(Reuters) - To reach its strict climate targets and fulfill Chancellor Angela Merkel's nuclear exit plans, Germany needs to avoid coal and build a stack of gas power plants to secure clean energy supplies beyond 2020. Yet the challenge facing Merkel's new environment minister Peter Altmaier, his predecessor fired this week following a disastrous state election defeat, is finding a way to make gas an attractive option while coal remains the more profitable way to produce electricity for Europe's biggest economy. ドイツは2020年を目標に脱原発と温暖化阻止(Co2削減)を掲げてエネルギー政策を進めてきたが、メルケル政権は一部の地方選挙で 敗退し、天然ガス火力を検討し、石炭火力が最も利益率の高い発電方式となっている
Germany's energy mix is undergoing sweeping changes, with massive growth in solar and wind, and a law on phasing out nuclear set to erase 12,696 megawatts (MW) of atomic power over the next decade. Germany needs to make up for that loss, some 15 to 20 percent of the country's electricity needs, by importing more or building new power plants using gas or coal. ドイツは原子力発電所を今後10年余りでフェーズアウトするために、電力需要の15−20%に相当する原発の代替えを行う発電所を必要 としている。電力を他国から輸入するか、或いは天然ガスないし石炭火力発電所の建設が検討されている
Environmental considerations would make gas the clearcut choice over coal, as it pollutes far less. Germany aims to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. But then there is the need to create power while making a profit, and on that front coal wins. Electricity from coal for sale in 2013 is more than 16 euros per megawatt-hour (MWh) more profitable than generating it from gas, according to Reuters data. 地球温暖化阻止の観点から石炭火力を避けるというのが従来の明確な方針であり、2020年にドイツはCo2排出を1990年レベルの40%削減 を目標としている。しかし(輸入化石燃料の価格上昇で)石炭火力が発電所にとってもっとの利益の多い発電方式になっている。2013年 の見通しでは石炭火力は天然ガス火力よりもMWHあたり16ユーロ利益が大きい。(天然ガス発電のコストが高い)
Another stumbling block for gas has been the failure of the carbon market to spur a move to greener energy and away from sources such as coal. Under the European emissions trading scheme, large polluters must buy carbon emissions certificates for each ton of CO2 equivalent they emit, a system that favors clean gas over coal. But carbon prices are currently below 7 euros a metric ton, while Reuters research shows that prices would have to top 35 euros in order to make German gas-fired power generation more attractive than coal. "We need more long-term investment (in power plants), but at 6 to 8 euros for a metric ton of CO2 there is no price signal (to invest in cleaner technology)," the European Commission's Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger told the Reuters summit. Gas-fired power plants, in fact, lose money during baseload hours (24-hour supply), only turning a profit at the higher-priced hours of peak demand (0800-2000 local time). 石炭火力の利益率向上のもう一つの要因は欧州の排出権取引市場でCo2排出権の価格が暴落して、従来石炭火力のコスト要因であったこの 排出権部分が減少していることである。Co2排出権は現在トン当たり7ユーロであるが天然ガス火力が石炭火力とコスト的におなじになるに は、この値が35ユーロである必要がある。天然ガス火力はベースロード時間では赤字になり、電力価格の高いピーク時間帯 (0800-2000 local time)でのみ利益が出る。
Generous renewable energy subsidies have led to a boost in wind and solar power generation in Germany, but this only means even more competition for the gas sector. 政府の補助金のお陰でドイツは太陽光発電や風力発電などの再生可能エネルギーを大きく増やしてきたが、これらの発電方式では天然ガス 火力よりも更にコストが高い。
天然ガス価格は世界的なシェールガス開発とか、アゼルバイジャンやイラン、イラク、キプロス他からの天然ガスとか、今後の諸般の状況に よって低下することはあり得る。しかし、将来はそうである可能性があるにせよ、 In the meantime, if new gas power plants can't be built to compete with coal in Germany, then the country must fill its looming capacity gap by other means. それまでの間に、天然ガス火力が石炭火力に価格的に対抗できないのであれば、電力を供給するための施設を(=石炭火力を)建設せざるを 得ない(後略)
ギリシャの(主要産業である)観光業界について、ビジネス・インサイダーの記事 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ttp://www.businessinsider.com/rumors-denials-and-visions-of-chaos-in-the-eurozone-2012-5 A return to the drachma?and its rapid devaluation?would do wonders, however, for Greece's tourism industry, the second largest industry after shipping. In 2011, the number of international visitors actually rose by 9.5% from the prior year, and they spent 9.3% more. The industry is hugely important to Greece: it provides 18.4% of the country’s jobs and makes up 16.5% of the economy. ギリシャの観光業界は海運業に続く国内の第二の産業で、ギリシャにとって大変重要であり雇用の18.4%、GDPの16.5%を占める
But now reservations for the summer have collapsed by a stunning 50%! "Political instability," explains Georgios Drakopoulos Director General of the Association of Greek Tourism Enterprises (SETE). And bad publicity, strikes, demonstrations, and images of Athens on fire?the only things foreign media showed, Drakopoulos lamented, though in the rest of Greece, “the conditions are the exact opposite.” And once those issues disappear from the media, a devalued drachma would turn Greece into an irresistible and highly affordable paradise for tourists of all types, including waves of budget tourists?all of whom would bring in hard currency. しかし今や、夏の観光シーズンを前に予約は50%低下していてギリシャの「政情不安」が原因とされている。ギリシャの観光業協会は アテネで起こったデモやストライキ、暴動事件などが観光客にとってのギリシャのイメージを悪化させているという。しかし、ギリシャ の地方では、そういう状況は見られないという。更に、通貨がドラクマに切り替わって通貨価値の切り下げがあれば、ギリシャは争いが たく安価な観光地になると見られる。
ギリシャのユーロ離脱というイシューは、EUとギリシャのチキン・ゲームだが・・・ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://www.watoday.com.au/opinion/politics/and-the-winner-is--well-it-sure-isnt-greece-20120518-1yvyx.html In truth, it's all an elaborate game of chicken. Neither Greece nor the rest of Europe wants it to leave the eurozone. Most likely they will come together to renegotiate the severity of austerity measures imposed as a condition of bailout funding.
The problem is, the longer political uncertainty continues the more likely scenario three becomes: a messy exit of Greece sparked by a massive bank run. Greek depositors have already begun to withdraw their money from Greek banks. Traders are readying for the return of drachmas, getting software in order to process new currency trades. Futures traders are starting shadow markets in drachmas, which, on some estimates, could trade as high as 1500 to the euro, compared with 340 before Greece adopted the currency.
The key text for the coming dismemberment of the European Union can be found in that compendium of homespun wisdom and haunting melodies, The English Hymnal. In The Day Thou Gavest, Lord is Ended, John Ellerton reminds us that “earth’s proud empires pass away”. The adjective is crucial: for it is when empires become proud, and thence hubristic, that their days become numbered. It is now time for us to debate the precise moment when that fate befell the Brussels economic empire. これから起こるであろうEUからの離脱分裂について、鍵となるテキストは英国聖歌集のメロデイの中に織り込まれていて、それを 編纂したJohn Ellertonが教えてくれるのだが、地上の誇り高き帝国というものは、いずれ亡きものとなる。ここで形容詞が重要であ って、帝国が誇り高きものとなる時、そうして高慢になる時に、その残された運命は限られたものとなる。ここではブラッセル(のEU本部) の経済的帝国の凋落モメントが何時であるのかについて論じる。
For the first French empire and the Nazi empire the moment historians call “imperial overstretch” is simple to spot: they both invaded Russia. The second French empire suicidally sent the Ems Telegram to Otto von Bismarck, ensuring its speedy downfall in the Franco-Prussian War. The Soviet empire invaded Afghanistan on Christmas day 1979, just as the Habsburgs had invaded Serbia in 1914. Imperial overstretch was obvious, at least in retrospect, in Britain’s invasion of the Boer republics, a war it eventually won, but only after it had become Britain’s Vietnam. For the Ottomans, the decision to join the Central powers in 1914 condemned a six-century-old empire to the scrapheap in less than a decade. フランス帝国とナチの帝国についてまず言っておくと、歴史家の言う「過大な帝国拡張」の時を知ることは容易だ。両者がロシアに侵略 した時点がそれである。第二フランス帝政はビスマルクに向けて自殺的なメッセージを送ってフランス・プルシャ戦争で迅速に凋落した。 ソビエト帝国は1979年のクリスマスにアフガニスタンに侵攻して凋落がはじまり、それはハプスブルグ家が1914年にセルビアに侵攻した のと同じ事であって、帝国的な過大な拡大というのは明瞭である。少なくとも後から見れば。英国のボーア共和国への侵攻は戦争には勝 利したものの英国にとってのベトナムであった。オットマン帝国では1914年の(WWIの)Central Powersへの参加の決定が6世紀続いた帝 国の10年以内での消滅を招いた。
Future historians might see the creation of the single currency in 1999 as Brussels’ Pearl Harbor moment, where it simply went too far ever to be able to retract, and invited threats and dangers that must one day overwhelm it. 後世の歴史家は1999年にEUの決めた単一共通通貨というのがEUのパール・ハーバー・モメントであると見るかもしれない。その時には 既に引き返すことの出来ない地点に逝ってしまったわけであって、それは何時の日にかEUを転覆させることが確実な危険と脅威を招いた
Along with the cognitive dissonance required for faith in the efficacy of the “big push”, another well-known mental disorder is that of the “mark”, or victim, in a con trick who actually wants to be swindled out of his money. This explains what happened in 1999 when Brussels blithely accepted Greece’s statements about its economic health in good faith, and allowed it to join the single currency on January 1 that year. On a deeper level Brussels knew perfectly well that Greece was lying about its debt, but on an institutional level the mark was anxious to be conned. Brussels assumed that with rising markets it would all be fine in the end. これに呼応して、もう一つのよく知られた精神疾患の現れである「ビッグ・プッシュ」があって、マルクという被害者が自らのお金を騙し 取られるというトリックを自ら望んだのである。そういう流れは何故1999年にEUがギリシャのユーロ圏入りを承認したのかを説明できる。 ギリシャはユーロ圏に参加する経済的条件が整っていると判断されたが、より深いレベルではEUはそれが嘘でギリシャが負債の上に横たわ っていることを完全に承知していた。でも組織(機関)としてのレベルではマルクは上手く載せられることを案じていて、EU本部は結局 全てが最終的には上昇する市場の中で上手くゆくものとして承認した。
Well, here we are in the endgame, and it is certainly not all right. Greece has now lost almost a quarter of its gross domestic product in five years; foreign companies sweep their cash out of the country before close of business every night; Greek banks have lost almost half their deposits as people camp outside cashpoints; political extremism is on the rise on both right and left, and there are even reports of Dickensian diseases appearing in parts of Athens that did not have slums before but do now. その結末を我々は今見ているわけだが、ギリシャは過去5年でGDPの四分の一を失い外資企業は毎晩、キャッシュを集めて国外に送っている。 ギリシャの銀行はほぼ半分の預金を失い、極左や極右の政治家が勃興している。アテネの一部には、これまで見られなかったディケンズ (の書いたビクトリア朝の時代の悲惨な物語)のような症候すら見られる。
The testament of history is so often witness to the hubris-nemesis phenomenon that it is worth repeating, since there is a way out of this for Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande and a few others, though not many. If Napoleon had stayed one day in Moscow, rather than a month, and returned to Vilnius before the frost descended, there might be a Bonaparte on the throne of France today. If the Ottomans had stayed neutral or joined the Allies in 1914, the Caliph might still be reigning in Istanbul. Nothing is inevitable if empires do not overstretch. 歴史の証人は、度々にわたって高慢と応復の症状を見るわけで、それは繰り返し記述するだけの意味がある。メルケルとオランドの、また その他の指導者にとって対処の仕方と言うものがあるからである。ナポレオンがモスクワに1ヶ月でなく1日だけ滞在したら、そして寒波の 襲来前にビリニスに戻っていれば、今日でもフランスにボナパルト王朝があるかも知れない。オットマン帝国がWWIに際して中立を保って いれば、あるいは1914年の連合側に参加していれば、今日でもカリフがイスタンブールに存在するのかもしれない。帝国の過剰な拡張を 防ぐことが出来れば、不可避のことはない。
Germany and France should, therefore, in as orderly and honourable a way as they can, return to the safety and the rationality of the original Treaty of Rome, reinstitute the “six”, and keep the euro only for those countries that deserve membership on the logical grounds of genuine economic synergy. These are utterly removed from the commission’s hubristic fetish of global hegemony. ドイツとフランスは、そういうわけで、秩序と名誉在るやり方で、オリジナルのローマ協定に安全かつ合理的に回帰すべきである。つまり オリジナルのEECの6ヶ国の体制に戻って、ユーロはこれら6ヶ国の経済的シナジーを共有する国のみのものとすべきである。EUコミッション のグローバルな覇権への高慢なフェティシスムを離れるべきである。
各種指標は売られすぎの状態を示しているわけではあるが・・・ So we must ask ourselves the one question that is more important than Facebook's (FB) $104 billion IPO: Are we still in a healthy sustained upward move, or are we in a state of bearishness that is being masked by love for Apple (AAPL) or Facebook? 巷で議論されているフェイスブックのIPOよりももっと重大な話題は、市場が依然として健全で持続可能な上向きのトレンドの中に あるのか、あるいは、アップルの高騰やフェイスブックのIPOで気がついていなだけで、弱気相場にシフトしているのかという問で あろう。 Is our market in a state to handle such a large issuance? Recall that we topped out on the Carlyle IPO last month. Only Father Time knows this answer, and as I stressed yesterday in the Buzz & Banter, I might be my own best contra-indicator. There are many warning signs that suggest something bigger than we are able to anticipate may in fact be on its way. (See: Dreams of a Market Downdraft Drifting in the Distance.) 現状の株式市場は大型の株式公開を支える力はあるのか? 先月のCarlyleのIPOで、株式がトップをつけていることを思い出すのだが いずれにせよ先にならないと正解は得られない。昨日の私の記事にも書いたけれど、私は相反するインディケーターに注目する。 市場には多くの、表面的な動きからは測れないような、something biggerが進行することを示唆する警鐘があると思う。 Yesterday, we saw over one million put contracts trade on the SPY (which is 2.5 times average daily volume) after having traded over 900,000 put contracts the previous day, which was the second highest in 2012. It's imminent... or is it? The possibility of a move higher from here is large, but our objectives in managing capital are protection, preservation, and a responsible return over time. It is with this notion that we must decipher both sides of the equation to arrive at the most appropriate answer. 昨日、SPYのプットは100万契約を超えていて、平均の2.5倍のトレードがあり、その前日の、今年二番目の90万のプット契約とあわせて 考えると売られ過ぎは確かで、反発が迫っているようにも見える? ここから反発する可能性は高いものの、資産管理の目的というのは (ギャンブルではなく)資産の保護保全で、長期的な利益の確保である。その意味で市場の動きの解釈には、両面の可能性を考えるべき である。
Our markets are attempting to tell us something and my intention is to present and see both sides. We are stretched and at an extreme moment. We will break and it can go two ways. 市場の示していることは、そして私の言いたいことは、陰陽両側の動きを見ることで、状況は引き伸ばされていて、極端なモメントにある。 それは上下いずれかの方向にブレークするが、どちらにでも行き得る
When The Post’s Keith B. Richburg approached Mr. Chen’s home village, Dongshigu, a week ago, he found it sealed off by plainclothes thugs who kicked his car and chased him away. The fear of these men has spread from Dongshigu to the surrounding villages, Mr. Richburg reported. WaPoのKeith B. Richburg記者が一週間前に陳光誠氏の故郷の実家を取材した時、彼は平服の893に取り囲まれ、車を蹴られ、追い返される 事になった。こうした893連中の恐怖が郷里の村から周辺の村に広がっている。
All of this conduct is blatantly at odds with China’s claim to be a nation of laws. No doubt these are nervous times for the Chinese government, embroiled in a power struggle that has cost Bo Xilai, the Communist Party boss in Chongqing, his career. The economy is increasingly troubled as well. Yet the cases of Mr. Chen and the jailed South Koreans are symptoms of the same larger ailment. China can have neither prosperity nor stability without greater freedom and more official accountability ? no matter how threatening those may be to the people who currently hold power. この事件で起こっていることは、中国政府の言う法の支配とは矛盾している。現今は(18大前なので)中国にとって神経質になる時期である 事には疑いがないが、薄煕来事件の示す権力闘争が続いている。また、中国経済にはトラブルが続いている。しかし、陳光誠氏の事件や韓国 の(脱北者を支援する)人権活動家を逮捕するという中国のやり方は、同じ病気の現れである。中国は個人の自由と役人の説明責任の拡大 なしに繁栄や安定を達成できるということは無い。現在の権力者に対して、これらの事件が如何に脅威であろうが、それは変わらない。
FRANKFURT?Europe has begun to prepare for Greece's possible exit from the euro zone ahead of a crucial round of elections in the country next month, which are fast becoming a referendum on its membership in the common currency. Euro-zone officials have started emergency planning to contain the fallout from a Greek exit from the currency bloc, officials said Friday. That includes the preparation of emergency scenarios by staff at the European Commission, the European Central Bank and in national finance ministries, the officials said. ヨーロッパはギリシャの次期選挙に先立って、ギリシャのユーロからの離脱の準備を始めている。来月の選挙はギリシャがユーロ圏 に留まるのか否かの国民投票になりそうである。ユーロ圏の関係機関はギリシャのユーロ離脱に備えて非常時対応の計画を作り始めた。 EUコミッション、ECB、及び各国の財務省がそれを始めていると関係者が語った。
The ECB said it doesn't "engage in any speculations about any emergency plans or possible scenarios and therefore do not comment [on] Commissioner De Gucht's statement." The "immutable preference" is for Greece to stay in the currency bloc, the ECB said, referring to comments Wednesday from ECB President Mario Draghi. Mr. Draghi has also said Greece's future in the euro zone isn't a matter for the ECB to decide. Still, the ECB has a lot at stake. It owns around ?45 billion in Greek government bonds it started purchasing when the crisis first flared two years ago. It has about ?80 billion in outstanding loans to Greek banks and billions more through emergency lending.
Though messy, the ECB could probably withstand the immediate hit to its balance sheet if Greece repudiates its debts and exits the euro. The central bank has vast gold and foreign-exchange reserves. It earns billions of euros in fees from printing euro notes. Any losses on bondholdings and from central bank claims on Greece?known as Target2?would be spread throughout the 17 national central banks that comprise the euro, meaning Germany would take the largest hit.
The bigger issue for the ECB would be how to deal with any contagion to other vulnerable euro-area countries such as Spain. The ECB could make more unlimited loans available to banks to ease fears of a credit crunch. It could also restart its dormant bond-purchase program to provide immediate relief to Spanish and Italian government-bond markets.
Though a Greek exit would pressure market, the greater fear is what it might mean for the rest of Europe, especially Spain. While U.S. banks have cut two-thirds of their Greek debt exposure of the past two years, they have not necessarily had the same time to discount a blowup of Spain, said Kathy Lien, director of currency research at Global Forex Trading. As investors continue to keep a close eye on the region for developments, increased uncertainty in the eurozone will likely boost demand for safe haven investments, Praveen said. ギリシャのユーロ離脱問題は株式市場を脅かしているが、より大きな恐怖は、それがスペインなどに感染する可能性である。アメリカの 銀行は過去2年でギリシャへのエクスポージャーの三分の二を削減したが、スペインについては必ずしも同じようにしていない、と グローバル・フォレックス・トレーディングの研究者、Kathy Lienが言っている。投資家は欧州情勢を注視しユーロ圏の増大する 不確実性がセーフヘブンへの資金の流れを促すと Praveenが言う。
"If the pro-euro major parties fail to muster enough support to form a coalition and the radical left Syriza party and other anti-euro, anti-austerity parties secure a majority, the risk of a disorderly Greek exit from the Euro increases and could roil markets," said John Praveen, chief investment strategist at Prudential International Investments Advisers. プルーデンシャル・インターナショナル・インベストメントの主任投資アドバイザー、John Praveenは「もしもプロ・ユーロの政党が 連立政権を樹立するに足るだけの支持を集められないのであれば、そして急進左派のSyrizaなどのアンチ・ユーロ政党が多数派を占め ることになれば、ギリシャの無秩序なユーロからの離脱の起こる可能性は高くなる。そうなれば市場が混乱することになる」という(ry
ユーロ危機について、ウオルター・ラッセルミード。現状でユーロ圏をパニックに陥れる危険の最も大きいものは(ギリシャの再選挙 よりも)ギリシャやスペインなどで銀行の取り付け騒ぎの起こることである、と解説する。スペインでは木曜日に銀行(バンキア)の 取り付け騒ぎの噂が流れ、銀行の株価が激動したが政府が噂を否定して収まっている(今のところは・・) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/05/19/ratcheting-up-the-crisis-in-europe/ Ratcheting Up The Crisis In Europe WALTER RUSSELL MEAD May 19, 2012
Again, why have your money in some gut-shot Spanish bank when you can transfer it to a German, Austrian or Dutch bank with a mouse click? And if you are worried about the whole eurozone, or that devious financial trolls will find a way to convert all deposits held by Spanish citizens in European banks to pesos when and if the change comes, put the money in Switzerland, the UK or even the US.
If a few thousands or a few tens of thousands do this in Portugal, Italy and Spain, no problem. But if hundreds of thousands or millions of people shift their money out of their home banking systems, then you have a new and very grave bank crisis that blows the December fix out of the water. Either the ECB would start creating trillions of euros to bail out the Club Med banks (and Club Med under some circumstances could stretch as far north as France), or banking systems start exploding like firecrackers across the southern tier. At the same time you would have a new panic on the bond markets; nobody is going to want to own Spanish or Italian debt under those circumstances.
Voters are not nearly as scary as depositors right now from the standpoint of Europe. Elections in Greece can’t cause as much trouble as bank runs in Barcelona or Turin.
For some years now, and probably since they joined, it has been dead obvious that Greece would have to leave the eurozone. This is why I giggle when I read earnest news reports about European central banking officials, unofficially preparing for the unthinkable: i.e. Greece leaving the eurozone. And why my sneaking admiration for the Greeks, who have strung the same bankers along for years, grows with each month they are able to stay in.
And just when the jig seemed finally to be up, their collective genius called another election ? for six weeks after the last one. The chance a government will emerge from that, profoundly committed to meeting the country’s austerity targets, is nil.
But the hiatus accomplishes something more important. It gives every Greek one last chance to withdraw any bank savings, and convert anything else he can, into cash in the hardest available currency ? before Greece returns to a drachma that will quickly evaporate from inflation.(ry ・・・・ ・・・・ All their efforts must assume politicians and voters will play along; that nations with long jealous histories of sovereignty will stonily agree to surrender, merely for the sake of fiscal rectitude. But as the latest election results show and will show, there is no chance of that.
A bank run is now happening within the eurozone. So far it has been relatively slow and prolonged, but it is a run nonetheless. And last week, it showed signs of accelerating sharply, in a way which demands an urgent response from policy-makers. ユーロ圏では今、銀行の取り付け騒ぎが起こっているが、これまでのところは比較的遅いスピードで緩慢な(長引く)ものである。 とはいえ、これは取り付け騒ぎである。先週、それは加速化の兆候をシャープに示している。これは政策立案者の緊急の対応を要請 するものである。
The ECB has done this to the full extent required; in this respect it is not possible to criticise the ECB for failing to fulfill the role of lender of last resort to the entire system. Yet the continuing drain on deposits has not been halted. The reason for this, of course, is the fact that the eurozone is not a single nation state, even though it does have a single central bank. ECBは最後の貸し手として充分には機能していないように見えるが、その理由はユーロ圏が(単一通共通通貨と)単一中央銀行を持つにせよ、 それは単一国家ではないためである
As the table (from David Mackie of J.P. Morgan) shows, the outstanding bank deposits of the periphery are many times larger than the current exposures of the ECB and core governments to the periphery. It seems inconceivable that core countries like Germany will be willing to expose themselves to these risks if the deposit flight continues. ttp://blogs.r.ftdata.co.uk/gavyndavies/files/2012/05/ftblog259.gif
Mario Monti apparently took a plan to the G8 summit to offer jointly-funded guarantees on bank deposits to apply across the entire eurozone. This would certainly help, but whether it would be sufficient to eliminate fears of exchange rate losses if the euro were to disintegrate is another matter. To fix that problem, belief in the integrity of the euro as a single currency needs to be restored. The bank run could bring matters to a head.
ギリシャレポーターというメディアの記事。これによればギリシャ共産党(KKE)とは対立するものの、SYRIZAのTsiprasも、その 同盟相手であるデモクラティック・レフト(DL)も、元が共産党で、Tsiprasはいわばベネズエラのチェベスのようなもの、という。 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://greece.greekreporter.com/2012/05/20/the-red-scare-the-hammer-and-sickle-flying-over-greece/ The tactics are working. The Troika-New Democracy-PASOK United Capitalist Front warnings are showing in polls that have pushed New Democracy from 18.8 to 25 percent of the vote ? virtually tied with SYRIZA. Samaras needs enough votes to either win outright or for New Democracy and PASOK to gain enough together to be able to control Parliament. If they succeed, they will immediately scrap their promises to try to renegotiate the Draconian measures, say their hands are tied and they have to impose more austerity and get about the business of ruining what lives people have left, their futures destroyed by the dictators they were forced to re-elect.
The ammunition they have is fear: SYRIZA, by its definition, is a radical group and Tsipras was a leader of the Communist Youth. His most likely ally, Democratic Left leader Fotis Kouvelis ? who refused to join a New Democracy-PASOK coalition after the elections because he wanted to include Tsipras and feared being branded a traitor to the Left, was a founding member of the Communist Party of Greece, the one known as Interior, to differentiate it from the cuckoo-A Stalinist-Trotskyites of KKE led by Aleka Papariga, who wants Greece out of the Eurozone, out of the European Union, and out of Europe, sliced off and pushed either next to Cuba, Red China or North Korea. So desperate was Tspiras, who could best be compared to Venezuela’s leader, Hugo “Pink Tide” Chavez, that the SYRIZA leader offered the Prime Minister’s job to Papariga in hopes of forming his own Communist coalition that would have included Kouvelis.
Almost all of the international troops are scheduled to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014, with a small NATO force set to remain in the country to help with training of the Afghan military. Among the issues Obama and Karzai will talk about are Afghan forces taking over more of the nation’s combat duties from the NATO troops. 2014年末に殆ど全ての国際戦力がアフガニスタンを去ることが予定され、少数のNATO戦力がアフガニスタン軍への引き継ぎのために 残される。オバマ大統領とカルザイ大統領は、このNATOからアフガニスタンへの戦力の引き継ぎについて会談する(後略)
If you want to know what will drive the eurozone to destruction, my advice would be to follow the money, and ignore the real economy. I am exaggerating, of course, but only a little. ・・・・ ・・・・ Should Greece leave the eurozone, it will almost certainly have to impose capital controls and deposit freezes. Since the cost of transferring a savings account from Athens to Frankfurt is negligible, such action constitutes cheap insurance against a potentially catastrophic event. I would go as far as to say that it would be economically irrational for savers to keep their money in Greece under the present circumstances. Then there is Spain. A Spanish saver in Bankia is confronted with the following questions: Does the balance sheet give a true and fair depiction of the risks? Is the Spanish government’s deposit insurance credible? Is Bankia safe now that it is partly nationalised? My answers to these questions would be “no”, “no” and “no”. ・・・・ ・・・・ The only policy that can credibly counter the threat of a self-reinforcing bank run in the eurozone would be a eurozone-wide deposit insurance and bank resolution regime ? at eurozone level. In other words, you have to take the banks ? all the banks ? out of the control of their home country. Such a scheme would, of course, not solve all of the eurozone’s problems. But it would halt the dynamics that could actually soon destroy it.
Chinese consumers of thermal coal and iron ore are asking traders to defer cargos and ? in some cases ? defaulting on their contracts, in the clearest sign yet of the impact of the country’s economic slowdown on the global raw materials markets. The deferrals and defaults have only emerged in the last few days, traders said, and have contributed to a drop in iron ore and coal prices. 中国の石炭や鉄鉱石の消費者が、トレーダーにカーゴの延期を要請し、一部のケースでは契約のデフォルトが発生している。グローバル な原材料、資材の市場での中国経済のスローダウンの明瞭な兆候と見られる。カーゴの延期やデフォルトは最近の数日に起こったことで 石炭や鉄鉱石の価格低下を起こしているとトレーダーは言っている(略)
“People are worried about China and China is worried about Europe,” he said. “Everyone is worried about growth. You cannot decouple Europe from China.” ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9b8a8b8e-9ffb-11e1-90f3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1vFppFuAb Samsung fears shrinking China demand By Robin Kwong in Taipei May 20, 2012 9:00 pm サムスンが中国市場の需要の冷え込みを恐れている FT、20日
Samsung has admitted to concerns over “worrying” weakness in Chinese consumer spending as customer sentiment, damped by government austerity measures, turns against spending on technology products. Kim Young-ha, chief executive of Samsung Electronics China, said the overall market for technology goods in China will probably grow by only about 7 per cent this year, down from 10 per cent in 2011. He pointed to disappointing sales of televisions during the “Golden Week” holiday at the beginning of May ? traditionally a strong sales period ? as evidence of lacklustre demand. サムスンが中国市場での需要低迷を公式に認め、消費者のセンチメントが政府の緊縮政策で悪化していると述べた。サムスン中国の 社長、Kim Young-haは中国の消費者向けテクノロジー製品の伸びは昨年の10%から低下して7%になるとの見込みを述べた。彼は、通常 強い需要期である5月の「ゴールデンウイーク」のTVの、失望させられる売上低迷につい述べたもの。
先週スペインで銀行(バンキア)の取り付け騒ぎの噂が流れ、株価が動揺した後、スペイン政府がそれを否定する という事件があったのだけれど、取りつけは「噂』ではなく「リアル」であるという記事 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://soberlook.com/2012/05/run-on-banks-in-spain-is-very-real.html Run on banks in Spain is very real SUNDAY, MAY 20, 2012
先に紹介したWolfgang Munchauの評論の日本語訳 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/35256 ユーロ圏の銀行取り付け騒ぎを止める唯一の方法 2012.05.22(火) Financial Times By Wolfgang Munchau(2012年5月21日付 英フィナンシャル・タイムズ紙)
興味深いのは、ギリシャとアルゼンチンは違うといっていること。ユーロはヨーロッパ統合という理念から発した政治的なもので 経済的なものではないという。 The single currency is a political and not an economic project. As an economic venture, it is a flawed proposition: the eurozone is not an optimal currency area and its members, with differing preferences and characteristics, require different interest and exchange rates over long periods. But the euro exists, and it embodies European integration, which is the centrepiece of postwar European politics. EUやユーロがもともと政治的なプロジェクトなので、その政治的意味が第一で、経済だけで判断できないという。
ギリシャがユーロ圏に留まる場合に、通貨の切り下げによる国際競争力の回復ができなくなることについて、それは政治的に解決 すべきでEUの富める国が支援すべきものだという。 Regarding competitiveness, in the absence of exchange rate adjustments, intra-union transfers should aim to reduce production costs. Given the political impossibility of further wage cuts, a temporary wage subsidy, partially financed by external sources, should be implemented until structural reforms increase productivity. These measures, together with public investments financed by the European Investment Bank, should improve competitiveness over a reasonable time period.
そうしたユーロ圏内での支援が可能なのかという疑問があるのだけれど、これは政治的意志の問題でギリシャのユーロ離脱の引き 起こす混乱を防ぐ対価であるという All this is desirable ? but is it feasible? It all depends on political will. Germany may not be willing to subsidise, even temporarily, Greek labour. The euro could still be saved with meaningful burden sharing. All share the same aim. The Greeks want to remain in the eurozone, but are unwilling to do what it takes, since what it takes today is too much. The Germans want the euro to survive, but are reluctant to pay the price. If both compromised, the euro would have a better chance of survival.
とてもユニークで興味深い評論と思うけれど、シュピーゲルの掲載していたギリシャ追放論などを読んできた後では、この主張が EU内でどのくらい説得力があり、実現できるものなのかよくわからない・・ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d1b420d6-a32e-11e1-8f34-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1vFppFuAb Greece must not follow Argentine example By Mario?Blejer May 21, 2012 7:41 pm (The writer is a former governor of Argentina’s central bank)
Earlier this month protesters in several towns in Punjab, Pakistan’s wealthiest province, smashed windscreens, blocked motorways, shut down markets and set fire to the offices of parliamentarians and an electric utility. They clashed with police who brought out handcuffs and tear gas and fired live rounds in the air. It was a reaction to electricity shortages that had plunged parts of the province into darkness and scorching heat. At one point the gap between supply and demand hit 7,500 megawatts (MW), or nearly 40% of national demand.
Riots over power shortages in Pakistan are not new. But this time the protests flared up against a unique political background: that of a prime minister’s conviction. On April 26th Yousaf Raza Gilani was declared guilty of contempt of court for refusing to re-open various corruption cases pending against Asif Ali Zardari, the president. In response, the Pakistan Muslim League -Nawaz (PML-N), the main opposition party, claimed the prime minister stood disqualified and started calling for his resignation in parliament and through public rallies.
Greeks have spurned the politicians who represent the country's broken system, and many are now following rising star Alexis Tsipras. The radical left-wing politician has pledged to free Greece from painful austerity measures while keeping the euro, but no one knows how he plans to fulfill his promises.
●A Social Contract Collapse ●'Without Help, We Cannot Survive'
Dragasakis says that Syriza's success primarily means a great deal of responsibility. He also admits that Greece is unlikely to pay back its debts completely. "The mountain is too large," he says, adding that the country is mired too deeply in recession. "Without help, we cannot survive," he says. Indeed, "a joint European approach" is now needed, he adds. But no one really knows what form this should take. Until now, international lenders have refused to renegotiate the bailout packages. Dragasakis would like to see a "road map" for more growth, but he doesn't say precisely how this should look. In contrast to Tsipras, he doesn't talk about revoking the loan agreements.
The Europeans will also have to accept the election results, he says, and recognize that a new, younger generation has taken the reins -- Tsipras' generation. Dragasakis doesn't know whether Tsipras can keep his promises. "But at least he hasn't made a deal with the old system," he says.
The bulls hit a temporary air pocket, courtesy of Fitch's downgrade of the No. 3 global economy, but quickly regain their footing. Stock-index futures indicate minor carryover from Monday's rally.
FRANKFURT (MarketWatch) -- The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on Tuesday cut its forecast for growth in the euro zone and said policy makers should consider taking steps to pave the way for the joint issuance of Eurobonds alongside other measures.
●海底ガス田、油田の発見の経過、推定埋蔵量 In 2009, a consortium of U.S. and Israeli companies discovered the Tamar field about 50 miles off the Israeli coast, with an estimated 8.3 trillion cubic feet of gas. A year later, a similar consortium discovered Leviathan, a huge field nearby estimated to hold 16 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
A 2010 U.S. Geological Survey study estimated that the Levant Basin off the coast of Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Gaza Strip could hold about 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil, 122 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas and 5 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. If true, Israel could meet its own electricity needs in the future and possibly become a net exporter to a gas-thirsty region. This would bring economic and political benefits as well as regional clout at a time when Israel’s regional standing is more uncertain than it has been for decades.
●しかしこの領域は各国の思惑の交錯する地帯で Imagine a scenario in which a new field is found in Israeli waters but bleeds into the 330-square-mile disputed area where Israel and Lebanon’s claimed economic zones overlap. It could also run into Cypriot territorial waters. Suddenly, the world could face a situation in which Turkey insists that the field not be developed until the problem of a divided Cyprus is resolved, while Hezbollah threatens to take military action against what it sees as an Israeli effort to commandeer Lebanese national resources. (In December 2010, Hezbollah stated that it wouldn’t allow Israel to “plunder Lebanon’s maritime assets.”) The U.S. would be pulled in two directions -- one by its NATO ally Turkey, the other by Israel.
●政治的交渉と妥協の可能性は・・ Israel and Lebanon -- as well as Cyprus and Turkey, if necessary -- might agree to disagree. They might choose a limited accord in which each side states that it does not relinquish any of its claims or withdraw any of its grievances, but agrees to start developing the gas and oil fields following agreed-upon guidelines, pending final resolution of the big political issues.
Historical examples suggest this model is viable. In 1979, Malaysia and Thailand agreed to a joint development arrangement to exploit the resources of their continental shelf, setting aside “the question of delimitation of the Gulf of Thailand for a period of fifty years.” More recently, the 2003 Timor Sea Treaty between East Timor and Australia pushed off the settlement of boundaries for 50 years in order to open the door for resource development under agreed terms. Israel’s Undersea Gas Bonanza May Spur Mideastern Strife By Meghan L. O’Sullivan May 22, 2012 8:21 AM GMT+0900 ttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-21/israel-s-undersea-gas-bonanza-may-spur-mideastern-strife.html
Thus, the leaders of these organizations usually were chosen from among their ranks, people who moved up through the organization and knew the important issues of those fields. Since the 1980’s, however, many of these leaders have been political appointments that have undermined their group’s effectiveness. Most recently such an appointment was Chairman Jaczko of the NRC. His appointment as Chairman was a bit of blackmail on the part of Senator Reid to force the death of the Yucca Mountain Project. Whatever one thinks of that project, the NRC was not the way to kill it. ・・・・ The NRC is a technical agency with approximately 4,000 skilled professionals who deserve excellent leadership and we need to provide that to them. Congress needs to act quickly to reappoint Commissioner Svinicki and to appoint a new Chairman, but given the Senate’s abysmal record on appointments, I won’t be holding my breath. America courts disaster if the NRC does not remain above the most blatant political gerrymandering, on both sides of the aisle.
It’s a riddle the Mad Hatter would love: Natural gas prices fall to a decade low. Electricity prices in Texas are pegged to natural gas prices. So what happens to electricity prices? Why, they go up, of course. テキサス州の天然ガス価格は下がっているが、電気料金はどうなる? もちろん、上昇するのさ。
Prices are going up no matter what. The deregulated market has become a sort of Mad Tea Party, and consumers are Alice. Bombarded by ridiculous riddles, we can only conclude that deregulation has become expensive nonsense. とにかく電気料金は上がる。規制緩和(自由化)された電力市場というのはMad Tea Partyで、消費者はアリスなのさ。 こういう不可解ななぞなぞに攻められるばかりで、我々は規制緩和というのは高価なナンセンスだと結論づけざるを得ない。 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *国内メディアで電力市場独占の弊害と自由化の素晴らしさを力説している評論家さんたちは、現実の事例をよく見てみる必要が(ry
In finding a successor, the White House will have to balance competing interests. Reid is expecting another chairman in Jaczko’s mold, even as the White House has touted its support for nuclear power as part of its “all of the above” energy strategy. Most Democratic leaders, including President Barack Obama, are at least nominally pro-nuclear, and the administration has boasted that new nuclear power plants are moving forward for the first time in decades ? even though Jaczko voted against approving some plants over safety concerns. Plus, the administration has sent mixed signals to the industry by zeroing out funding for completion of the Yucca Mountain repository in its previous budgets.
ttp://www.technologyreview.com/energy/40436/ Can Japan Thrive without Nuclear Power? After shutting down its last reactor, Japan is now even more heavily dependent on imported oil, gas, and coal. TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2012BY MIKE ORCUTT MITテクノロジー・レビュー:日本は原発なしに繁栄可能か? 最後の原発の停止の後、日本はますます輸入石炭、ガス、石油に依存するようになっているが
Japan's heavy dependence on foreign oil was exposed as a major vulnerability in 1973, after oil-producing countries in the Middle East imposed an oil embargo. In order to help protect itself from future shocks, the country accelerated its nuclear program, which had begun in the 1950s. Still, half of the nation's primary energy supply in 2010 came from oil, around 85 percent of which was imported from the Middle East.
If its reactors remain idle this year, predicts the Institute for Energy Economics, Japan will spend nearly $60 billion more than in 2011 on foreign oil, natural gas, and coal. And carbon-dioxide emissions could rise 5.5 percent. 日本の原発の再稼働のない場合、2011年に比して日本の石油、ガス、石炭の輸入は$60B増加しCo2排出は5.5%増大する。
Germany refused to share the debt burden of stressed eurozone peers on Tuesday, ignoring two of the most influential international economic bodies which offered support for proposals championed by Paris, Rome and Brussels ahead of a summit. Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, has argued that any co-mingling of eurozone debt would remove incentives for southern economies to adopt structural reforms. The calls from the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development came on the eve of Wednesday’s EU summit.
We said earlier, the market remains driven by Europe, and to prove that point, we give you, well, this afternoon. The Dow was up 50 points at 3 p.m., then these headlines hit Dow Jones Newswires:
*DJ Former Greek PM Papademos: Risk Of Greece Leaving Euro Is Real *DJ Papademos: Preparations For Greece Euro Exit Are Being Considered
The news drove down the euro, which yoked the Dow with it. Incidentally, the Dow’s high for the day was set before noon, and the index started sliding a little before 3 p.m. So while the Papademos headlines clearly had an effect, certainly on the euro, the stock market here in New York was already running out of steam.
The question now is whether the policy response is able to step up to this further twist in the protracted Greek tragedy, especially as bank runs can easily get out of control. If policies lag again, this will increase the probability that Greece would be forced not just to default again but also to exit the eurozone -- what is now called a "Grexit." If that scenario unfolds, Greece will face the prospect of an even deeper and longer economic, financial, political, and social implosion -- and the world would face significant risk of collateral damage.
Should Greece exit the 17-member eurozone, it is disconcerting that no other part of the global economy is in a position to step in and fully offset the resulting waves of disruptive global contagion. Meanwhile, neither regional nor multilateral coordination mechanisms can fully compensate. That said, there are a series of steps that can and should be taken now to make sure that the shocks are both temporary and reversible. ギリシャのユーロ離脱がおこれば世界のどの国の経済も悪影響は免れない。さらに欧州の、或いは多国籍の対応政策というのは、この ショックを十分に補償できないであろう。しかしそうではあっても、対応策を準備すべきである。
Europe needs to urgently find ways to fortify internal circuit breakers that reduce the risk of Grexit contagion becoming a self-reinforcing phenomenon, with key leadership provided by the governments of the four largest economies (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain). This involves urgently strengthening internal firewalls, enlarging emergency financing windows at the European Central Bank, establishing the basis for eurozone-wide deposit insurance, and providing a proper institutional framework and plan for channeling co-financing from the rest of the world. In addition, to simultaneously secure the underpinning of what would remain of the eurozone (which could possibly be fewer than 16 countries), fiscal and growth compacts would need to be accompanied by a better policy mix at the national level as well as a more sustainable regional political integration process that lifts damaging leadership and legitimacy constraints. Finally, should Greece exit the eurozone, Europe must find a way to keep the country within the 27-member European Union, providing it also with stabilization funding and technical assistance. ヨーロッパは緊急の感染防止のためのサーキットブレーカーを準備すべきで、ドイツ、フランス、イタリア、スペインの4大国が主導して 内部のファイアーウオールの強化、ECBの緊急ファイナンスの拡大、ユーロ圏の預金保護機構の設立、世界のその他の国からの金融支援を 受けるメカ二スムの計画準備。これと同期して残るユーロ圏諸国の財政及び成長政策規定の見直し、より持続可能な統合プロセスの検討、 ギリシャのユーロ離脱後のEUとしての安定化支援策の準備。
Political leaders have little time to waste if they wish to reduce the immediate disruptive impact of a Grexit -- which, increasingly, seems inevitable -- and to make the messy aftermath more manageable. Recent history suggests that they are not nearly as prepared for this eventuality as we might think. Indeed, with European leaders having spent so many summits and meetings thinking about the eurozone's ill health, they won't have anyone to blame but themselves if they're not ready with the defibrillator when the heart attack does occur. ギリシャのユーロ離脱に対応するため政治指導者に時間的余裕は殆ど残されていない。離脱は加速度的に不可避にみえる。最近の実績から 見て、これら指導者は自分で思っているほどは準備ができていない。余りにも多くのサミットを繰り返して時間を浪費してきたヨーロッパ の指導者らは心臓発作の起こった時に心房除細動器の準備ができていないなら、彼ら自身以外の誰をも咎めることが出来ない。
Pharmacies in Greece will close on Wednesday as owners protest the fact that social security funds have yet to settle their mounting unpaid drugs bill, while pharmacists are warning that some medicines are already in short supply. Pharmacists have decided to close their stores for one day and to stop supplying customers with medicine on credit until the National Organization for Healthcare Provision (EOPYY), the country’s main healthcare provider, settles debts of some 250 million euros for prescriptions issued in March.
FRANKFURT -- The European Central Bank (ECB) has set up a working group on Greece to prepare for a possible escalation of the country's debt crisis, German newspaper Die Zeit reported Wednesday. The working group is run by Jorg Asmussen, Germany's representative on the ECB executive board, the newspaper said. ECBはドイツ人の取締役員であるJorg Asmussenを長とするギリシャ・ワーキンググループを設置し、ギリシャ金融危機のエスカレーション に対応すると、ドイツのメディアDie Zeitが報道した。
A spokesman for the ECB declined to comment. ECNの広報官はコメントを拒否している Greece's recent elections thrust the balance of power into the hands of parties that reject the terms of the country's international bailout package, prompting eurozone leaders to indicate that a Greek exit from the currency bloc is no longer impossible. Still, ECB president Mario Draghi has stressed that the ECB would prefer that Greece remains within the bloc. Germany's Bundesbank also set up a crisis unit on Greece, run by board member Joachim Nagel, the report said. ギリシャは最近の選挙で政党間のバランスが変化し、ECB、IMF、EUのトロイカとギリシャとの合意した救済パッケージを拒否する勢力が 躍進し、ギリシャのユーロからの離脱が現実性を帯びてきている。しかしECBのマリオ・ドラギ総裁はギリシャがユーロ圏に留まることを 望むとしている。ドイツ中央銀行もギリシャ問題のクライシス・ユニットを取締役のJoachim Nagelのもとに立ち上げたと報道している。
FTの論説主幹、マーチン・ウルフが単一共通通貨の問題点を解説している評論のシリーズ(尤もこのテーマは、遥か昔にこのスレで 指摘されるつくしている) The previous two posts Part 2 and Part 1 tried to explain why the sovereign debt of eurozone countries seem to be far more fragile than that of countries with their own central banks.
Under more nationalistic approaches comes an intriguing suggestion from Richard Koo of the Nomura Research Institute, whose work on balance-sheet deflation I have mentioned before (The journey towards becoming Japan). In a paper entitled “Revitalizing the Eurozone without Fiscal Union”, delivered at the conference organised by the Institute for New Economic Thinking in Berlin, in April 2012, Mr Koo suggests that eurozone governments should limit sale of their bonds to citizens. That, he argues, would exclude foreigners from their markets and so limit these countries’ ability to run deficits. It would also prevent people from buying foreign bonds, thereby underpinning the domestic market.
First, the empirical portion of this paper will conduct three calculations to show that the wealthiest 1% households in China commands wealth that is at least as large as 2/3 of the foreign exchange reserve and possibly as high as nearly twice its size. Thus, if the top 2.1 million households in a nation of 1.3 billion people decide to move even 30% of their wealth overseas, the foreign exchange reserve will reduce by a trillion dollars or more.
Second, despite official foreign exchange control, numerous channels, especially those through China’s current account, exist to move capital in and out of China.
Third, households, which are net savers, face a negative 3 plus percent in real return from bank deposits and Chinese treasury bonds, forcing them to constantly look for higher returns than inflation rates.
These three conditions combine to create extremely fragile conditions for China’s foreign exchange reserve, which is the backbone of the entire financial system of China. If the foreign exchange reserve is depleted by capital flight, the central bank will need to resume large scale money creation, as it did in the 1980s and the 1990s, to maintain the solvency of the banking sector (Walter and Howie 2011; Shih 2004).
Even when there is capital control and the state’s propaganda machinery instills confidence in the vast majority of the population, panic even among a subset of this richest?and also the most knowledgeable? set of insiders may have an enormous impact on the foreign exchange reserve. (by Victor Shih from Northwestern University)
The latest poll from Quinnipiac University shows President Obama with a six-point deficit in Florida, 41 percent to Mitt Romney’s 47 percent. Romney also gets much better ratings on the economy ? 50 percent say that the Republican is better able to handle the economy, compared to 40 percent for Obama. Forty-four percent say that they approve of the president’s job performance, and his unfavorables have risen to 50 percent. 最新のQuinnipiac 大学のフロリダ州世論調査では、オバマ=41%、ロムニー=47%、経済運営で共和党が良いとする人=50%、 これに対して民主党の良いとする人=40%、オバマを評価する人=44%、評価しない人=50%
FTの日本経済関連記事、貿易赤字とQ2-Q4のGDPみとおし 日本銀行は「穏やかな回復は続く」といっているが・・・ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/16960f8e-a48d-11e1-84b1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1vmDjKSDp Meanwhile, imports of liquefied natural gas and oil remain high, as a consequence of the complete shutdown of the country’s nuclear power-generation capacity after the Fukushima crisis beginning last March. In April mineral fuels accounted for 36.9 per cent of Japan’s imports by value, up from 29 per cent in the calendar year 2010. Overall, Japan’s trade deficit in April widened to Y520bn from Y477bn a year earlier. On a seasonally-adjusted basis, the balance stayed in the red for a 14th consecutive month. The deficit is likely to remain intact until “at least early 2013,” said Kyohei Morita, economist at Barclays, thanks largely to continuing demand for energy.
That trade picture is one of the main reasons why Japan’s economy is already past the post-quake “sweet spot”, said Robert Feldman, senior economist at Morgan Stanley in Tokyo. He predicts annualised growth will moderate from 4.1 per cent in the first quarter to between 1 and 2 per cent for the remainder of the year, as the boost of reconstruction spending fades. 日本の石油とLNG輸入は脱原発で増大しており、4月には鉱物燃料類は日本の輸入総額の36.9%に達していて、2010年比で+29%である。 日本の季節調整済みの貿易収支は前年のY477Bの赤字からY520Bの赤字に拡大し、貿易赤字は「少なくとも2013年初旬まで」継続の見込み とバークレィズのKyohei Moritaがいう。もちろんそれはエネルギー輸入の増加に依る。 モルガン・スタンレー東京のシニアエコノミスト、Robert Feldmanは日本経済が既に震災後の回復期の“sweet spot”を過ぎたという。 彼はQ1の年率換算GDP成長4.1%が、Q2−Q4には1−2%に低下するだろうという。震災後の回復の建設などの支出が減少するためという。
日本経済のQ1の予想以上の成長が、長続きしないだろうというのはWSJも書いていて、欧米や中国の経済の先行き不安など を理由にあげている。さらに電力不足への消費者の憂慮・・・ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304707604577421470763959772.html The Land of the Rising Sun's economy grew by 1% in the first quarter compared to the prior three months, or 4.1% on an annual basis. Credit for these pleasantly robust numbers goes to government spending on rebuilding after last year's March 11 earthquake and tsunami. Subsidies for purchases of environmentally friendly cars explain the bulk of a jump in domestic consumption.
So why isn't anyone cheering? Because everyone knows it won't last. While exports were a relative bright spot this quarter, demand in America, Europe and China is uncertain. Consumer confidence fell in April apparently on concerns about impending summer electricity shortages and weak export markets.
●まず、ノースカロライナ、バージニア、インディアナのトリオを獲得し After this initial hurdle, Mr. Romney's victory road starts with "3"?as in Indiana, North Carolina and Virginia, a trio of historically Republican states. In 2008, Mr. Obama won by narrow margins in Indiana (barely 1%) and North Carolina (0.32%). Today, even Team Obama doesn't pretend Indiana is in play. North Carolina also appears to be sliding away from the president: A May 14 Rasmussen poll of likely voters showed 51% for Romney, 43% for Obama. Virginia, on the other hand, will likely remain a battleground through Election Day. Mr. Obama carried it by more than six points and remains ahead by a little more than three points, according to the RealClearPolitics average of state polls. Nevertheless, if Mr. Romney can put these states' combined 39 electoral votes back into the GOP column, the Electoral College vote would be 319 for Mr. Obama, 219 for Mr. Romney.
●次に重要なスイング州のフロリダとオハイオを Next up is "2"?as in Florida and Ohio. They flipped from Republican in 2004 to Democratic in 2008. Both were close?a 2.8% margin for Mr. Obama in the former and 4.6% in the latter. The president's commanding lead in Florida among Jews has been sagging, his lead among Latinos has sharply narrowed, and seniors are restless. In Ohio he has definite problems with white working-class voters and affluent suburban independents. The race is extremely close in the Buckeye State?a May 7 Quinnipiac poll of registered voters has Mr. Romney at 44%, Mr. Obama at 45%?while a May 21 Quinnipiac poll of registered voters in the Sunshine State has Mr. Romney up 47% to 41%.
●最後に、どの州でも良いから残りの一つの州を獲得すればOK Which brings us to "1." Mr. Romney then needs one more state?any state?and the White House is his. There are many paths open to him. One is the Neighborhood route. If the Boston resident and former Massachusetts governor captures next-door New Hampshire, its four electoral votes would take him to the magical 270 and the Oval Office.
今年の選挙は2008年のような熱狂や地すべりでオバマが勝利する環境とは異なって接戦になるので、ロムニーがうまくやれば勝利のチャンス Mr. Obama long ago lost his chance to duplicate his 2008 performance. A record of failure will do that. He's now forced to fight for states he easily won in 2008. The odds now narrowly favor a Romney win.
On Thursday, the General Index managed with difficulty to be kept marginally above 500 units, however intraday was found below the level of 500 units (-5.06%), for the first time since January 1990.
NHKがソフトウエアをテーマとしたドキュメンタリー番組「新・電子立国」を放送したのは1995〜1996年。 Windows 95とインターネットが世界を席巻し始めた時期だ。 少なくともこの頃から「これからはソフトウエアの時代」という言葉を耳にタコができるくらい聞いた。 ところが今日の状況を見ると、日本の大手電機メーカーにはいまだソフトウエアの時代が到来していないのではないか、と思わざるを得ない。
Why did Europe go from bad to total horrific panic in the last year? There are all sorts of theories: weak growth, the impact of austerity, missteps by central bank bureaucrats. But here’s another scapegoat offered up by the International Energy Agency: Europe’s soaring oil bill. IEAは石油価格高騰がヨーロッパの経済に影を落とし危機を長引かせているという
Getting dizzy. (Hasan Jamali - AP) The IEA laid out some eye-catching numbers on Thursday: Between 2000 and 2010, Europe spent an average of $182 billion per year on oil. Then, in 2011, due in part to a civil war in Libya, Europe spent a record $488 billion on crude. In 2012, thanks to tight global supplies in the first half of the year and tensions with Iran, the continent is expected to spend well over $500 billion. To put that in context, the total debt of Greece, which has everyone sweating, is about $370 billion. IEAによれば2000年から2010年のヨーロッパの石油輸入支出は平均して毎年$182Bであるが、2011年に$488Bとなり、2012年$500Bを 超えるという。産油国の紛争やイランの石油禁輸などの影響で石油価格が高騰している。
The IEA worries that the recent oil crunch has been bleeding Europe’s economy, which in turn has exacerbated the continent’s debt woes. “Prices at these levels are forcing households to either cut back on spending on other items or to increase their debt,” said Maria Van der Hoeven, executive director of the IED. “They are also undermining the profitability of companies that are unable to pass on fully higher input costs.” IEAは石油価格高騰がヨーロッパ経済に与える悪影響を憂慮し、「このレベルの石油価格では家計が他の支出を切り詰めざるを得ない」 という「石油価格の高騰は家計のみならず企業収益も圧迫している。価格上昇分を充分に転嫁できない」(後略)
The arc of Europe’s postwar history is turning toward tragedy. It isn’t just that much of the Continent has fallen into a new Great Depression, or that in some countries things will get worse before they get better. It isn’t even that the whole mess was avoidable in the first place. It’s that the crisis is dividing Europe along the very lines the European project was intended to erase. ヨーロッパの戦後の最大のプロジェクトであった、ヨーロッパの統合のためのユーロが失敗していて、単に経済的苦境をもたらす というだけではなく、ヨーロッパが解消を目指していた諸国の対立と混乱の問題が再発している
Meanwhile, resentments thought to be dead and gone have revived. Three generations after the end of World War II, newspapers in Greece publish caricatures of Merkel as a swastika-sporting Nazi. In Spain, Italy, and other countries suffering the stress of a German-directed drive to restore Europe’s public finances, anti-German sentiment is better disguised but no less widely held. 諸国間の対立は、ギリシャの新聞がメルケル首相のナチスの制服姿の写真を掲載して第二次大戦以来の反ドイツ感情を煽っているに とどまらず、スペイン、イタリア、その他の国にも同様の反ドイツ(の主導する緊縮財政政策)のふいんきがある。 ・・・・・・ ・・・・・・ Why did it all go wrong? Three main reasons: French grandiosity, German shame, and a universal law of bureaucratic self-aggrandizement. Together these formed a European Union that was poorly adapted to the stresses the project was sure to encounter. The EU was perhaps unlucky that the crisis came when it did?before national loyalties had diminished and an emerging European identity had begun to take their place. Yet the EU’s designers had some sense of the risk they were running. They gambled and lost. 一体どうしてこういう事態に陥ったのか? 3つの主要な原因があって、(1)フランスの壮大主義、(2)ドイツの恥、(3)官僚主義の 自己強大化の法則、である。これらの3つがEUを構成して、それはストレス体制に乏しいものに成っていた。EUにとっては不幸なことは 国民国家へのロイヤリティーが消え、ヨーロピアンというアイデンティティが確立する前に危機の到来したことであるけれど、これは EUの設計者が憂慮していたことである。彼らはギャンブルを行なって、失敗した。
The relationship between Greece and the rest of the eurozone is increasingly reminiscent of the cold war’s balance of terror. We are of course speaking only of financial terror and Greece is not the Soviet Union, but the mechanics are strikingly similar. ギリシャと、ユーロ圏のそれ以外の国の関係は、ますますのことに冷戦時代の恐怖の均衡を思い出させる。ここで言っているのは ギリシャの金融危機の恐怖のことで、ソ連のことではないのだが、そのメカニズムは驚くほどよく似ている。 ・・・・・ ・・・・・ A lesson from the Cold War is that ultimately, rational behaviour proved to be the best insurance against disaster. Today also, both partners have a common interest in behaving in cool blood. They have to set red lines credibly and unambiguously, as well as to indicate where there is room for discussion. This can only happen after June 17, when a new coalition emerges from the election and forms a government in Athens. In the meantime, we are bound to live dangerously. 冷戦から得た教訓というのは、結局のところ合理的な行動というのが破滅から我々を守る最大の保険であるということである。今日でも 問題の両側の当事者(=ギリシャとユーロ圏諸国)が、冷静沈着に行動すべき共通の利益というものはある。彼らは信頼出来るような レッドライン(限界線)を明確に設定し、何処に議論の余地があるのかを明らかにすべきである。これは6月17日の選挙の後でのみ 起こり得る。つまり、ギリシャの新連立政権が発足したあとで。それまでの間、我々は危険な状況に置かれる。 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *国の経済的破綻をかけたチキンゲームに熱中する政治屋というのもアレだけれど、彼らをしてそうせしむるのは、日比谷焼打事件とか 「腰抜け東条、勝てる戦争何故やらぬ」と煽る連中。「破壊的結末を免れる、冷静沈着な、合理性に基づく行動」が取れるためには、 そういうノイズを無視する必要があろうけれど、我が国の再稼働チキンゲームの事例もそうであるように、非合理でヒステリックな喚き 声は高まるばかりで・・