太平洋戦線でアメリカは27,000機もの航空機を失ったって知ってるか? 欧州戦では未生還機に修理不能機(lost or damaged beyond repair) を加えても18,000機なのに対し。
Aggregate United States plane losses during the course of the Pacific war, not including training losses in the United States, were approximately 27,000 planes. Of these losses 8,700 were on combat missions; the remainder were training, ferrying and other noncombat losses. Of the combat losses over 60 percent were to antiaircraft fire.
In the attack by Allied air power, almost 2,700,000 tons of bombs were dropped, more than 1,440,000 bomber sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties were flown. The number of combat planes reached a peak of some 28,000 and at the maximum 1,300,000 men were in combat commands. The number of men lost in air action was 79,265 Americans and 79,281 British. [Note: All RAF statistics are preliminary or tentative.] More than 18,000 American and 22,000 British planes were lost or damaged beyond repair.
c. Current plans for the air transport route to CHINA con- template that its present capacity of approximately 3,000 tons per month may be expanded to approximately 10,000 tons per month by the end of 1943. Due to physical limitations imposed by the area in which this line operates, it is doubt- ful whether this latter figure can be exceeded until ANAKIM or a Revised ANAKIM has been accomplished. d. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that the forces required to conduct planned combat operations in CHINA are as follows: 4 Fighter Groups 300 airplanes 2 Medium Bomber Groups 114 " 1 Heavy Bomber Group 35 " 1 Reconn. Squadron 24 " TOTAL 473 airplanes http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/t17j06.html
3. The U. S. Fourteenth Air Force actually possessed the following plane strength in June 1945: Fighters--483; medium bombers--127; heavy bombers--65; photo and night-fighter aircraft--48; total--723. USSBS, ibid., p. 67. http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/utm/kogun.txt
During the war, FEAF units flew 720,980 sorties and delivered 476,000 tons of ordnance. For these numbers FEAF estimated it had killed nearly 150,000 North Korean and Chinese troops and claimed the destruction of more than 975 aircraft, 800 bridges, 1,100 tanks, 800 locomotives, 9,000 railroad cars, 70,000 motor vehicles, and 80,000 buildings. This damage was inflicted at the cost of 1,841 men killed, wounded and missing, and 750 aircraft destroyed by the enemy.
Over 1,180,000 tons of supplies and equipment and 1,380,000 troops were transported by air. The air movement over the "hump" between India and China attained a peak rate of 71,000 tons in 1 month. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS-PTO-Summary.html
3. The U. S. Fourteenth Air Force actually possessed the following plane strength in June 1945: Fighters--483; medium bombers--127; heavy bombers--65; photo and night-fighter aircraft--48; total--723. USSBS, ibid., p. 67. http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/utm/kogun.txt
c. Current plans for the air transport route to CHINA con- template that its present capacity of approximately 3,000 tons per month may be expanded to approximately 10,000 tons per month by the end of 1943. Due to physical limitations imposed by the area in which this line operates, it is doubt- ful whether this latter figure can be exceeded until ANAKIM or a Revised ANAKIM has been accomplished. d. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that the forces required to conduct planned combat operations in CHINA are as follows: 4 Fighter Groups 300 airplanes 2 Medium Bomber Groups 114 " 1 Heavy Bomber Group 35 " 1 Reconn. Squadron 24 " TOTAL 473 airplanes http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/t17j06.html
But a fundamental question remains: What good end was served by the emergency delivery of 650,000 tons of this and that into China? Certainly little went directly to the aid of the Chinese people and relatively little to the Chinese armies, though it can be urged that the regime of Chiang Kai-shek would have collapsed without the support of General Chennault's command and that Chennault's men were wholly dependent upon the Hump lift.
In dealing with the first of these three points, the memorandum applied the "strategic axiom" that the commander should first attack and defeat the weaker force of a divided enemy. Eisenhower reasoned that although Germany and its satellites were stronger in total combat power than Japan, Japan was still "relatively stronger" since it was not at war with the Soviet Union and much less accessible to attack by the main forces of the other Allied powers. Moreover, it took three to four times as many ships to transport and maintain a given American force in the Pacific as in the Atlantic. Therefore, Eisenhower concluded, "logistic reasons, as well as strategic axiom, substantiate the soundness of the decision to concentrate against the European Axis. http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/Sp1941-42/chapter7.htm
>Germany and its satellites were stronger in total combat power than Japan, >Japan was still "relatively stronger" since it was not at war with the Soviet Union