不良債権問題の解決はヤクザの殲滅から避難所２

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ときはこちらを使用して下さい。

前スレ
不良債権問題の解決はヤクザの殲滅から避難所スレ
http://namidame.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/seiji/1219758744/

現行本スレ
不良債権問題の解決はヤクザの殲滅から87
http://namidame.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/seiji/1229227101/

依頼元URL
http://namidame.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/seiji/1228577212/116

２００３年のりそなショックをフォーカスしていたフィナンシャル・タイムズの記事


COMMENT & ANALYSIS: Resona's downfall: an auditor's death and a $17bn bail-out: Rescue culture will not solve problems
By Michiyo Nakamoto and David Pilling, Financial TimesPublished: Jun 13, 2003


It was a typically muggy spring afternoon when Satoshi Hirata, a young auditor with one of Japan's top accountancy firms,
arrived back at his flat in Toshima ward, central Tokyo. Dressed in a grey business suit, he took the lift to the 12th floor,
walked to the emergency stairway and, according to police reports, jumped from the building. There was no will and no suicide note.

Not even Mr Hirata's parents know for sure what drove him to his desperate act. But his apparent suicide appears to have been
intimately connected with the equally dramatic fall of Resona, Japan's fifth biggest bank, whose $17bn bail-out has sent tremors
through the entire banking system.

In the months leading up to April 24, the day he died, Mr Hirata had been part of a team conducting a preliminary audit of
Resona for Asahi, the KPMG-affiliated accountant and one of two firms looking into the bank's accounts. His work had helped to
uncover a gaping hole where Resona's capital ought to have been.

Two days before Mr Hirata's death, Asahi had all but decided it could not continue with the audit. That left Shin Nihon - the other,
Ernst & Young affiliated, auditor - with the sole responsibility of deciding Resona's fate. Three weeks later, after discussions with Shin Nihon,
Resona reluctantly accepted that it could not continue operations without a massive infusion of public funds.

Precisely what triggered this spectacular train of events is still the topic of heated debate, not to mention a parliamentary inquiry.
This week senior executives from Asahi, Shin Nihon and Resona - though not from the Financial Services Agency, the regulator - were summoned to Japan's Diet,
or parliament, to answer questions about the bank's demise. Specifically, they were asked about allegations that some FSA executives tried to influence
the auditing process to save Resona from the pain and embarrassment of a bail-out - an accusation that the FSA and the auditors all vehemently deny.

The full answers to these questions are yet to emerge - key figures in the bank's downfall blamed each other
this week in the Diet hearing - but are crucial for Japan's entire banking system.
That is because the decision to bail out Resona before it became insolvent could become a blueprint for
future pre-emptive capital injections into struggling banks (see right). It could also transform the role of
Japanese auditors, previously bit-players in regulating the financial industry.

In all of this, the role of Heizo Takenaka, the academic who heads the FSA, is shrouded in mystery.
Some politicians argue that Mr Takenaka has skilfully manoeuvred from behind the scenes, forcing Resona
into a corner and obliging it to beg for public funds. If that is true, he may have done so without
the consent of senior officials within his own agency, many of whom oppose his radical plans to shake up
the banking system.

Another possible explanation of Asahi and Shin Nihon's action is that the auditors themselves,
emboldened by Mr Takenaka and terrified by the fate of Arthur Andersen over its flawed auditing of
Enron, reluctantly took Resona's fate into their own hands.

If that is so, the Resona affair could in effect amount to the privatisation of Japanese banking regulation,
turning auditors into a powerful agent of policymaking.

The events that led to Resona's downfall can be traced back to September 30 last year. That was when
Mr Takenaka - a mop-haired university professor whom Junichiro Koizumi, prime minister, had already
controversially installed as economy minister - was also named head of the FSA. His remit was to do what
so many had tried and failed to achieve over the previous decade: clean up a banking system infested with
bad debts.

Mr Takenaka's arrival, bitterly opposed by some FSA officials as well as by many senior politicians within
Mr Koizumi's own Liberal Democratic party, was explosive. Within days the politically unconnected but
now extremely powerful minister began to talk about sweeping changes to the way banks were regulated.

Among his initial proposals were stricter assessment of banks' bad loans, already estimated at Y43,000bn ($360bn),
about 8 per cent of gross domestic product. Crucially, he raised the issue of deferred tax assets, the credits
on future tax payments that Japanese banks have been using with abandon to pad their capital base.

Mr Takenaka's proposal severely to restrict the use of such tax credits amounted to a declaration that
he intended to nationalise the banks, or at least force them to accept public funds. In one press interview,
he claimed that the era of government coddling was over and that no bank or company was considered "too big to fail".

Banks were so incensed by his perceived threat that they threatened to sue him. Politicians and public figures such as
Eisuke Sakakibara, who once ran Japan's yen policy, likened Mr Takenaka to a mad professor carrying out an untested
laboratory experiment on the fragile Japanese economy.

The political uproar forced Mr Takenaka to water down his policies. Or so it seemed. When his plan was at last announced on
October 30, instead of concrete policies on the stricter assessment of loans and the use of deferred tax assets he merely
promised further study of such issues. Richard Jerram, economist at ING and a veteran observer of Japan's start-stop economic policies,
said the document should be assigned to the rubbish bin with all the other failed bank clean-up plans.

Yet even then, close advisers to Mr Takenaka told sceptics that there was more to the package than met the eye.
The idea that he has been beaten back is nonsense, said one friend of the minister. "Takenaka-san has got virtually everything he wanted.
Just give it time."

In retrospect, it appears the minister's allies may have been referring to vague promises in the plan to assess banks' capital
more strictly and, perhaps decisively, a warning that auditors should carry out their work with "grave responsibility".

書き忘れてましたが、ソースはここです。
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=Resona++Rescue&y=5&aje=false&x=17&id=030613001036&ct=0

That message was reinforced in February when Akio Okuyama, head of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
told members they must assess banks' books more strictly. In remarks barely noticed at the time, but now considered crucial,
he specifically brought up the issue of deferred tax assets that was to prove Resona's downfall.

While these political storms were blowing, Resona was quietly putting the finishing touches to the long-drawn-out merger
that created it. In March, signs belonging to Daiwa and Asahi, the two main merging banks, were being replaced by a bright
green logo bearing an unfamiliar name: Resona. Soon it would be on everybody's lips.

The merger was one of a series being orchestrated by the government to reduce the nation's top 13 banks to
just five - a reflection of Japan's shrinking economy and the need for its financial sector to hunker down.

The main partner in Resona was Daiwa, which had retreated to its base in the industrial city of Osaka, central Japan,
after a 1995 scandal in which one of its New York traders lost $1.1bn in a series of fraudulent deals.
Daiwa, which later swallowed several smaller banks in Japan's Kansai region, of which Osaka is the hub, was now taking over Asahi,
another struggling bank based in the Tokyo area.

Like all their peers, Daiwa and Asahi were weighed down with bad debts, which made up about 10 per cent of
their loan books even after years of aggressive write-downs. Many of those dated back to reckless lending during the bubble years,
when banks were falling over themselves to provide companies with money based on what turned out to be grossly overvalued collateral.
New bad loans were also being conjured up by persistent deflation, which has dogged Japan's economy since 1995 and
makes it progressively harder for borrowers to repay loans from shrinking revenues.

Asahi was supposed to be the weaker of the two banks. But Daiwa looked in pretty bad shape too. It had lent heavily
to several grandiose and now loss-making government-led schemes, such as the World Trade Centre, built on an artificial island.
It was also massively exposed to small and medium companies in Kansai, once the engine room of Japan's economy
but now the region most threatened by competition from cheap foreign producers, especially China.

These problems were more or less familiar to all Resona's peers. But, in one fatal respect, Resona was more vulnerable still.
At other banks, deferred tax assets made up about half of capital, a level high enough to raise serious concerns at ratings
agencies such as Fitch. But at Resona this figure rose to an alarming 77 per cent of capital.

The problem for Resona was that auditors, galvanised by changes in Japan and in post-Enron America,
had suddenly become a lot tougher.

Like all their peers, Daiwa and Asahi were weighed down with bad debts, which made up about 10 per cent of
their loan books even after years of aggressive write-downs. Many of those dated back to reckless lending during the bubble years,
when banks were falling over themselves to provide companies with money based on what turned out to be grossly overvalued collateral.
New bad loans were also being conjured up by persistent deflation, which has dogged Japan's economy since 1995 and
makes it progressively harder for borrowers to repay loans from shrinking revenues.

Asahi was supposed to be the weaker of the two banks. But Daiwa looked in pretty bad shape too. It had lent heavily
to several grandiose and now loss-making government-led schemes, such as the World Trade Centre, built on an artificial island.
It was also massively exposed to small and medium companies in Kansai, once the engine room of Japan's economy
but now the region most threatened by competition from cheap foreign producers, especially China.

These problems were more or less familiar to all Resona's peers. But, in one fatal respect, Resona was more vulnerable still.
At other banks, deferred tax assets made up about half of capital, a level high enough to raise serious concerns at ratings
agencies such as Fitch. But at Resona this figure rose to an alarming 77 per cent of capital.

The problem for Resona was that auditors, galvanised by changes in Japan and in post-Enron America,
had suddenly become a lot tougher.

Mr Hirata, who had once been seconded to the FSA as a bank inspector, must also have been struck by
Resona's heavy dependence on tax credits. The bank's calculations were based on optimistic assumptions
about its future profits, from which these tax credits could be deducted. But such assumptions were
difficult to square with the fact that Resona had been bleeding red ink for three years in succession.

So grave were the doubts at Asahi that, at a meeting held on April 22, just two days before Mr Hirata's death,
the audit committee concluded that Resona could not claim any deferred tax assets at all. That rendered
the bank in effect insolvent. Rather than send Resona to its doom, Asahi decided to pull out of the audit,
leaving Shin Nihon in sole charge of the bank's fate.

Only senior regulators and Resona bankers knew about Asahi's dramatic withdrawal. If the public had been informed,
it would have sent a wave of panic across Japan's banking system. Yet even at this late stage, Yasuhisa Katsuta,
Resona's politically influential president, thought his bank could persuade auditors to sign off the accounts.

As Japan prepared for its annual Golden Week holidays - a time when city-dwellers return to their home towns
and business grinds to a halt - Resona had no idea what was about to hit it.

On May 5, the last day of the holiday, Shin Nihon decided that it too could not accept Resona's deferred tax assets
in their entirety. As a result, the bank's capital adequacy requirement would fall well below the legal minimum of
4 per cent, it concluded. On the following day, Shin Nihon met Resona's executives and dropped the bombshell.

"Mr Katsuta called this a betrayal," says Shunji Koike, a prominent Osaka businessman who this month was named
an external auditor of Resona. "Before Golden Week, it had all been accepted . . . but after Golden Week,
we were notified by Shin Nihon that they had to be more strict."

Even at this stage, there appear to have been attempts to save Resona. According to leaked memos that have
since been distributed in parliament, senior FSA officials encouraged Resona to go back to Shin Nihon and
persuade the auditor to change its mind.

That, according to Kouhei Ohtsuka, an opposition member of the upper house of parliament, was a breach of
the Securities and Exchange Law and could lead to action from the prosecutor's office. "This is Japan's Enron,"
he says. "But in Japan, the regulator tries to stop auditors from doing what they need to do."

日本語でおk

>>13 カキコありがとうございます。フィナンシャル・タイムズの記事原文をアップしてます。
私自身が翻訳できればいいのですが、とても忙しくて手がまわりません。機械翻訳は、文脈が
めちゃくちゃですから、もし英語の得意な方がおられたら、ぜひ和訳にご協力ください。

There was a considerable gap between Shin Nihon's decision on May 5 and the government's shock announcement
on May 17 that it would have to bail Resona out. "During this time, there was a heated debate between the bank
and the auditors," says Mr Koike. "But in the end, the auditors would not listen to Mr Katsuta."

Mr Koike is not alone in thinking that the death of Mr Hirata, who had friends within the FSA, could have played
an important part in determining the eventual outcome. "Partly because of the suicide, Asahi pulled out of the audit
and Shin Nihon had no choice but to comply [with the stricter assessment]," he said. One political analyst who has
closely followed the Resona affair described Mr Hirata's suspected suicide as a dramatic gesture designed to persuade
his seniors that Japan could no longer afford to keep covering over the cracks.

As a result of the bail-out, the government now controls 70 per cent of Resona. Some 140 of the bank's senior executives,
including Mr Katsuta, have been forced to resign.

It is still far from clear whether the potential scandal surrounding the Resona bail-out will escalate
or quietly fizzle out. If accusations spread, Mr Takenaka might seek to strengthen his position by purging
the FSA of those who oppose his methods. On the other hand, as head of the agency, Mr Takenaka - already
a target of senior LDP politicians - could find himself having to take responsibility.

What is more, there are serious doubts that the $17bn bail-out with public funds can really transform Resona
into a successful bank. The former Daiwa and Asahi banks received a total of Y1,100bn in public funds in 1998 and 1999,
yet the revival plans they drew up at that time have failed in spectacular fashion.

In all of the uncertainty, one thing is patently clear. Japan's big four banks, whose problems are not materially
different from those of Resona, will be watching hawk-eyed as events unfold. If Mr Takenaka hangs on and the Resona
bail-out proceeds smoothly, it may only be a matter of time before auditors are unleashed on one of them.

There is already talk about the possibility of Resona, The Sequel. Resona's problems were marginally
worse than those at Japan's other big banks - but only just. It is not too far-fetched to imagine
the same thing happening to one of the big four banks in the future, only on a larger scale.

One of the criticisms of Resona's rescue is that the government did not articulate a policy for bank bail-outs;
instead it passed responsibility on to the auditors.

Yet from the fog, a blueprint is emerging.

The Financial Services Agency is preparing a rule that would allow it to inject public funds into banks
without declaring a systemic crisis.

This could also allow it to bail out banks without sacking managers, which might soften opposition from bank executives.

This will not please those who object to the handling of the Resona bail-out.

↓ここに、植草氏の名前が出ています。さすが世界のフィナンシャル・タイムズ！！りそな問題の本質をしっかり
とらえているのがわかります。

First, there is the issue of moral hazard. Kazuhide Uekusa, professor at Waseda University, complains
that shareholders of Resona should have been punished through a capital write-down. By allowing shareholders
to get off with almost no penalty, he says, Japanese investors are free to prop up any bank they choose,
safe in the knowledge that the government will bail them out.

Second, it is unclear what kind of bank is being created by the bail-out. It could become a hardbitten model
of banking efficiency. More probably a well capitalised Resona would be used as a means of dispensing subsidies
to hard-hit small and medium-sized enterprises in the depressed Kansai region. In a few years the bank could be
in terrible shape all over again.

Bankers are furious at the Resona bail-out for another reason. They complain that Japan's tax system is
punitive for struggling banks. Rule changes to deferred tax assets should be compensated for by more
generous tax treatment, they say. That would allow them to keep doors open, at least for now, without fresh funds.

Paul Sheard, economist at Lehman Brothers, says that from a macroeconomic perspective it is all the same.
Whether by tax rebates, a Resona-style bail-out or full nationalisation, the central truth remains that
banks need more capital, he says.

Resona proves Japan has the wherewithal to pay, he argues. Not only is there another Y13,000bn ($110bn) where
the Resona funds were drawn from, but because of deflation, says Mr Sheard, Japan has a "free lunch option" of
printing as much money as it needs to recapitalise the banks. On its own that is not enough. Macroeconomic and
monetary policies are needed too.

But Mr Sheard, for one, cannot wait for Resona, Part II.

俺も英語は苦手ｗ
誰か頼む。

日本語で書いて

◆非常事態◆非常事態◆非常事態◆

　http://changi.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/ms/1229837234/3-10
　●【消費者庁】案＝【企業向けの人権擁護法案】●

◆非常事態◆非常事態◆非常事態◆

よくある春の午後，日本有数の会計事務所勤務の平田悟は
中央区豊島の自宅マンションに戻った。グレーのスーツ姿で
エレベーターで12階まで昇り，非常階段から身を投げた。
捜査報告によれば遺書はなかった。

平田の両親でさえ自殺の心当たりが全くなかったが，自殺の兆候は
5大メガバンクのひとつであり，公的資金を注入した
リソナ銀行の劇的な経営危機と密接な関連があった。

自殺から遡る数ヶ月前から，平田はリソナの会計担当チームの
一員であった。彼の仕事でリソナのあるべき
資本ギャップが明るみになったのだ。

平田の死の二日前，朝日会計事務所が会計監査から手を引く事を決めた。
残る新日本とErnst & Young affiliatedがりそなの命運を握る事になった。
2週間後，新日本との議論の末にりそなは公的資金の注入をしぶしぶ受け入れた。

「spam」
http://blog.drecom.jp/cheerleaderkamo/img/444/spam.jpg

ネットゲリラ 伊豆グルメ 　「スパム丼」　！！！
http://shadow-city.blogzine.jp/photos/uncategorized/2009/01/04/dsc_1895.jpg

記事
http://shadow-city.blogzine.jp/net/2009/01/post_2f57.html

まさに，この劇的な一連の出来事は，議会での調査だけでなく
今でも熱い議論の種である。
今週，りそな，朝日，新日本の経営幹部はりそな消滅にかんして議会に召喚された。
金融庁幹部が監査の過程で，痛みをともない困惑するような救済案（金融庁や会計士が
激しく抵抗したとされる告発がある）からりそなを救済するように仕向けた件についてである。

　　 ∧l二|ﾍ
　　（・ω・　）　　←に土産を持たせてどこかのスレに送ってください
　./￣￣￣ﾊ
　|　　福　 | |
　|　　袋 　| |,,,....
　 ￣￣￣￣

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.

ネットゲリラさん 伊豆グルメ　「丸勝製麺所の黄蒸し麺」！
http://shadow-city.blogzine.jp/photos/uncategorized/2009/01/08/dsc_1916.jpg

記事
http://shadow-city.blogzine.jp/net/2009/01/post_3f77.html

なにこの韓流スレw

なにこの韓流スレw

　不良債権の「元凶」が「ヤクザ」だとしれば、アメリカの場合はどんな「ヤクザ」が・・・・・・

　米国の「貨幣乗数」(マネー・マルチプライヤ:Money multiplier) が「１」を下回っていると逝う事は・・・・・・
「マネーサプライ (M1) = 現金通貨 + 預金通貨」が「ハイパワードマネー = 現金通貨 + 準備預金残高」
を下回っているって事なんですよね。これは米国の市中銀行のお金が中央銀行に留まっている、貸すに貸せ
ない状況だって事なんでしょうか。
　不良債権処理を強力に進めないとダメだって事でしょうか。「不良資産救済プログラム」(TARP:Troubled
Asset Relief Program) だけでは手ぬるいって事なんでしょうか。その上で「大型景気刺激策」で強制的に
需要を生み出さないと逝けないんでしょうか。それをやる「景気刺激策＝財政出動」となれば借金（米国債の
起債残高）が増えるわけで、それも困りモノですがそうは逝っていられないのでしょうか・・・・・・・。

松竹DVD倶楽部
http://www.shochiku-home-enta.com/shop/item_detail?category_id=0&item_id=212398

不良債権問題の解決はヤクザの殲滅から９０
http://namidame.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/seiji/1231904470/l50

.

ほす

今に見ておれ　でございますよ

不良債権問題の解決はヤクザの殲滅から91
http://namidame.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/seiji/1232886597/l50

.

★人権擁護法案はフェミなどが押す。フェミが制圧した内閣府に権力集中の法案は超危険★

http://mobile.seisyun.net/cgi/read.cgi/news21/news21_news2_1139339503
>2 名前：朝まで名無しさん mailto:sage [2006/02/08(水) 04:13:20 ID:EQwiRo9D]
>865 ：○男女じゃなくて「女男」だよbyジェンフリ教科書 ：2006/02/08(水) 01:31:09 ID:TdS2J/MU0
>おまえらさあフェミの実力を舐めすぎてない？　（まあ付き合ってくれ）
>こないだの選挙の「女性枠」だってなにも小泉・武部の発明品じゃなくて、
>「クオータ制」といって、世界中のフェミの政治目標の一つだ。
>北欧フェミ先進国やフランス、韓国では法律で強制導入されてる。
>内閣府男女共同参画局のフェミが小泉に入れ知恵したんだよ。
>過激フェミ学者のブレーンが大量にいる。
>予算の額みたらわかるだろ、舐めたらいかん。
>男女参画局なんてこの世になかった10年前とは様相が一変してんだよ。
>国家総予算が年間82兆円のとこ、
>10兆円の予算を支配浪費/しかも毎年増額してんだから。
>さらにｽｰﾊﾟｰ省庁として全省庁/審議会に過激メンバーが出向。
>
>ほんの一例だがｱﾌｧｰﾏﾃｨﾌﾞｱｸｼｮﾝ（女性優遇措置）によって、
>総官庁の�T種公務員の採用率も、
>（最も採用率の高い）東大生より、女性の方が全然高くなってるのが現状。
>愛知博のキャラもこいつ等の干渉によって、
>メスみたいな方（ｷｯｺﾛ）が左になった（Korea-Japanだね）。
>

>
>今度の女性・女系も推進の最大勢力は間違いなく●内閣府男女参画のフェミであって、
>そのバックで皇室廃止をもくろむ極左・創価がプッシュしているに過ぎない。
>フェミの中心勢力は皇室廃止の動機はないはず。
>女性or女系がダメというのは、ｷﾁｶﾞｲﾌｪﾐにとって脊椎反射で
>屈辱の「女性差別」なので血眼になってんだよ。
>
>3 名前：朝まで名無しさん mailto:sage [2006/02/08(水) 04:14:02 ID:EQwiRo9D]
>ｶﾌﾞﾄﾑｼのｵｽをﾒｽより高く売ったと猛抗議してｽｰﾊﾟｰ店長をｸﾋﾞにさせたような連中が、
>●権力中枢になだれ込んだ。 半分だまし討ちでね。97-99年のことだ。
>「女男」という表記に徹する教科書も最近複数登場。
>「慰安婦」問題も黒幕はむしろフェミ。
>参画のｼﾞｪﾝﾌﾘと戦ってきた最大の功労者は神社本庁、次いで産経の正論。他は微々たるものだ。
>ここ僅か数年で爆発的に強力になったフェミに対し、
>時代の風潮もあって多くの保守派が油断したのが、
>ついに今回の悲劇を招いたんだよ。天王山をやられた。
>
>小泉の最大支持は女性層であって、
>この辺を参画局のブレーンが強烈に焚き付けているはず。
>夢の圧勝を再びと刷り込まれてるはずだ。前回恩も売ったしな。
>安倍さんは反ｼﾞｪﾝﾌﾘだから、利用しやすいﾊﾞｶな宰相の間に改正と、血眼になってる。
>これが「何故気違いのように今急ぐか」という疑問への回答。
>人権擁護法も起草の中核は部落とフェミ。

★内閣府に橋頭堡を築き、そこから因縁つける口実を確保し、全省庁に因縁つけて、★
★それにより政府・国全体に、干渉体制を敷き、恐怖統治で乗っ取って行けるという、★
★【男女共同参画】で成功の戦法踏襲が【消費者庁】>>3-10　【内閣府人事局】構想?!★
↓
ttp://saku　ra4987.exb　log.jp/3015841/
内閣史上初のフェミニズム専任大臣が出現
■>...新設される内閣府の中に「男女共同参画会議」を置くことを強硬に主張する。
⇒>「他省庁を指示する権限のある司令塔を」といふ猪口の計略は成功し、
■>内閣府には男女共同参画に関する総合調整機能が与へられ、男女共同参画会議は、
■>経済財政諮問会議などと並ぶ内閣府の四大会議のひとつに位置づけられた。
■>そして、男女共同参画社会基本法と中央省庁等改革基本法によつて、
■>我が国は強大な権限を有するフェミニズム司令塔を持つことに...

ttp://ameb　lo.jp/jenderfree/entry-10012800498.html
フェミニズム批判-内閣府男女共同参画会議の恐るべき戦略 ...
■>...予算を付けなければいいんです。ここで削るわけですから、公共事業でも
■>どこでもこれは全体を通して聖域なき事業の見直しをするわけですから、
⇒>内閣府は、ではいいよ、君のところはもう切りますよという力を持っているわけです。
■>人事権を持っていることと、おまえのところはつぶすぞという力を持っていることと、
■>言うことを聞かなかったら金を召し上げるぞということをやるのは、これは
⇒>大変大きな力ですので、ある面では有無を言わさず言って聞かせるという...

●そもそも「改革」なら省庁は削減のはずが次々と庁局が作られる異常さ、背後に外圧?●
◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆
◆改善のようで実は、【内閣府人事局】が官僚人事を事実上独占して一元管理するので◆
◆【内閣府人事局】を制する者(外患)が官僚機構を全て恫喝統治する独裁国家へ移行!◆
◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆
▲渡辺喜美は外患の方を向いてる。
↓http://namidame.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/seiji/1232806672/
↓【民間独裁】公務員制度改革【外資族渡辺喜美】
●マスゴミが「居酒屋タクシー」と叩いたのは、官僚の抵抗を悪と思わす世論操作
↓http://news24.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/wildplus/1212767418/
↓【社説】居酒屋タクシー税金でいい思いは許されない
↓http://mamono.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/newsplus/1212768145/
↓国家公務員制度改革基本法案、成立
↓>...▲渡辺喜美行革担当相は審議で「３年以内に法制上の措置...
●官僚は抵抗。利己的動機だが今回は国益と一致。
↓http://unkar.jp/read/mamono.2ch.net/newsplus/1226490846
↓内閣人事局への移管、13部局が拒否
●麻生の認識は不明だが、官僚の抵抗で先送りか
↓http://gimpo.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/wildplus/1227884833/
↓麻生首相が指導力を発揮せず､内閣人事局の設置が2010年度に先送り
●自民内の売国勢力も内閣/官僚バッシング
↓http://anchorage.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/liveplus/1232080260/
↓渡りあっせん容認の政令「不可」 自民行革本部
★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★
★[韓国]は大統領も議会もカザリ、KCIA【韓国中央情報部：現国家情報院】が代理統治★
☆　http://like700.hp.infoseek.co.jp/22.html (歴代アメリカ大統領達と文鮮明集団の…)☆
★[米国]も大統領も議会もカザリ、実は【外交問題評議会(CFR)】が代理統治とされる。★
☆　http://tak0719.hp.infoseek.co.jp/qanda3/The_Illuminati_Agenda.htm　それと同様に☆
★[日本]も実質、【内閣府人事局】が独裁代理統治する植民地に作り変えられるのか?!★
★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★非常★事態★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★

http://www.3bs.jp/model/patho/j15.htm

●バトル（官僚+各族議員+麻生 vs 外資族議員+マスゴミ?!）●今回は官僚側が国益を代表；

http://anchorage.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/liveplus/1232715773/
【政治】人事院総裁　甘利行革相との会談で内閣人事局への「公務員の任用や給与に関する企画立案」の機能移管に難色
http://gimpo.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/wildplus/1232785888/
【政治/行革】内閣人事局バトル白熱［01/24］
http://mamono.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/newsplus/1233209968/
【政治】麻生首相「公務員OBの『渡り』、今後は認める考えない」…自民・細田幹事長への答弁
http://gimpo.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/wildplus/1233234430/
【政治】「工程表」決定、来週以降に先送り＝自民から異論−公務員改革[01/29]
http://gimpo.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/wildplus/1233235155/
【政治】ようやく言った麻生さん…退職した国家公務員が天下りを繰り返す「渡り」あっせん全面禁止
http://gimpo.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/wildplus/1233237212/
【自民行革本部】公務員改革「工程表」の決定を先送り
http://gimpo.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/wildplus/1233352543/
【政治】公務員改革、工程表の決定先送り　行革相「役人なぜ来ない」…人事院総裁徹底抗戦の構え［01/31］
http://gimpo.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/wildplus/1233590474/
【政治】公務員改革「工程表」政府案　修正せず決定へ
http://mamono.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/newsplus/1233552685/
【公務員改革】 人事院・谷総裁「当面は辞めるつもりない」と、辞任の考えがないことを強調
http://anchorage.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/liveplus/1233628215/
「工程表」人事院反対のまま決定　政府公務員制度改革本部　[02/03]
http://mamono.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/newsplus/1233639355/
【谷公士６８歳】「法案出すのは政府だが最終的には国会判断だ」　人事院総裁、日本国政府を牽制

報道が抑え込まれる中、【内閣府人事局】作戦も重大局面に

http://namidame.2ch.net/test/read.cgi/seiji/1232806672/3
■【危険法案情報】
□　憲法１５条（公務員の公正中立）違反の内閣人事局を潰してください。
□　この法案は国籍法と同じように、自民党内論議を経ずに、
□　民主党案の「省庁幹部人事権の内閣府人事局一元支配」をいきなり
□　渡辺喜美が丸呑みする形で、大島や山岡という与野党の国対が談合して、
□　衆院の審議わずか２時間で通過してしました。
■　公務員の公正中立を確保すべきという付帯決議が１５個もつきました。
□
□　今、渡辺と甘利、麻生が付帯決議や憲法１５条を無視する形で
□　省庁幹部人事権を人事院から内閣人事局に移そうとしてます。
！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！！