのかもしれんなあ(w イギリスはインド亜大陸には強い。 おそらく握ってる情報をアメリカには全部は渡してないでしょう。 イギリスでそもそも Asian というのはインド亜大陸系の インド、パキスタン、バングラ、スリランカのことなので、 日本人が I'm from Asia とか As an asian とか自己紹介すると、 はあ?みたいな反応が返って来るですよ。
(以下、リアリストの姿勢ですが適切な訳が出せません) he(=realist) goes on to show that, considered as aspirations, they are not PRIORI propositions, but are rooted in the world of reality in a way which the utopian altogether fails to understand.
ところが、ここからリアリストの欠点というべきものが明らかにされます。 すなわち、 but the realist, in denying any a PRIORI quality to political tehories, and in proving them to be rooted in practice, falls easily into a determinism which argues that theory, being nothing more than a rationalization of conditioned and predetermined purpose, is a pure excrescence and impotent ro alter the course of ivent.
>>295 >>事実の声明とみせて、実は(ここに良い訳が出せません) >>items in a political programme だとカーは言います。 「このような主張は、事実を述べたものに見せかけた政治的なプログラム (行動計画とでも言うべきかな)を構成する要素に過ぎない」ぐらいの訳ですかね。 夢と現実がグジャグジャになる中では、 何を言ってもそれは「我田引水」と言うことでしょうか。 だからそれは「イデオロギー」だと言うんですね。主義主張に過ぎんのであると。
>>297-298 ここで大事な議論は Thus for the realist, ではじまる文(ややこしい構造の文だが)の中の 「the ineptitude of sovereign states (is) the ideology of predominant Powers which find the sovereignty of the other states a barrier to the enjoyment of their own predominent position 」 主権国家(マンセー)のアフォらしい所は列強のイデオロギー(いい文)である。 すなわち列強がその強さを享受しようとすれば他国の主権国家(としての権利)が それを邪魔すると言う事だ
>> 館塾君 TOEFL おつかれ。この頃の得点スケールが昔と変わってて分からんのだが、 180というのは昔でどのぐらい?550ぐらいかな? IELTS は受けたことある?一度受けてみたらいいよ(高いけど) 京都は北白川に British Council もあるし、イギリス系の情報は手に入りやすい。
>>315 >政治的なプログラム(行動計画とでも言うべきかな) とかいたんですが、ここの部分、 These propositions are items in a political programme これはつまり極端に例えれば「選挙公約」みたいなもんで、 一応党の公約は達成できるはずと(純粋な)党員は思い、 作った幹部は「んなわけねーだろ」と思いつつも一応「努力目標」としよう、と。 日本国憲法第25条みたいなもんですな。(プログラム規定説か、なつかしい)
< The Intellectual and the Bureaucrat > このセクションの本題は官僚と言うものあり方と、彼等が学者達とぶつかってきた現象が、 どう影響しているかですね。 学者は理論を現実に当てはめようとし、官僚は「there are no general cases」と経験的に行動する。 学者について 「しかしユートピア主義の特徴的な弱点は政治学者の特徴的弱点でもある。 すなわち現存する現実、および自分たちの立てた基準がその現実に根づく(具体的な)方法を理解できないのである。」 官僚については 「It is worth remarking that both Machiavelli and Bacon were bureaucrat. マキャベリもベーコンも官僚だっった事を思い出そう」 うーん、なるほど。 「官僚は官僚だ。伝統を維持し、前例を「安全」と考える。こうして空虚な形式主義に 卑屈な首振り人形に、外からは何をやってるのかようと知れない手続きマンセー主義に と簡単に落ちていく危険性がある」
For the intellectual, the general principle was simple ans straightforward; the alleged difficulties of applying it were due to obstruction by the "experts". For the experts, the general principle is meaningless and utopian; whether armaments could be reduced and if so which, was a "practical" question to be decided in each case "on its meits". 学者にとって原則と言うものは単純で分かりやすいものだ。実際にそれを摘要しようとして問題が起こるのは「専門家」が邪魔するからだ。 「専門家」にとって、原則そのものが意味がなく、ユートピアンだ。軍縮が行われるとすれば、そしてもし行われるとして何を削減するかは個々の事情をかんがみた上での現実的選択であるからだ。
>>341言い出しっぺ氏 >「Average Value 」 ありがとうござイマスでつ。英語は全然ダメでつ。トホー それと、大恐慌期の話ですが、やはり、テミンの本とEssays on the Great Depression がよいかと。多分、イギリスの図書館ならあるでせう。インタゲの本は数式が出て くるのが確実な気がしまつ。もっとも、どの場合でもある程度の数式が登場してし まうかと思われまつが。。 まぁ、それを見なくても論旨さえ追えれば、、 やっぱり、図書館で本を見てみてから借りませう。
まず章のタイトルを出しますと 3. The Utopian Background 4. The Harmony of Interests 5. The Realist Critique 6. The Limitations of Realism
叩き台の三案は 1. Chap 3 から順々に読む 2. Chap 3 を自習にして、Chap 4 -6 をよむ 3. Chap 3 の全部と Chap 4 前半をを自習にし、 Chap 4 後半の The Common Interest in Peace, International Ecoomic Harmony, および Harmony broken を読んだあと、Chap 5-6 をよむ。
On December 23, 1913, the Federal Reserve System, which serves as the nation's central bank, was created by an Act of Congress. The System consists of a seven member Board of Governors with headquarters in Washington, D.C., and twelve Reserve Banks located in major cities throughout the United States.
ネオ根関連については以下のような概説本を見つけました。 * Mark Gerson. Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars. Madison Books, 1996. この本をとりあえず読み始めてます。やっぱり、元祖であるアービングクリストルの 著作(というよりかはエッセイ集)を読むのが大切だとは思うのですが、まあ、私自身の 読癖(?)もあって、概説書から・・・、とは言っても未だに40ページほどしか進んでいません。 ガーソン自身はネオ根仲間の中でも評価の高い執筆当時はイェールロースクールの学生だった 様でしたので、批判論集というわけではないようです。そういう類のものを探しては見たのですが、 ネオ根のイデオロギーとして密教的な性質ゆえなのかどうかはわかりませんが、未だにこれといっ てめぼしい物は見つかっていません。
>George W International たしか、最近就役した空母の名前を、大ブッシュにして人悶着があったかと思われ まつ。日本の軍艦にも名前の付け方があって、軍艦命名基準というでつ。 ttp://banners.cside.biz/army_word1.htm#か の、下のほう参照。天羅万象や、地名などを使用していまつ。
No political society, national or international, can exist unless people submit to certain rules of conduct. The problem why people should submit to such rules is the fundamental problem of political philosophy. The problem presents itself just as insistently in a democracy as under other forms of government and in international as in national politics; for such a formula as "the greatest good of the greatest number" provides no answer to the question why the minority, whose greatest good is ex hypothesi not pursued, should submit to rules made in the interest of the greatest number. Broadly speaking, the answers given to the question fill into two categories, corresponding to the antithesis, discussed in a previous chapter, between those who regard politics as a function of ethics and those who regard ethics as a function of politics.
というわけで 「倫理」と「政治」が Chap 3 で論じられていたことが分かります。 Chap 4 は ユートピアンの基盤を説明する章なので、 「倫理」がおよそ重要なテーマである事は間違いないでしょう。 こうして分かりやすい例を次に引っ張ってくることになります。
Those who assert the primacy of ethics over politics will hold that it is the duty of the individual to submit for the sake of the community as a whole, 倫理が政治を動かすと考える事は、個人が自分を殺して全体としての”善”に寄与する事 Those, on the other hand, who assert the primacy of politics over ethics, will argue that the ruler rules because he is the stronger, and the ruled submit because they are the weaker. 政治が倫理をこえる説は 支配者は強いゆえに支配し、被支配者は弱いから支配する (民主主義にこれを当てはめると) The majority rules because it is stronger, the minority submits because it is weaker. 多数派は強いから支配し、少数派は弱いから支配される。
こうして Obligation is thus derived from a sort of spurious ethic based on the reasonableness of recognizing that might is right. 強者は正しいと認識することは妥当な事であるとする、 いささか不純な倫理のようなものから(服従の)強制が由来することになる。
Both these answers are open to objection. Modern man, who has witnessed so many magnificent achievements of human reason, is reluctant to believe that reason and obligation sometimes conflict. On the other hand, men of all ages have failed to find satisfaction in the view that the rational basis of obligation is merely the right of the stronger.
One of the strongest points of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century utopianism was its apparent success in meeting both these objections at once. The utopian, starting from the primacy of ethics, necessarily believes in an obligation which is ethical in character and independent of the right of the stronger.
But he has also been able to convince himself, on grounds other than those of the realist, that the duty of the individual to submit to rules made in the interest of the community can be justified in terms of reason, and that the greatest good of the greatest number is a rational end even for those who are not included in the greatest number.
He achieves this synthesis by maintaining that the highest interest of the individual and the highest interest of the community naturally coincide. In pursuing his own interest, the individual pursues that of the community, and in promoting the interest of the community he promotes his own. This is the famous doctrine of the harmony of interests. It is a necessary corollary of the postulate that moral laws can be established by right reasoning.
The admission of any ultimate divergence of interests would be fatal to this postulate; and any apparent clash of interests must therefore be explained as the result of wrong circulation. Burke tacitly accepted the doctrine of identity when he defined expediency as "that which is good for the community and for every individual in it."
It was handed an from the eighteenth-century rationalists to Bentham, and from Bentham to the Victorian moralists. The utilitarian philosophers could justify morality by the argument that, in promoting the good of others, one automatically promotes one's own. Honesty is the best policy. If people or nations behave badly, it must be, as Buckle and Sir Norman Angell and Professor Zimmern think, because they are unintellectual and short-sighted and muddleheaded.
Ces deux r姿onses sont ouvertes d'objection. L'homme moderne, qui a 師 t士oin de tant d'accomplissements magnifiques de raison humaine, est peu dispos croire que la raison et l'engagement sont en conflit parfois. D'autre part, les hommes de tous les 曳es ont ne trouvent pas la satisfaction dans la vue que la base raisonnable de l'engagement est simplement le juste du plus fort. この二つの回答案に関する異議提出は可能だ。人間理性の素晴らしい成果の目撃者である現代人 は、時として表面化する理性と拘束(アンガージュマン/現実参加)との抗争にしり込みする。 言い換えると、人間はどの時代にあっても、理性的基盤としての拘束(アンガージュマン/現実参加) は単に最も強いものの正義であるという見方に満足できないでいるわけだ。
そこで Reason なんですが、 Modern man, who has witnessed so many magnificent achievements of human reason, is reluctant to believe that reason and obligation sometimes conflict.
ここで human reason と使ってるのを ね氏の仏語訳で 'de raison humaine' となってて初めて意味が分かるような気がしますが、 要するに「人間であることの意味」みたいな意味なのでしょうか。 そうするとここは訳しておられる通り「人間理性」が適訳のようですね。
でもやっぱり分かんないや(w もう一回 Obligation is thus derived from a sort of spurious ethic based on the reasonableness of recognizing that might is right. に戻りましょうか。 力が上か倫理が強いかの議論があって、急にここで突然 Obligation につづく上記の文がでてくるんですね。 (続く)
たくさん参考文献が載っていて興味深いわけですが、 読ませている文献が比較的新しいものばかりですね。この辺りはどんなものかな。 Politics among Nations が落ちてるのも気になるところですねえ。 時の審査をへてないモノばかりを学部卒レベルで読んでも片寄るような気がするけど。 - James E. DOUGHERTY et Robert L. PFALTZGRAFF, Jr. (1997) Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 4塾e edition, New York, Longman, Pp. 58-99. は いい教科書ですよ。
それは18世紀合理主義者からBentham へ、そしてBentham からビクトリア時代の道徳主義者へ手渡された。 ご都合主義哲学者はこの論理を行使し、他人の財産を優遇することで自動的に自分の富を増すという論法で 道徳性を正当化しえた。誠実は最良の政治戦略だ。ある民族なり国家なりがいい加減に振舞うとすれば、 Buckle and Sir Norman Angell and Professor Zimmern が考えるように、インテリジェンスに欠け、 近視眼的で、まぬけであるからにすぎないのです。 ね:いやむつかしい。 あと >One of the strongest points of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century utopianism was its apparent success in meeting both these objections at once. というのを 18世紀・19世紀理想主義の特性のひとつは、いっぺんにこれら二点の異議提出に遭遇し、 見かけ上の成功を得たことである。 とやっつけてみますた。ここを見かけだけ論破したって読みとこれが以降のご都合主義に通じるのかもしれん。
Obligation is thus derived from a sort of spurious ethic based on the reasonableness of recognizing that might is right. ねの勝手訳:こうしてObligationは、正しいかもしれないとリコガナイズされた合理的キャラの 上に構築された一種の間違った倫理から派生する。 →もともとの論理基盤である倫理が間違ったものであって、ここから派生するObligationは間違っ たものとならざるを得ないってことなのかなー、と言ってみるテスt。
後もうひとつの問題語は“right of the stronger” のright :権利なのか、 正義なのかあるいは権利=正義なのか。仏語ではjuste と droit に別れまつが、、、。
The utopian, starting from the primacy of ethics, necessarily believes in an obligation which is ethical in character and independent of the right of the stronger. 理想主義者は倫理原理から出発して、最強者の権利(あるいは正義)とは独立した倫理的性格 のobligationを必然的に信じるに到る。 ・・・・
こうやって見ていくと、Carr先生がここでやってる仕事は実に“哲学”ですね。 哲学っつーのはの各単語の意味規定で多くは決まってくるんで、訳はどうしても苦しい、読みにくいものになることが多い。 (言葉で作られたモデル、というか体系というか、、。) entre deux guerres; 二つの戦争にはさまれた時代の先生はそれまでの“歴史学”を超える“歴史哲学”という科学を 確立したがっているようにも見えます。
そこで実は先になってでてくるリアリストの立場からの Interest of Harmony に 対する批判があるんです。Chap 5 のまん中あたりなんですが ここで叩いた方が忘れなくていいと思うので(w ちょっと出します。
The doctrine of the harmony of interests yields readily to analysis in terms of this principle. It is the natural assumption of a prosperous and privileged class, whose members have a dominant voice in the community and are therefore naturally prone to identify its interest with their own. In virtue of this identification, any assailant of the interests of the dominant group is made to incur the odium of assailing the alleged common interest of the whole community, and is told that in making this assault he is attacking his own higher interests. The doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant position. But a further point requires notice. The supremacy within the community of the privileged group may be, and often is, so overwhelming that there is, in fact, a sense in which its interests are those of the community, since its well-being necessarily carries with it some measure of well-being for other members of the community, and its collapse would entail the collapse of the community as a whole. In so far, therefore, as the alleged natural harmony of interests has any reality, it is created by the overwhelming power of the privileged group, and is an excellent illustration of the Machiavellian maxim that morality is the product of Power.
The doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant position. 「Harmony of Interest は自らの支配的な地位を維持したいと望む 特権階級にとってまたとない、道徳にかなった道具として使われた」
But a further point requires notice. The supremacy within the community of the privileged group may be, and often is, so overwhelming that there is, in fact, a sense in which its interests are those of the community, since its well-being necessarily carries with it some measure of well-being for other members of the community, and its collapse would entail the collapse of the community as a whole. In so far, therefore, asthe alleged natural harmony of interests has any reality, it is created by the overwhelming power of the privileged group, and is an excellent illustration of the Machiavellian maxim that morality is the product of Power.
この「財産」と「富」ですが、おそらく英→仏翻訳サイトのいたずらだと思うんですが、 たぶん 翻訳ソフトが the good を goods(もの)と訳したのではないかとと思うんですが。 どんなもんでしょうか。
もう一回英語を出すと
>>473 の一部 The utilitarian philosophers could justify morality by the argument that, in promoting the good of others, one automatically promotes one's own.
もう一つ昔むかしの >>70-72>>177 English Speaking Countries の件ですが、 これ今ごろになって「チャーチルを皮肉ってるのかな」と思うんですよ。 彼が第一次大戦後に書いたのが「英語国民の歴史」だったでしょう。 これかなあ、なんて今ごろになって思ってるデス。 どんなもんでしょうね?
むむ、530のレジュメは原文、自分の翻訳文も見ないで書いたので自信ない、、、 The supremacy within the community of the privileged group may be, and often is, so overwhelming that there is, in fact, a sense in which its interests are those of the community, since its well-being necessarily carries with it some measure of well-being for other members of the community, and its collapse would entail the collapse of the community as a whole. の its intarest を支配階級の利益と解釈したですけんども、、
,,, dans lequel ses interets sont ceux de la communaute, puisque son bien-etre porte necessairement avec lui une certaine mesure de bien-etre pour d'autres membres de la communaute,, が翻訳エンジンの出した文でつ。
>>516 の The utilitarian philosophers could justify morality by the argument that, in promoting the good of others, one automatically promotes one's own. と >>533 の a sense in which its interests are those of the community, since its well-being necessarily carries with it some measure of well-being for other members of the community,
それにしても船橋さんは少し年をとったかなあ。 時代が時代だけにアメリカ総局長(ワシントン支局長?)してた頃の ようには行かないのは仕方がないにしても、 近年彼が「英語第二公用語」を言い出したときには「船橋よ、お前もか」と思ってしまいましたね。 岩波新書ですが、「なぜ公用語か」の論拠が弱くて全然説得されなかった(w まあ元本のひとつの(これも情けないなあ、元本がばれてる w) David Crystal 著 English as a World Language (ダッタかな、確認しますが)も 「なぜ英語なのか」には非常にイーカゲンなことしかいってないわけだが(w 自分のような「英語の時代だ」に異論を挟むつもりのない人間を説得できないんだからなあ(w
It was the laissez-faire school of political economy created by Adam Smith which was in the main responsible for popularizing the doctrine of the harmony of interests. The purpose of the school was to promote the removal of state control in economic matters; and in order to justify this policy, it set out to demonstrate that the individual could be relied on, without external control, to promote the interests of the community for the very reason that those interests were identical with his own. This proof was the burden of The Wealth Of Nations.
そしてこのあと例の Invisible Hand が出てくるわけですが (UP スレ英文にとんでもないタイプミスあり, lie → he の間違い、どうしてこんなミスが?)
The individual "neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.... he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention." 個人は意識して公共の利益に貢献しようとしたわけでも、 どのぐらい貢献しているかも知ったことではなかった。 個人は彼個人の利益だけを追求しているのであり、そうすることで意識はなくても、 見えざる手に導かれて公共の利益に貢献することになるのである。
The invisible hand, which Adam Smith would perhaps have regarded as a metaphor, presented no difficulty to Victorian piety. そしておそらくはアダムスミスがメタファーとして使った「見えざる手」は ビクトリア朝の道徳にぴったりだった、 と話は続くことになるです。
"We now know," wrote Mr. Henry Ford as recently as 1930, "that anything which is economically right is also morally right. There can be no conflict between good economics and good morals."
アダム・スミスは1759年の《The Theory of Moral Sentiments 》の中で、 同一の個人が、一方では個人的利益追求願望に導かれ、他方では自分の 社会的環境内での共通道徳に導かれて、結果として彼は《見えざる手》に プッシュされる形で、社会全体の利益に重なる行動をする、、、と言ってるらしいです。
The assumption of a general and fundamental harmony of interests is prima facie so paradoxical that it requires careful scrutiny. In the form which Adam Smith gave to it, it had a definite application to the economic structure of the eighteenth century. 原則としての利益協調の考え方は一見しただけでは何のコッチャわからんので しっかり見ていかなければならない。 アダムスミスが与えた形式によって、利益協調は19世紀の経済構造に非常に大きな影響を与えた。
うまく訳せませんが、ようするに Interest of harmony という考え方は アダムスミスのレッセフェールを通して19世紀の経済構造を形作った、と言うことのようですね。
蒸気機関はスミスが想定したのとは違う社会を作り出していく。 それは immobile, highly specialized, mammoth industries and a large and powerful proletariat more interested in distribution than in production. 固定的で、高度に細分化された巨大な産業社会であり、 また大規模で強力なプロレタリアートの集団は製造の最大化よりも富の分配の方に利害を有する
Once industrial capitalism and the class system had become the recognized structure of society, the doctrine of the harmony of interests acquired a new significance, and became, as we shall presently see, the ideology of a dominant group concerned to maintain its predominance by asserting the identity of its interests with those of the community as a whole. こうして産業資本主義と階級システムが社会の根幹として確立したとき、 harmony of interest のドクトリンは新しい重要性を帯びるようになった。 Harmony of interest は こうして社会においてその重要性を維持しようとする 支配グループが自らの利益を社会全体の利益と強調するのに使われるようになったのである。
"It was the continual widening of the field of demand which, for half a century, made capitalism operate as if it were a liberal utopia." 半世紀にわたってまるでその時代が自由主義理想今日でもあるかのように 需要は常に拡大を続けたのである。(スピノザ) 暗黙の了解としての限界なき市場の拡大こそが Harmony of Interest の理論に よって立つところであった。マンハイム博士が指摘したように車が道路が許容できる数を 超えない限り、交通整理は必要ないのであって、そのときがやってくるまでは道路を使う ものにとってはお互いに自然な利益協調を信じるのは簡単なことではないか。
大陸ではこのように時間は流れていないと言うのもあります。 1848年の革命は極論すれば「ダメだ、こりゃ」のムードを煽ってます。 (Carr がほんのすこし What is History でふれてますが) 革命挫折はナポレオン三世とマッツィーニとビスマルクを直接生んでくるわけだけれども その頃イギリスにはパーマストンが(しょぼー この辺のシンクロが苦しいです。
Yet Carr's own historical work, which I began reading under the inspiration of 'What is History?' was a real disappointment. ............ Unlike Gibbon, whose six volumes on 'The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' could be read with pleasure from start to finish, Carr's magnum opus defied any sane person to plough through from beginning to end.
There was Carr the journalist, ............there was Carr the bureaucrat, ............. 'What is History?' was obviously written by Carr the journalist, ........... 'A History of Soviet Russia' on the other hand was clearly written by Carr the bureaucrat,
Or was Carr simply dismissing the whole of history before modern times as irrelevant and uninteresting? Certainly on occasion he seemed to come close to this, for all his fondness for Classical allusions in his work.
これは私も感じました。 あの短い要約でも What is History にはほとんど触れずに ロシア革命史をえんえん叩いている(w 退屈だといって。
なんだかな(w 歴史家としてのCarrを認めない、とよめるんですよ。 歴史書を批判するのではなくて人間叩いてる感じですね。 What is History は良い、ジャーナリストとしてのCarr は良い。 しかしその前は木っ端役人だったではないか、とそんなふうに読めてしまって、 ま、わちきの読みが浅い(かつひねくれている)んでしょうが。
Under the growing strains of the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was perceived that competition in the economic sphere implied exactly what Darwin proclaimed as the biological law of nature - the survival of the stronger at the expense of the weaker. 競争がどんどん激しくなる19世紀の後半において、経済の世界での競争は ダーウィンが生物学上の法則として述べた事をそのままさしめすと考えられた。 すなわち強者は弱者の犠牲脳えに勝利し生き残る、ということだ。
The good of the community (or, as people were now inclined to say, of the species) was still identical with the good of its individual members, but only of those individuals who were effective competitors in the struggle for life. Humanity went on from strength to strength, shedding its weaklings by the way. 共同体(あるいは人々が呼びたがったいい方で言えば、種)における善は これまで同様そこに属する個人の善と同じだと考えられはいたが、 しかしその「個人」とは生に対する闘争において上手に生き残っていった強い人々をさすのであった。 人類はどんどん強くなっていく。その過程で弱いものをコソギ落としながら。
T. H. Green, the English Hegelian who tempered the doctrines of his master with concessions to British nineteenth-century liberalism, held that "no action in its own interest of a state which fulfilled its idea could conflict with any true interest or right of general society," 11 though it is interesting to note that the question-begging epithet "true," which in the eighteenth-century quotation is attached to the interests of the nation, has been transferred by the nineteenth century to the interest of the general society.
Universal free trade was justified on the ground that the maximum economic interest of each nation was identified with the maximum economic interest of the whole world. Adam Smith, who was a practical reformer rather than a pure theorist, did indeed admit that governments might have to protect certain industries in the interests of national defense.
そうしてもう一つ、現代の目からみればこうしたお気楽な考えが Adam Smith の経済政策の演繹と考えるのが面白いと思うんです。 それからやっぱりそれは「イギリス的なもの」であった事も興味深い。 しかしそれは所詮は時代の背景との interaction であって、 たまたまイギリスは Adam Smith 的自由放任を実施するに適した状況だったのか、 それとも自由放任に適した環境が状況が既にあって、 Adam Smith がそれを見つけただけなのか。
Among English writers who applied this evolutionary principle to international politics, the most popular was Bagehot:
Conquest is the premium given by nature to those national characters which their national customs have made most fit to win in war, and in most material respects those winning characters are really the best characters. The characters which do win in war are the characters which we should wish to win in war.15 15. Bagehot, Physics and Politics (2nd ed.), p. 215. What does "material" mean in this passage? Does it merely mean "relevant"? Or is the writer conscious of an uncomfortable antithesis between "material" and "moral"?
また別の高名な学者は情け容赦もなく以下のように書いている、とCarr はいってるんですが その後の英文のthe wreck of nations のあとににセミコロンが抜けていたり、 スペルの間違いがあるので、正確にはこうです。
The path of progress is strewn with the wreck of nations; traces are everywhere to be seen of the hecatombs of inferior races, and of victims who found not the narrow way to the greater perfection. Yet these dead peoples are, in very truth, the stepping stones on which mankind has arisen to the higher intellectual and deeper emotional life of today.17 進歩の道筋は累々たる国家の屍骸の間に見えている; それは劣った人種の、あるいはおおいなる完成への道を見い出せなかった犠牲者の 大虐殺の残骸としてあっちこっちに転がっている。 しかしそうして死んでいったものたちこそが、本当の意味において、 人類がより知的な高みを、より深い感情を目指す踏み石であるのだ。
ここではトライチュケと HS チェンバレンの人種および国家の淘汰が 述べられているんですが、 国家観の競争における淘汰が全体の善と言う考え方はこの国家を「個人」といいなおして考えることにつながる、と言うことですね。 "the basic problem of international relations was who should cut up the victims." (綴りミス cut tip ではない)
>>597-598 ね氏 すんません、フォロー有り難うございます。 きちんとしたれすは今晩しますが、一点だけ the dictrine itself died hard ですが これは「ドクトリンはなかなか死ななかった」です。 「しぶとく生き残った」ですね。 映画の「Die hard」と同じ意味です。
Balfour, approaching the problem from the angle of philosophy, concluded that バルフォアは哲学のアングルからこの問題を見て、そしていかの如く結論付けた。 "a complete harmony.......can never be provided by a creed 完全な調和はこの信条に基づいてはありえない。 between 'egoism' and 'altruism', between the pursuit of the highest happiness for oneself and the highest happiness for other people, (この二つは並列) エゴイズム(利己主義)と利他主義の間で、 すなわち自分の最高の幸福の追求と、他者の最高の幸福を実現する試みとの間で a creed which refuses to admit that 信条は以下の事を認めない the deeds done and the character formed in this life can flow over into another, この世での行いとこの世で形成された特徴(性格)があの世へ持ち越されること and there permit a reconciliation and an adjustment between (the conflicting principles which are not always possible here)." そしてここで(....)の間の和解と調整が許可される。 (ここではいつも可能ではないはずの対立する原則の)あいだで
とここまで英文を分解してしかし文法的な構造がやぱーり分からんで、 Housemate と二人して考え込むこと15分、どうもこういうことらしい。 this life とは this generation のようで、複雑な二重否定に迷わされるが admit をむしろ concede と読んで、その他いろいろ考えてこうなりますた。
Biologically and economically, the doctrine of the harmony of interests was tenable only if you left out of account the interest of the weak who must be driven to the wall, or called in the next world to redress the balance of the present.
tenable は家賃との関わり(テナントと同じ語源)があって、 account は口座、とか(会計)勘定 interest はここでは明らかに「利益」と「利子」のかけ言葉 gone(driven) to the wall は破産する call in は(管財人)を呼んでくる the balance of は 〜の残高
ただダーウィニズムとレッセフェールのコンビネーションがなぜ死んでいったかは 説明がチーと独りよがりな気がします。どうでしょうか。 Harmony of Interest が died hard だと書いてから、 Less and less was heard of the beneficent of free competition となるまでに バルフォアの引用ぐらいしかないのでは、ちょっと「我田引水」かな、とは思います。
しかし、とここでCarr 自身がでてきてこう言います。 But this is no excuse for barking the issue. To make the harmonization of interests the goal of political action is not the same thing as to postulate that a natural harmony of interests exists; and it is this latter postulate which his caused so much confusion in international thinking. それは言い訳に過ぎないのだ。利益を強調させることを政治行動の最終的ゴールと する事と、自然発生的な利益協調が存在すると仮定して考えることは別物だ。 しかしこの後者の「仮定」が国際間の問題を考える上で、混乱を引き起こしている。
・チェスの天才を多く抱えるロシアに対して地政学的チェスゲームを仕掛けて勝とうというのは、あま り利口な考えではない。(これはブレジンスキーの本へのイヤミ→ 《The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives》)
この二者の混同は、the House of CommonsにおけるMr.Attleeの発言が見事に示している “国際連盟設立の目的とはまさに平和維持、それが国際社会の共通利益なのだ。” Mr.Attleeは明らかに、自然利益コミュニティが存在しているという主張と、そういったコミュニ ティを作り出さすのが国際連盟の指名であるという主張を別個のものであるとは認識していない。
The statement that it is in the interest of the world as a whole either that the status quo should be maintained, or that it should be changed, would be contrary to the facts.
The statement that it is in the interest of the world as a whole that the conclusion eventually reached, whether maintenance or change, should be reached by peaceful means, would command general assent, but seems a rather meaningless platitude.
The utopian assumption that there is a world interest in peace which is identifiable with the interest of each individual nation helped politicians and political writers everywhere to evade the unpalatable fact of a fundamental divergence of interest between nations desirous of maintaining the status quo and nations desirous of changing it. (長々引用スンマソン)....
Politically, the doctrine of the identity of interests his commonly taken the form of an assumption that every nation has an identical interest in peace,
こいつはちょっと見ておかんと。<the doctrin of the identity of interests> ここまで読んで来て一度も the doctrin of the identity については書いてなかったぞ、ゴルァ! the identity of interests も言及がないぞ(バカヤロー) この状態で the doctrin of the identity of interests はどー考えろっちゅーんじゃ(ボケ
>Politically, the doctrine of the identity of interests his commonly taken the form of an assumption >that every nation has an identical interest in peace,
the doctrine of the identity of interests の<identity> は この際「非常によく似ていること」「同じこと」なのではないかと。 そうすると「(みんなの)利益は同じと考える教義」となるのではないかと思うんですね。
そう考えると Politically, the doctrine of the identity of interests has commonly taken the form of an assumption that every nation has an identical interest in peace, and that any nation which desires to disturb the peace is therefore both irrational and immoral. 「人間なんてどこへ行ってもたいして変わった事を考えるもんじゃないのさ」を 政治家的な文章にするとどうなるか、それは 「どの国も平和を望む」とか「平和をぶっ潰すとはなんとひでー香具師なんだ」 なんていう書き方になるんだ
>>627 アングロサクソン系単純化にはいつもプラスとマイナスサイドがあるように思います。 利点はすぐ分かっちゃう気がする。マイナスは多様性を許容できない。 イス・パレ問題のロードマップにしても、(以下略 でもって、メンドイ細部をエイヤッと斬って、はーいご苦労様でした、、にもってきやすい。 (米語会話だと “But, it depends on nya nya nya,,, ” と言い返すとちゃんと聞いてくれたりするんですがね)