共和党の大統領候補の一人で黒人のHerman CainがCNNのインタビューの中で中絶問題について「プロ・チョイス」派と受け取られかねない 発言をして政治的波紋。一部にはこの発言が致命的という見方も。 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://www.tnr.com/article/the-permanent-campaign/96544/cain-abortion-iowa-gop-2012-tax-plan Why There’s No Way Cain Will Survive His Abortion Gaffe Ed Kilgore October 22, 2011 | 12:00 am
Cain’s improbable rise in national and early-state polls would now end, they probably figured, as GOP voters discovered the pizza man’s signature policy proposal wasn’t terribly well thought out. But it’s likely that Cain could have overcome the criticisms surrounding his tax proposal. What he will struggle to live down, on the other hand, are his recent comments on abortion.
ドイツ政府が発表しているエネルギー政策の国家目標というのがあって: RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY TARGETS In September 2010 the German government announced the following targets:
(1)Renewable electricity - 35% by 2020 and 80% by 2050 発電のエネルギーソースを2020年に35%再生可能エネルギーに、2050年に80%に (2)Renewable energy - 18% by 2020, 30% by 2030, and 60% by 2050 総エネルギー需要の再生可能エネルギー比率を、2020年=18%、2030年=30%、2050年に60%に (3)Energy efficiency - Reducing the national electricity consumption 50% below 2008 levels by 2050 2050年までに電力消費を2008年の半分 以下に
この文書では、こうした3つの国家目標を実現する為の計画とコストの概算を述べている。ドイツの場合、再生可能エネルギーの主役は風力発電 (大陸の西端なので北部ドイツには恒常的な偏西風がある)それもオフショア(沖合の海中での風力発電)がメインになる。バイオマス発電と 水力発電が風力の半分程度で太陽光発電は風力の三分の一程度 ドイツの脱原発・再生可能エネルギーへの転換というのは(3)の目標の大胆な省エネとセットになっている。省エネにより電力需要を半分に減 らして、其の電力を原発なしに賄うというもの。このために、その省エネ、電力需要切り詰めが、どの程度可能・必要なのかという議論があって According to The Breakthrough Institite, Germany would have to reduce its total electricity consumption by about 22% of current 2020 projections AND achieve its target for 35% electricity generated from renewables by 2020. This would require increased energy efficiency measures to effect an average annual decrease of the electricity consumption/GDP ratio of 3.92% per year, significantly greater than the 1.47% per year decrease assumed by the IEA's BAU forecasts which is based on projected German GDP growth and current German efficiency policies. シンクタンクのBreakthrough Instititeの計算では電力需要の削減は2020年で22%の削減である必要があり、それと同時に再生可能エネルギーの 発電を2020年までに35%増加させる必要がある。これをGDPあたりの年次の効率向上の比率で見ると、毎年3.92%の効率向上になってIEAがドイツ について試算した1.47%よりも大変大きい
*ドイツの再生可能エネルギーへの傾斜は地球温暖化阻止のCo2削減運動と連動しているのだけれど、この文書に依れば風力発電ではCo2削減はでき ないという。風力発電の発電量の頻繁な変動を補うために、出力調整の容易なガスタービン発電で平準化をするのだけれど、一日あたり100−200回 のオンオフを繰り返すような運用では燃費効率は最悪でCo2排出が増えるのだという Wind and Solar Energy Depend on Gas: Wind and solar energy is variable and intermittent. This requires quick-ramping gas turbine plants to operate at part-load and quickly ramp up with wind energy ebbs and quickly ramp down with wind energy surges; this happens about 100 to 200 times a day resulting in increased wear and tear. Such operation is very inefficient for gas turbines causing them to use extra fuel/kWh and emit extra CO2/kWh that mostly offset the claimed fuel and CO2 reductions due to wind energy. ttp://theenergycollective.com/willem-post/64492/wind-energy-reduces-co2-emissions-few-percent
●Greek debt write down. Bottom line: Writing down Greek debt needs to be on the table. Public reports have pegged the required haircut at 40-60%. We believe anything significantly less than this would be a disappointment to the markets. ヘアカット40−60%を予想、少ないなら市場が失望
●European bank recapitalization. Bottom line: Recapitalizing European banks needs to be on the table, since it is directly linked to any credible haircutting of Greece sovereign debt values. A recapitalization of less than ?70 billion would likely be a disappointment, while ?150 billion or more would likely be considered to be a credible response. 欧州銀行の資本強化、700億ユーロ以下なら市場は失望、1500億ユーロ以上なら充分
●Anti-contagion fund. Bottom line: Preventing contagion to Spain and Italy needs to be on the table. There are many complex legal issues that surround the various plans considered to achieve this end. Nearly all of these plans involve leveraging the fund’s resources either directly or via the ECB. The plan reported to have the greatest traction involves the fund providing loss insurance to buyers of sovereign bonds in the secondary market. Rather than engage in a discussion of the pros and cons of the various proposals, we will remain focused on the overall size of the anti-contagion program. By whatever mechanism policymakers come up with to leverage the EFSF, we think ?2 trillion is the minimum required to control contagion. An amount less than ?1.5 trillion would likely be viewed as a disappointment. EFSFは2兆ユーロ必要、1.5兆ユーロ以下なら市場は失望
Then consider Turkey. Twenty years ago, it too was perceived as a basket-case economy, dependent on American largesse, protected by the American security umbrella, and quietly seeking approval from Europe. It needed the West. But now Turkey has a booming economy, has an increasingly confident democracy, and is a major regional power. It is growing faster than every European country, and its bonds are safer than those of many Southern European nations. 次にトルコ。20年前にはトルコも農業国とされ米国の寛容さに頼り米国の防衛力の傘に守られていた。そして静かに ヨーロッパからの承認を求めていた。西洋を必要としていたのだ。しかし今やトルコは盛況な経済を誇り、民主主義への 自信を深めている主要な地域大国である。どのヨーロッパ国家よりも成長しており、国債が多くの南ヨーロッパ国家のもの よりも安全である。
Its foreign policy is becoming not so much Islamic as Ottoman, reestablishing a sphere of influence it had for 400 years. Abdullah Gül, Turkey’s sophisticated president, explains that while Turkey remains resolutely a part of the West, it is increasingly influential in the Middle East, Central Asia, and beyond. “Turkey is becoming a source of inspiration for other countries in the region,” he said to me while in New York last week. トルコの外交政策はオスマン帝国のものほどイスラム的なものになっている訳ではないが、帝国が400年間保っていた影響圏を 再確立しつつある。同国の優秀な大統領であるアブドラ・グルは、トルコはこれからも西洋の一部であることは間違いないが、 中東や中央アジアそして、それ以外の地域にも影響力を持っていくとしている。「トルコは地域内で他国にとってインスピレーション の源となっていくのです」と、先週ニューヨークで私に語ってくれた。
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 25 state legislatures are controlled by Republicans and 16 by Democrats, with eight split (i.e., each party controlling one house). There are 29 Republican governors and 20 Democrats, with one independent. And there are 20 states where Republicans control both the legislature and governor’s mansion vs. 11 Democratic, with 18 split (one party controls the governor’s office and the other the legislature). NCSLの資料に依れば、アメリカの諸州のうち29の州は共和党の州知事が、20の州は民主党の州知事がいる。一つの州が無党派の州知事である。 州議会の上下院を共和党の抑える州は25、民主党の支配する州は16あって、8つの州では上下院が別の党に支配されている。これをまとめると 20の州で州知事と議会上下院を共和党が抑え、民主党は11の州を抑えていて18の州では知事と議会を別の政党が抑えている。このデータから 州を共和党より(レッド州)あるいは民主党より(ブルー州)に区別できる。
What’s clear is that red or red-leaning states dominate the top positions while blue states have the dubious distinction of dragging in last. In the economic outlook section, for example, the top 20 states are bright red or lean red, while eight out of the bottom 10 are very blue: New York, Vermont, California, Hawaii, New Jersey, Illinois, Oregon and Rhode Island. 州の財政経済状況の見通しをみるとトップ20の州はレッド州或いはレッド傾斜の州で、最底辺の10の州のうち8つの州が濃いブルーである。それ はニューヨーク、ヴァーモント、カリフォルニア、ハワイ、ニュージャージー、イリノイ、オレゴン、ロードアイランドである。
As commentator Michael Medved points out: “Between 2009 and 2010 the five biggest losers in terms of ‘residents lost to other states’ were all prominent redoubts of progressivism: California, New York, Illinois, Michigan, and New Jersey. Meanwhile, the five biggest winners in the relocation sweepstakes are all commonly identified as red states in which Republicans generally dominate local politics: Florida, Texas, North Carolina, Arizona, and Georgia.” 2009年と2010年で、州への人口流入或いは流失で見た時、住民の流失の大きかったよっプ5の州は、カリフォルニア、ニューヨーク、イリノイ、 ミシガン、ニュージャージー。人口流入の多かったトップ5の州はいずれもレッド州のフロリダ、テキサス、ノースカロライナ、アリゾナ、ジョージア であった。
By contrast, some blue states appear determined to spend themselves into bankruptcy. The AP reported on Oct. 16, “Drowning in deficits, Illinois has turned to a deliberate policy of not paying billions of dollars in bills for months at a time.…” So that big tax increase passed by Obama’s home state, which likes to do things the Obama way, didn’t fix the revenue problem. Someone needs to call the president and explain that to him. レッド州が一般に財政保守派で減税に前向きであるのに比べてブルー州は放漫財政で破産に向かうような公共支出が多い。10月16日にはAPの記事 がイリノイ州の財政状況の悪化により増税に踏み切ると報じている。
Many fed-up citizens in those blue states are leaving. But others have decided that if anyone is going to leave, it’s those big-spending politicians who brought on the fiscal disaster. It’s a lesson blue-state politicians better learn: It’s better to be red than dead. ブルー州の住民が、その州を捨ててレッド州に移り住む傾向というのは、そうした州政府の財政規律のなさと増税政策に原因がある。(後略)
>>97 Magnitude 7.3 Date-Time Sunday, October 23, 2011 at 10:41:21 UTC Sunday, October 23, 2011 at 01:41:21 PM at epicenter
Location 38.627°N, 43.535°E Depth 7.2 km (4.5 miles) set by location program Region EASTERN TURKEY Distances 19 km (12 miles) NE (43°) from Van, Turkey 116 km (72 miles) N (351°) from Hakkari, Turkey 130 km (81 miles) SSE (161°) from Karakose (Agri), Turkey 192 km (119 miles) SSW (206°) from YEREVAN, Armenia
ttp://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/#axzz1bbWfydwd (FTのブリュッセル・ブログ) The Brussels Blog has obtained a copy of the 12-page draft of the morning gathering’s communique, circulated to summiteers this morning, and unless things change at the meeting, it looks like there will be no final decision on the one thing the 27 had hoped to finish today ? a plan to recapitalise Europe’s banks.
The draft “welcomes progress made” by EU finance ministers during their 10-hour meeting on Saturday, but says the work will not be officially signed off until another meeting on Wednesday ? the first official acknowledgement that leaders from all 27 EU countries (and not just the eurozone) will have to meet again next week. Whether that meeting will be the heads of all 27 governments or just their finance ministers remains to be seen. 結論は水曜日の会議に持ち越し・・
The message they delivered, according to one diplomat familiar with the discussion, was that Italy must deliver “specific and convincing reform measures soon.” They communicated a similar message to Berlusconi at a gathering on Saturday evening held by the centre-right European People’s Party. 独仏による伊首相攻撃は、外交官に依れば「イタリアは市場を納得させるような改革政策をすぐに出せ」というもの
Sarkozy also expressed his displeasure with Italy’s refusal to make way for a Frenchman on the European central bank’s executive board, according to the diplomat. France is due to lose its seat when Jean-Claude Trichet steps down as ECB president at the end of the month to be replaced by Mario Draghi, the outgoing president of the Bank of Italy. Berlusconi infuriated the French this week when he declined to free up a seat on the powerful decision-making committee by refusing to name current board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi as Draghi’s replacement. サルコジはECBのJean-Claude Trichet総裁の、イタリア中央銀行総裁であったMario Draghiへの交代に伴うECB理事会の人事で Lorenzo Bini Smaghi の昇格をベルルスコーニが拒んでいることにも不満を表明している
Just two years ago it seemed highly unlikely that Barack Obama would turn out to be a one-term president 僅か2年前にはオバマが一期限りの大統領になるというようなことは想像外のことであったが・・
The current ABC News/Washington Post polling finds that 55% of American people believe a Republican will win the election, and 37% that Obama will win. Democrats expect to win by 58% to 33% percent, while Republicans believe they will win 83% to 13%. By 54% to 36%, independents think a Republican will beat Mr. Obama. 最新のABC News/Washington Postの世論調査に依れば、アメリカ国民の55%は共和党が次期の大統領の選挙に勝利すると見ている。オバマの再選 を予想する国民は37%である。民主党支持者は58%:33%で民主党が勝利すると考えているが、共和党のほうは83%:13%で共和党が勝利すると 見ている。無党派層は54%:36%で、共和党が勝つと見ている。
>Just two years ago it seemed highly unlikely that Barack Obama would turn out to be a one-term president >僅か2年前にはオバマが一期限りの大統領になるというようなことは想像外のことであったが・・
China, the world’s biggest market for wind power, is bracing for a sharp slowdown in wind turbine installations this year, a move that will spark a “bloodbath” among wind turbine producers, industry executives say. 中国は世界最大の風力発電タービンの市場であるが、風力発電タービンの導入が急速に停滞する見込みで、風力発電タービンのメーカーは 最悪の事態に備えているとこの業界の専門家が述べている。
China’s explosive growth in wind energy took the country from having almost no wind power five years ago, to becoming the world’s largest installer of new turbines last year. This year, however, industry executives expect China’s new wind installations to fall by 20 per cent because of tightening government regulation and bottlenecks on the electricity grid. China’s slowdown comes as the turbine-making industry globally is facing overcapacity and turbulent demand. The US, the world’s second-largest market for turbines, is seeing anaemic growth in new installations because a key tax credit is soon to expire. In the first half of this year global wind installations were up 15 per cent, from a low base last year in the aftermath of the financial crisis. But China expanded by just 2.6 per cent, and that growth is expected to turn negative by the end of the year. 5年前には殆ど存在しなかった中国国内の風力発電市場は近年になって爆発的に成長して昨年は中国が世界一の風力発電タービン設置国となった。 しかし今年の風力発電の設置は前年比で−20%と業界の幹部が話している。この理由は政府の規制強化と送配電網のボトルネックである。 風力発電タービンは世界的に過剰生産であり、中国の設置件数の停滞はこの時期になって起こっている。アメリカは世界第二の風力発電タービン の設置国であるが税金控除制度がまもなく時限切れとなるため設置件数が停滞している。今年前半のグローバルな風力発電タービン設置数は+15% であるが中国の今年前半の成長は2.6%であり年末にはマエナスになると予想されている。
One cause of the slowdown is that wind farm developers are having trouble securing financing because of tightening credit conditions. Beijing has gradually tightened monetary policy this year in an effort to combat inflation, which came in at a stubbornly high 6.1 per cent in September. Another reason is that Beijing is cracking down on low-quality turbines with new regulations, after several major blackouts caused by wind farm surges earlier this year. These include measures aimed at slowing down the building of new wind farms and China’s first turbines certification programme. 中国政府がインフレ対策として与信の引き締めに動いているため風力発電のデベロッパーは融資を得る為に苦慮している。また中国政府は新たな規制 を導入し、低品質のタービンを締め出そうとしている。今年の初旬に風力発電所のトラブルで幾つかの大型停電事件が起こり、政府は風力発電所の 建設をスローダウンさせている。中国政府は風力発電タービンに対する(品質向上のための)認可制度を導入している。(後略)
Options for the fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, were narrowed to two after a meeting of euro-zone finance ministers Friday. One is an insurance plan that foresees the fund's setting aside a pool of money that could be used to offset part of any losses suffered by purchasers of the debt of weak countries, such as Italy. That could entice buyers and keep Italy financed.
The other would be to create a special, separate fund. That fund would raise money from private investors and others, like sovereign -wealth funds, to buy debt of weak countries. The EFSF would also participate in the fund?but would suffer the first losses. Officials said the two options could be combined. OCTOBER 24, 2011 European Leaders Debate Severe Options for Accord ttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204777904576648542977238626.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hps_LEFTTopWhatNews
ttp://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/pre_report.pdf Summary Report of the Preliminary Findings of the IAEA Mission on remediation of large contaminated areas off-site the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP 7 ? 15 October 2011, Japan 14. October 2011
Acknowledgement 7: The Team acknowledges the impressive monitoring and mapping effort of the Japanese Authorities as a basis for a successful remediation program. The extensive, real-time monitoring system that is currently being set up and the transparent online availability of the resulting data are important measures to reassure the public and the international communit
The investment of time and effort in removing contamination beyond certain levels (the so-called optimized levels) from everywhere, such as all forest areas and areas where the additional exposure is relatively low, does not automatically lead to reduction of doses for the public. It also involves a risk of generating unnecessarily huge amounts of residual material. The Team encourages authorities to maintain their focus on remediation activities that bring best results in reducing the doses to the public.
TONY EASTLEY: A billion-dollar scandal has shaken one of Japan's blue chip companies with claims that huge amounts of money were somehow shifted to the Japanese mafia. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
The recently sacked CEO of camera and optical equipment manufacturer, Olympus, alleges that more than one billion dollars in unjustified payments were made to obscure financial advisors.
東部の二つの工業団地は、ホンダの自動二輪工場があるラカバン工業団地と、バンチャン工業団地。知事によると、首都の北隣パトゥムタ ニ県から押し寄せる洪水が近く達する見通しだという。 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Crocodiles "arrested" on the flooded streets of Bang Bua Thong district just north of Bangkok. (写真)バンコク北のBang Bua Thong地区で「逮捕」されたワニ(バンコクポスト) ttp://www.bangkokpost.com/media/content/20111024/322883.jpg
A woman paddles a cement mixing tub past Wat Lum Khongkharam School in Bang Kruai district of Nonthaburi. PATIPAT JANTHONG (写真)セメントをこねる容器を船にして進む女性、背後はWat Lum Khongkharam学校、NonthaburiのBang Kruai地区 ttp://www.bangkokpost.com/media/content/20111024/322882.jpg
FTアルファビレのコメント See that little spell of short-covering in early October? Is it a coincidence that it occurred at the same time as the euro’s small recovery this month? 10月の初旬に、空売りの買戻し(ショートカバー)が見られるが、それが10月のわずかの値上がりに関連するのか?
ソシエテ・ジェネラルのSebastien Galyのコメント It would not be hard to put a pretty negative spin around the summit, fresh from a Sarkozy/Merkel argument last week, the press can ponder on a Sarkozy/Cameron row and conclude that tensions and tempers are running high. And yet, commentators are going to have to match their analysis of events to price action, and may be forced to conclude that the market is optimistic. I see this as further evidence that what is driving markets is a combination of extreme bearishness and steady pressure to take back short positions in both ‘risk’ and in euro. 先週の独仏首脳の対立以降の欧州サミットに、ネガティブなスピンを見ざるを得ない。英仏首脳の対立も伝えられ会議の緊張は高まっているようで あるけれど、市場は楽観的とアナリストは結論づけるように強制されているかも知れない。私から見ると、これは市場が、極度の弱気と、ユーロと リスクに対するショート・ポジションをとるという恒常的圧力の混在に動かされていつように見える。
ユーロ圏の負債危機について、イタリアやフランスが負債に苦しんでいることにくらべ、同じように(対GDPで)負債の大きい英米日が 同じような苦境に陥っていないのな何故か? クルーグマン先生の講義 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Think about countries like Britain, Japan and the United States, which have large debts and deficits yet remain able to borrow at low interest rates. What’s their secret? The answer, in large part, is that they retain their own currencies, and investors know that in a pinch they could finance their deficits by printing more of those currencies. If the European Central Bank were to similarly stand behind European debts, the crisis would ease dramatically. 英米日は大きな負債や財政赤字があっても、高い金利を支払うこと無く資金調達ができるのは何故か? 答えの大部分は、それらの国は独自通貨 があって、必要なら紙幣を増刷でき資金を循環させることができる。ECBが同じようにすればユーロ負債危機はドラマティックに緩和する。
Wouldn’t that cause inflation? Probably not それはインフレにならないか? 多分ならない(欧州はデフレで、むしろ適度のインフレが必要と解説)
*何故ECBがそうしないかというと、彼らは過去のインフレの亡霊に悩まされているからだという The story of postwar Europe is deeply inspiring. Out of the ruins of war, Europeans built a system of peace and democracy, constructing along the way societies that, while imperfect ? what society isn’t? ? are arguably the most decent in human history. Yet that achievement is under threat because the European elite, in its arrogance, locked the Continent into a monetary system that recreated the rigidities of the gold standard, and ? like the gold standard in the 1930s ? has turned into a deadly trap.
European negotiators have asked Greek debt holders to accept a 60 per cent cut in the face value of their bonds, a hardline stance that far exceeds losses agreed in a deal between private investors and eurozone authorities three months ago. 欧州の交渉担当者はギリシャ国債日保有者(主に欧州の銀行)に額面の60%カットを受け入れるように要求した。これは3ヶ月前の国債保有者と EUとの合意事項から見て更に大幅の負担の受け入れを要求していることになる
この条件ではCDSのクレジットイベントに相当する(デフォルトと同じ)とも意見もあるが、それに反論もあって But Paris, the ECB and IMF went along with the hardline negotiating position. Officials said Christine Lagarde, IMF chief, Nicolas Sarkozy, French president, and Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB president, met Mr Grilli on Saturday night to give him the mandate. この条件はECB、IMF、フランス政府が支持している。
Mr Sarkozy’s backing was a significant breakthrough, officials said. France had initially resisted but Mr Sarkozy accepted the need for a big writedownon the condition it be voluntary. “The French president has moved, very much so,” said a person familiar with the talks. 交渉担当者らに依ればサルコジ大統領が、この条件の支持に回ったことは意味が大きいという。
The 60 per cent cut is a significant shift both in magnitude and in kind. The July deal did not force cuts in the face value of Greek debt; instead, bondholders would have been given new bonds that only delayed repayment for 30 years. The IIF estimated the deal amounted to a 21 per cent reduction in net present value. A person close to bondholders said a 60 per cent cut in face value would be equivalent to a 75-80 per cent reduction in net present value. 7月の合意ではNPVで21%カットになるが、今回提示された条件はNPVで75%−80%のカットになると(国債保有者者側のIIFは述べている(後略)
Libyans may be celebrating the killing of Muammar al-Qaddafi, but you'd better believe that Western governments are breathing a sigh of relief themselves. リビアではカダフィの殺害を喜んでいるようだが、西側諸国の政府にもカダフィが殺害されて安堵の息をついている人達がいる
*カダフィの西側世界のお友達について書いている、ちょっと面白い書き物(荒っぽい概要)
英国のMI6のカウンターテロイリズム部署の長であったSir Mark Allenは、リビアのWMD(原爆開発計画)の廃棄交渉をカダフィと行った人である。 彼はMI6を退職した後、民間のコンサルティング企業Monitor Groupのシニア・アドバイザーとなり、カダフィとの関係を続けてカダフィの息子が ロンドン・スクールオブ・エコノミクス(LSE)のPhDを取得する支援をしたことで知られる。このPhD事件では時の英国首相トニー・ブレアがLSEの PhDについてカダフィの息子にあてたファクシミリ文書があって、ディリーメール紙に暴露されている。Sir Mark Allenはカダフィ一家と近しい関 係があったが、それはBPがリビアの石油利権を獲得する上で彼のアドバイスを得ていたことでもよくわかる。英国政府は空軍のSAS特殊部隊をリビア に派遣してカダフィの軍の訓練を行うなど、カダフィ政権とは親密な関係があった。フランスではサルコジが2007年にカダフィの訪問を歓迎して国 賓扱いの晩餐会を開いている。このカダフィのパリ訪問はフランス企業が数十億ドルの契約をリビアと結ぶのに際して行われた。
Look at net exports: a significant net negative in 2009, as restocking and recession took hold, but only a small contributor to growth in 2010, in the broader scheme of things. And although the net number is forecast as negative for 2011 and beyond, Green and Wei say that gross export growth still contributes to GDP growth as it creates demand for manufacturing investment. GDP構成要素を見るとネット輸出が2009年に大きくネガテイブに振れている、2010年には陽転しているが構成比率としての寄与は大変少ない。 2011年以降にはネガティブになると予想しているが総合的に見れば輸出は製造業と投資に対する需要をもたらすのでGDP成長に寄与している。
StanChart’s China economists Stephen Green and Wei Li see the risks to growth rather than inflation ? the latter, they write, should ease as oil price pressure subsides in a soft global economy, and the pig problem, they add, will likely be addressed by rising production. Therefore they see little risk of tightening before 2013, but any stimulative measures next year will likely be new projects in irrigation, housing and the like ? possibly supported by the banks, to get around the local government financing issues. スタンダード・チャータードの中国担当エコノミストであるStephen GreenとWei Liによれば、中国経済のリスクはインフレーションではなく 成長の鈍化である。インフレは石油価格の圧力がグローバル経済のソフト化によって、また豚肉不足問題が緩和すれば弱まるだろうという。 この為、彼ら中国担当エコノミストは2013年に金融引締めのリスクがあると見ない。来年の経済刺激政策として、灌漑設備や住宅建設があり得る。 可能性としては地方政府・債務問題のサポートのための銀行への支援があり得ると見る。
Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition government in Italy appears in danger of collapsing over European Union demands for a demonstration of concrete action on economic reform by Wednesday’s summit of eurozone leaders. The EU ultimatum delivered to Mr Berlusconi in Brussels on Sunday risks breaking his coalition instead of giving it an external impetus to move ahead on measures to cut Italy’s debt and promote economic growth. The ultimatum was delivered as part of efforts to resolve the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, but the Italians’ failure to reach agreement on reform threatens EU leaders’ stated goal of finalising at Wednesday’s summit a comprehensive solution to the crisis. 日曜日にブリュッセルの欧州首脳会議で、諸国はイタリア政府に対して確固たる経済改革を示すように求めているが、この要求はベルルスコーニの 連立政権を崩壊させる危険がある。諸国首脳はイタリア政府が債務問題に取り組み経済成長を促進することを求めている。イタリアが経済改革に取 り組まない場合には水曜日の欧州サミットのゴール設定(イタリア国債の価格支持政策を含む)の成立が危ぶまれる
“The government is at risk,” Umberto Bossi, leader of the fiercely eurosceptic and federalist Northern League, told reporters in Rome. “The situation is difficult, very dangerous. This is a dramatic moment,” he was quoted as saying. 欧州統合懐疑派で連邦主義者であるイタリアの北部連合の指導者Umberto Bossiは「政権は危機的状況」という。「状況は困難でかつ危険、これは 劇的なモメントだ」と発言している。
Commentators said the crisis was the most serious facing Mr Berlusconi since his election victory in 2008, recalling memories of 1994 when the Northern League brought down his first government after just a few months. The prime minister’s People of Liberty party has proposed that the pension age be raised to 67 years from 65 in line with increasing life expectancy, and that the system of length-of-service pensions also be modified. The Northern League is opposed and La Padania, its party newspaper, on Tuesday attacked what it called “euro-tyranny”. コメンテーターはベルルスコーニが2008年に勝利して以来の最大の危機であるという。それは1994年に北部連合がベルルスコーニの最初の政権を わずか数ヶ月で倒したことを思い出させる。与党の自由人民党は年金の支給開始を65歳から67歳に引き上げる提案を出している。平均寿命の伸び とともに改訂を行い年金システムの変更を言っている。野党の北部連合は機関紙のLa Padaniaで与党を攻撃し「ユーロ独裁主義」とよんでいる
Altero Matteoli, a PDL minister, said a collapse of the government was a “hypothesis”. He also noted that talks were continuing and that a compromise with the Northern League was still possible. Government sources said Mr Berlusconi might only be able to present a declaration of intent on proposed reforms to the Brussels summit. If this was found to be unacceptable, then Italy runs the risk of losing support for its bonds on the open market by the European Central Bank. 閣僚のAltero Matteoliは政権崩壊というのは言い過ぎとしながら、野党との話し合いや妥協の余地はあるとしている。政府関係者はベルルスコーニ が改革政策意図の宣言のみをブリュッセル・サミットに届けることが出来るのかもしれないという。もしそれが受け入れられないならばイタリア国債 はECBの買い支えという支援を失うかも知れない。
The president would play a crucial role in shaping the aftermath of a government collapse. His options would include dissolving parliament and calling snap elections, or trying to find an alternative viable coalition within parliament ? possibly a new leader from the centre-right parties or the appointment of an outside technocrat to lead an interim administration.
Pressure on Mr Berlusconi was also building in Brussels. Amadeu Altafaj, spokesman for the EU economic and monetary affairs commission, said Italy had to back up its commitments to cut its debt and implement structural reforms “with specific actions, with a clear timing for all these actions”. “This is not about challenging sovereignty, it’s not about lecturing, it’s not about humiliating,” he said.
It’s a generally risk-off session, yet gold and oil are surging by nearly 3% each. Sound familiar? It should: Those were the defining characteristics during QE2, when analysts warned the Fed’s bond-buying was fueling asset bubbles in commodity and precious metals markets. 今日はリスクオンの日で株価が下落しているのだが、それでも金と石油は3%近く高騰している、いつか聞いた話ではないか? そう、こういうのはQE2の時期に典型的に見られた。アナリストはFRBの政策が資産バブルをコモディティや貴金属の形で煽る ことになると警告してきた(後略)
China’s largest real estate developer believes the country’s property market, a key driver for the economy, has turned and expects conditions to worsen in the coming months as sales prices volumes decline further. China Vanke, the country’s biggest developer by market share, said government efforts over the past year to rein in soaring prices were having a severe impact on the market and developers were being squeezed after sales volumes in 14 of the country’s largest cities halved in September from a year earlier. 中国最大の不動産開発業者であるChina Vankeの副社長は、昨年来の政府の引き締め措置によって不動産価格が下落しており販売量も低下していて 状況はこの先の数カ月、更に悪化すると述べた。中国の主要14都市の9月の不動産販売額は前年比で半減している。
“We can see a trend of declining sales, especially in the major cities,” Shirley Xiao, executive vice-president at China Vanke, said on a conference call with investors on Tuesday. “Prices have begun to decline little by little so we think even buyers who are able to buy will choose to wait for now because they’re targeting even lower price cuts.” Shirley Xiao副社長は「特に大都市で販売の落ち込む傾向が見られる」という「価格がすこしずつ低下してきているので、購入能力のある買い手で さえ、価格のさらなる低下を期待して様子見に回っている」
A 30 per cent drop in property prices would precipitate a collapse in fixed investment in China and the country’s investment-driven economy would experience a so-called hard landing after years of annual growth above 9 per cent, according to UBS economist Wang Tao. Property investment accounts for more than 20 per cent of total fixed investment in China and UBS estimates almost 30 per cent of final products in the economy are absorbed by the property sector. “A property-led hard landing scenario is quite likely in the next few years, even though we do not think the property market is about to collapse now,” Ms Wang said. UBSのエコノミスト Wang Taoは、いわゆる中国のハードランデイング・シナリオについて、不動産価格が30%程度低下すると、それは固定資産 投資を崩壊させ、投資に依存する中国経済の成長を阻害するという。不動産投資は中国の固定資産投資の20%を占めていて不動産開発業界は中国経 済の最終産出の30%程度を占めているという。「不動産市場が今直ぐに崩壊するとは思わないが、不動産セクター主導のハードランディング・シナ リオというのは今後数年間にあり得る話」という(後略)
For many young voters with high hopes for Barack Obama, his presidency has been something of a disappointment. オバマに大きな望みを託してきた多数の若者にとって、オバマ政権は失望させられるものであった(後略) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *マジックに騙されたとはいえ、それが虚像であった時がつくだけマシで、椿談合熱烈応援団に騙され続ける国民の多いことに比べれば(ry
最近のNYTやWSJに掲載される、(党派的なスピンの多い)政治評論家の大統領選挙予測のコラムについて、Russ Smith --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://www.splicetoday.com/politics-and-media/call-off-the-gop-primaries-pundits-have-already-nominated-romney (代表的な政治評論家のコラムを取り上げ、それらについて個々の批判を書いた後で) I’m lost. Maybe Romney wins it all, maybe Obama has a comeback and maybe there’s a presidential surprise coming up, I don’t know. So let’s revisit these four columnists in mid-January and chart their new certitudes. I’ve got 100 bucks that says their opinions won’t match those of this October.
WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) - Orders for durable goods fell 0.8% in September almost entirely because of lower demand for autos and commercial aircraft, the U.S. Commerce Department said Wednesday. Transportation orders sank 7.5%. Economists surveyed by MarketWatch had expected total orders to fall by 1.0%. Yet orders minus transportation rose 1.7% and orders for core capital goods, which omit the volatile defense and transportation sectors, climbed 2.4%. Core capital orders give a better read on trends in the private sector. Shipments of core capital goods, however, declined by 0.9%. The government uses the shipments data to help calculate gross domestic product. Orders for August were unrevised at a 0.1% decline. 輸送機器受注が7.5%下落。エコノミスト予測は全受注が−1.0%であった。コア耐久財受注(防衛受注と輸送機器を除く)は+2.4%、コア 耐久消費財出荷は−1.0%
Nomura, however, is now predicting that the jig will soon be up and that CDS will end up being triggered. This would probably fall into the “not priced into the market” category and the potential for all kinds of unknown ripples are out there… Here’s what Nomura analysts have to say: ギリシャ負債問題でCDSイベントを起こさない解決策が協議されているが、野村のアナリストはCDSトリガーが最終的には発動されるだろうと 予測している。もしそうなると市場はそれを織り込んでいないので、未知の変動要因ということになる。野村の主張は下記のとおり
In our baseline assumption … we anticipate a scenario with face value reductions of debt of at least 50%. We have been assuming that Euro area leaders would also offer sweeteners either in the form of cash or collateral to the new bonds, similar to the deal made in July, to incentivize participation (although we think that even this would not be enough to garner a large voluntary participation). Recent headlines, however, only discuss large face-value reductions, mentioning little with respect to credit enhancements. Consequently, we think that the methods used to achieve adequate participation into such an exchange scheme make it even more likely that CDS contracts will trigger. 従来はギリシャ国債保有者が損失の受け入れをしやすくするための新規債券発行や担保の提供などがあったが、最新の議論ではもっぱら国債の 額面価値への大幅な削減が言われており、国債保有者には此れを受け入れることが困難であるので、CDSイベントの発動の可能性が高まると考え られる We remain unconvinced in the European policymakers’ ability to take a decisive step forward toward a resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. While plans for the recapitalization of banks may only modestly disappoint markets, the bigger question relates to final decisions surrounding EFSF leverage and the ECB?s involvement in the sovereign bond markets. ソブリン負債危機を断固として解決するという方策への欧州の政策担当者の能力に我々は懐疑的である。欧州の銀行の資本強化策は勇気づけられ るものといえず、より大きな問題であるEFSFレバレッジをめぐる問題、ECBのソブリン国債市場への介入などへの疑問が残る。
While it seems increasingly clear that the ECB will remain involved in the secondary sovereign bond markets for the time being, it appears more likely that its involvement will be conditional on the implementation of requisite fiscal policies in Italy and less committal than markets hope to see. With the appropriate backstops still missing a CDS trigger in Greece continues to have potential for contagion across the euro area, leading to increased risk premia, even if the direct losses from a Greek credit event remain relatively small. In addition, there is a residual tail-risk related to liquidity provisions to Greek banks. This tail risk is small and, we believe, manageable; any hiccup, however, could have severe consequences.
Medicare (Canada) Medicare (French: assurance-maladie) is the unofficial name for Canada's publicly funded universal health insurance system.[1] The formal terminology for the insurance system is provided by the Canada Health Act and the health insurance legislation of the individual provinces and territories. ttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medicare_(Canada)
WSJブレーキング・ニュース The euro zone is closing in on a deal for a 50% writedown of Greek bonds, three officials familiar with the situation said. ttp://asia.wsj.com/home-page
◇みんすマニフェストの「財源は予算のムダ削減」を見て、FTは「ファンタジー」と断言、一方国内メディアは大絶賛! The money it is promising to shower on low-income families, parents, farmers (and anyone else who might vote for it) is meant to come from pruning waste. But, with election pledges costing around 3.5 per cent of GDP, that is fantasy. ttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d7b18e78-8b59-11de-9f50-00144feabdc0.html
Dear bondholders, you are invited to… Posted by Kate Mackenzie on Oct 27 05:36. 9 comments | Share ギリシャ国債保有各位へのお誘い(EUサミットのステートメントについてFTアルファビレ)
The full statement from the euro summit is out. ステートメント全文が公開された >>820 The details begin on page 4 and, as reported, private Greece bondholders are “invited” to take a 50 per cent haircut 4ページから説明が。民間のギリシャ国債保有者各位は(50%ヘアカット理髪店に)“invited”されますた ttp://ftalphaville.ft.com/
FTアルファビレのエントリーで、EU危機サミットでの「合意」(ステートメント)についての疑問点や問題点を整理しているもの。 大変ごもっともというべきであろうと思ふ(内容は要約しない) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/10/27/713546/so-many-bailout-questions/ So. Many. Bailout questions Posted by FT Alphaville on Oct 27 09:26. A few, initial head-scratchers at pixel time. EU債務危機の救済計画の、あまりにも多い疑問点 FTアルファビレ 27日
First, the Greek debt deal: まずギリシャ救済計画についてだが(ry *5項目の問題点を列挙、5番目は(CDSの)クレジット・イベントになる可能性・・・
On to our second set of questions ? the EFSF part of last night’s deal. EFSF強化案についても疑問点が・・・ *2項目の疑問点をあげている
これらの問題点、疑問点を挙げた上で、このコメンタリーの〆は How likely is it that we’ll see the level of fiscal integration alluded to in the agreement? A commitment to “consultation of the Commission and other euro area Member State before the adoption of any major fiscal or economic policy reform plans with potential spillover effects,” sounds like a big deal, and a sign of some determination to get at the root of the problem (or, one of them) by really deepening fiscal integration. Or, it could just be aspirational hot air. By Kate Mackenzie and Joseph Cotterill
*最後のセンテンスの「aspirational hot air」というのは、熱望による空手形といった意味合いが有るように思う(解釈はいろいろ有りそう) **明日は爆上げと思う心の徒桜、夜半にCDSトリガーが(ry
タイの新聞を見ていると政府の無能・無策を非難する声が。米の空母が応援に駆けつけたけれどタイ政府の支援不必要とのメッセージで 引き返したことに呆れるというのがその典型。より本質的なものの一つは2ヶ月前に北部地域などで降り続いた雨で貯水ダムが一杯になっ ていた時点で、管理された放流を検討すべきであって、そういう措置があればここまで最悪にならなかったという説も。 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ●Floods could have been mitigated 2 months ago
While we are in the midst of a flood that is unprecedented in recent memory in Thailand, I'd like to suggest that this flood is not a natural disaster like the tsunami that hit Thailand on Dec 26, 2004. The present flood started about three months ago in the North and Central Plains. As the reservoirs rapidly filled up and started to flood the surrounding provinces, it is incredulous that nobody realised the flood waters would eventually have to be drained somewhere. If a decision had been made to start a controlled drainage of the flood waters through all the canals and rivers three months ago, we might now be having a more manageable situation. The seeds of this disaster may have started as nature's doing, but I think the authorities are to be credited with turning this into a man-made national disaster.
●PM to blame for not acting from the start Re: ''It's clear Yingluck not to blame for flooding'' (Postbag, Oct 25). Kuldeep Nagi of Assumption University is right that the Thai people need to be educated to cope with natural disasters. However, his motive is questionable when he says PM Yingluck Shinawatra did not cause the current Bangkok flooding in any way. When dams in the upper part of the country were not opened early enough, and when the flood waters that passed through Nakhon Sawan had not been diverted adequately before it reached Ayuthaya and Bangkok, aren't these reason enough to ask the government what warranted its inaction? If not, then what do we have governments for? By the way, I thought universities were for teaching children to develop critical thinking and questioning minds, so that Thailand's governments can become more mature and responsible. Mr Nagi has proved me wrong. ttp://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/263184/is-this-govt-for-real バンコク・ポスト、タイ英字紙
EU債務危機のサミットでの「合意」でギリシャ国債の50%ヘアカットを銀行団が「自主的に」受け入れるということになって 株式市場は大暴騰のおまつりさわぎ(より正確には過剰なショートの一斉カバー)になっているけれどFTに書いているWolfgang Munchauは此れに大変批判的で、「I do not believe this is going to work.」という。 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/10/27/half-measures-and-wishful-thinking-do-not-a-solution-make/#axzz1bxUEbRhh Half measures and wishful thinking do not a solution make By Wolfgang Munchau October 27, 2011
(前段大幅省略) I do not believe this is going to work.
First, the agreement with the IIF is not binding on the banks. The IIF has yet to deliver the voluntary participation. Many banks would be better off if the haircut was involuntary, given their offsetting positions in credit default swaps. The whole point of a CDS is to ensure creditors against an involuntary default.
My second reason for scepticism concerns the forecast of sustainable 120 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio. The European Union has been consistently wrong in its economic forecasts for Greece. They misjudged the impact of austerity on economic growth and public sector deficits. This misjudgement is the reason why the voluntary bank haircut of 21 per cent, agreed in July, has now grown to 50 per cent. What happens if the outlook were to deteriorate further? There is no sign yet of a turnaround.
Third, in the unlikely event that the banks come up with the money, and that Greece manages to hit a 120 per cent debt-to-GDP level in 2020, it is far from clear that Greece can return to the capital markets even then. I believe that Greece will require a much lower debt-to-GDP level, perhaps around 80 per cent, to achieve sustainability and access to market funding. Italy has a debt-to-GDP of 120 per cent now ? this number may have served as a benchmark for policymakers. But Italy has a far more solid base of domestic savers than Greece, and this level is not sustainable for Italy either.
EFSFについて Leveraging can work, but only if the eurozone were willing to provide an unlimited backstop. This would be either in the form of an explicit lender-of-last-resort guarantee by the European Central Bank, or through a eurobond ? or ideally both.
WSJ欧州版の準社説というべき「レビュー&アウトルック」もブリュッセルの救済策合意に批判的な評論を掲げている。論点はFTの Wolfgang Munchauの言っていることと基本的に同じ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577001671498250002.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopBucket REVIEW & OUTLOOK EUROPEOCTOBER 28, 2011 Brussels Non-Breakthrough:Europe's policy makers are still ignoring the crisis's real origins. ブリュッセルの非ブレークスルー:欧州の政策立案者たちは、依然として危機の根本的要因を無視している WSJ R&O,欧州版
But that's small consolation now that the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and euro-zone governments hold about 40% of all Greek debt, a figure that will only grow as privately held bonds mature. As long as these institutions refuse to take haircuts on their own Greek holdings, a private-sector haircut can only go so far toward reducing total debt. As it is, the voluntary write-down is expected to reduce outstanding Greek debt to?this is almost comic?120% of GDP by 2020. This gives new meaning to kicking the can down the road. And that's the best-case scenario. ・・・・ Not surprisingly, markets rallied at yesterday's news, with the euro gaining 2.4% against the dollar. That isn't the first time a Brussels summit has triggered a burst of market relief. But without economic growth and more fundamental reform, yesterday's deal will merely be the latest palliative. (注 palliative【名】一時しのぎ(の手段)《医》苦痛緩和剤)
First, the agreement with the IIF is not binding on the banks. The IIF has yet to deliver the voluntary participation. Many banks would be better off if the haircut was involuntary, given their offsetting positions in credit default swaps. The whole point of a CDS is to ensure creditors against an involuntary default.
Think the all-clear has been sounded on a Greece default? Not so fast, says Barclays Capital. 欧州債務危機の、ギリシャのデフォルトの問題は全てクリアされたと思っている? それは早計に過ぎるとバークレィズ・キャピタルが言っている
They warn that that credit default swaps on Greece could still be triggered despite the so-called “voluntary” exchange. They note that there’s a key unknown about how much “voluntary” participation is being counted on by European officials to make the deal work. And even if they reach that unknown number, there’s still the little matter of whether Greece will be able to pay its remaining debts… バークレィズはギリシャのCDSのトリガーの危険は、いわゆる「自主的な」ヘアカット承認においても存在するよいう。彼らは「自主的」な債務カット の受け入れを、どれだけの債権者が承認しているのか、欧州の政策担当者が未知であるという。その数が既知であったとしてもギリシャが残存債務を 支払えるのかという疑問があるという。
Here’s what they have to say: バークレイズの主張は以下のとおり We believe the key question is: will the EU/Greece achieve their desired participation rate (not yet disclosed) with a purely voluntary process? Given the magnitude of the haircuts required, we would be surprised if there are not a significant number of holdouts among non-bank, non-insurer holders, particularly among holders of shorter-dated 2012-13 bonds (nearly EUR70bn of bonds mature by YE 2013). If the EU is willing to live with a significant number of such holdouts, they could accomplish this round of PSI without a CDS trigger. We suspect this could be difficult and, thus, believe the risk of a mandatory process in the near term (and a resulting CDS trigger) remains reasonably high. Further, we also highlight that even if a “voluntary” process is completed, Greece’s debt sustainability after this restructuring would remain far from certain and the debt dynamics would remain stressed. As a result, the risk of a future restructuring/CDS trigger would remain significant for some time.