>>3 A socially enforced signal of quality in a paper wasp
ELIZABETH A. TIBBETTS1,* AND JAMES DALE2
1 Department of Neurobiology and Behavior, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853, USA and Center for Insect Sciences & Division of
Neurobiology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA
2 Department of Biological Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6, Canada
* Present address: Center for Insect Sciences & Division of Neurobiology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to E.A.T. (
[email protected]).
Organisms use signals of quality to communicate information about aspects of their relative phenotypic and genetic constitution. Badges
of status are a subset of signals of quality that reveal information about an individual's size and dominance. In general, signals of quality
require high and differential costs to remain honest (that is, prevent low-quality cheaters from exploiting any fitness benefits associated
with communicating high quality). The theoretically required costs for badges of status remain controversial because the development (or 'production')
of such signals often seems to be relatively cost-free. One important hypothesis is that such signals impose social (or 'maintenance') costs incurred through
repeated agonistic interactions with other individuals. However, convincing empirical evidence for social costs remains elusive. Here we report social costs in a previously
undescribed badge of status: the highly variable black facial patterns of female paper wasps, Polistes dominulus. Facial patterns strongly predict body size and social dominance.
Moreover, in staged contests between pairs of unfamiliar wasps, subordinate wasps with experimentally altered facial features ('cheaters') received considerably
more aggression from the dominant than did sham controls,
indicating that facial patterns are signals and that dishonest signalling imposes social costs.
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