From October, 1944, to the end of the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese flew 2,550 Kamikaze missions, of which 475, or 18.6 percent were effective in securing hits or damaging near misses. Warships of all types were damaged, including 12 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, and 16 light and escort carriers. However, no ship larger than an escort carrier was sunk. Approximately 45 vessels were sunk, the bulk of which were destroyers. http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm
Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II Table 20 -- Military Personnel Overseas, By Theater and by Type of Personnel: Jan 1943 to Aug 1945
ここにArmy Air Forces人員数が戦線別年代別で詳しく載っている。 確かにC&I-B(中国・インド・ビルマ戦線)の人員割り当ては、ETO(欧州戦線)や MTO(地中海戦線)よりは少ないとはいえ、1944年末だと9万人くらいにはなる。 さらにそれとは別に、「Twentieth Air Force」(B-29運用部隊)もそのころまでは中国からの出撃だったはずだ。
>さらにそれとは別に、「Twentieth Air Force」(B-29運用部隊)もそのころまでは中国からの出撃だったはずだ。
The Twentieth Air Force was brought into existence on 4 April 1944 specifically to perform strategic bombardment missions against Japan. This was done at the insistence of General General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, commander of the USAAF, mainly to avoid having the new B-29 Superfortress being diverted to tactical missions under pressure from the China Burma India Theater commanders. Twentieth Air Force was be commanded by General Arnold himself at Joint Chiefs of Staff level. Twentieth Air Force was completely autonomous and it's B-29s were be completely independent of other command structures and would be dedicated exclusively against strategic targets in Japan.
In addition Twentieth Air Force was chosen (secretly) to be the operational component of the Manhattan Project in 1944, and performed the atomic attacks on Japan in August 1945.
http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t20.htm Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II Table 20 -- Military Personnel Overseas, By Theater and by Type of Personnel: Jan 1943 to Aug 1945
B-29 losses to accidents, enemy interception, and to Japanese air attacks on the Chengtu forward bases soon came to be prohibitive, and by the end of 1944 had reached 147.
LeMay gradually cut back on the number of missions flown out of the Chinese bases in favor of missions to Singapore, Borneo, Malaya, and Sumatra that could be flown from the bases in India where the supply situation was much more favorable.
By late 1944, it was becoming apparent that B-29 operations against Japan staged out of bases in Chengtu were far too expensive in men and materials and would have to be stopped. In December of 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the decision that Operation Matterhorn would be phased out, and the 58th Bombardment Wing's B-29s would be moved to newly-captured bases in the Marianas in the central Pacific.
The last raid out of China was flown on January 15, 1945, which was an attack on targets in Formosa. The 58th Bombardment Wing then withdrew to its bases in India and was redeployed to the Marianas in February.
During Operation Matterhorn, 49 separate missions had been flown involving 3058 individual aircraft sorties. Only 11,477 tons of bombs had been dropped. In spite of the massive effort involved in Operation Matterhorn, only insignificant damage had been done to targets in Japan.
I have been informed that the Chinese Government has hired 100 pilots and 181 ground personnel to man and service 100 P-40's. In the next few months we are delivering to China 269 pursuit planes and 66 bombers. The Chinese pilot training program here will not begin to turn out well-trained pilots until next summer. In the interim, therefore, I think we should facilitate the hiring by the Chinese Government further volunteer pilots here. I suggest, therefore, that beginning in January, you should accept the resignations of additional pilots and ground personnel as care to accept employment in China, up to a limit of 100 pilots and a proportional number of ground personnel. I am directing Mr.Lauchlin Currie to see that representatives of China carry out the hiring program with the minimum of inconvenience to the Navy and also to see that no more are hired than are necessary.
he was not familiar with the Polish issue (マーシャル元帥は)ポーランド問題には興味が無かった
they hoped for Soviet participation in the war against Japan at a time (米軍は)その当時においてソ連の対日参戦を希望していた
GENERAL MARSHALL said he was not familiar with the Polish issue and its political aspects. He said from the military point of view the situation in Europe was secure but that they hoped for Soviet participation in the war against Japan at a time when it would be useful to us. The Russians had it within their, power to delay their entry into the Far Eastern war until we had done all the dirty work. He said the difficulties with the Russians such as in the case of CROSSWORD usually straightened out. He was inclined to agree with Mr. Stimson that possibility of a break with Russia was very serious.