Actually, there is computer lab where I can use Japanese code, I don't want to go there. It's far from my room. I have no energy to use the template. Now, I'm stuck into the computer lab in deparment of Economics and practicing spoken English for around 2 hours. I have to record my voice into a tape for an assignment. That's a kind of a torture. I need help. A-sama, could you please sing the song of Kosuda-Buchou?
Why should there be a distinction between cooperation among unrelated individuals and that among related individuals at all? We have learned that genetics is the basis upon which evolutionary change is taking place. Fitness was defined above in terms of successful reproduction, i.e. the number of offspring carrying the selected allele. The more offspring, the “fitter” the parent. Darwin’s “struggle for existence” is a struggle for reproduction. With sexual reproduction, however, only one half of an organism’s genome is transferred into one of his offspring at a time.
Therefore, any particular trait - depending on its mode of inheritance ? is often transmitted from a parent to its offspring with a probability smaller than one. Thus, in order to transmit as many of one’s genes into the next generation as possible (and hence be evolutionarily s uccessful), an organism has to produce as many surviving offspring as possible in order to maximize the probability of transmitting all its genetic information. This might constitute a difficult task, however, since all its competitors try to do the same. But there are other sources of one’s own genes available: relatives.
Why should there be a distinction between cooperation among unrelated individuals and that among related individuals at all? We have learned that genetics is the basis upon which evolutionary change is taking
"No instinct has been produced for the exclusive good of other animals, but each animal takes advantage of the instincts of others" (Darwin 1859). Ever since Darwin the evolutionary success of a seemingly obvious contradiction to his statement has raised the interests of naturalists all over the world: some cooperating animals are clearly mutualistic or even altruistic. Before the 1960s only a few scientists attempted to understand the evolutionary processes underlying cooperation. since group selection seemed to explain cooperative societies. Yet. research in later years could not support a pervasive group-benefit view of selection; how then can cooperative genotypes spread in an environment of selfish genes? Currently, the evolution of cooperation can be divided into several general categories: e.g. 1) by-product mutualism where cooperation is an incidental outcome from genuinely selfish behaviour (Dugatkin et al. 1992) kin-selected altruism (Hamilton 1964) with its climax in the social insects and 3) reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) among unrelated individuals. The 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is used as the standard metaphor to conceptualise the conflict between mutual support and selfish exploitation among interacting non-relatives in biological communities.
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is widely regarded as a standard model for the evolution of cooperation. This review tries to give an outline of the development in the field since Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) spawned an avalanche of papers with the announcement of Tit-for-tat as the winner of their computer tournament. The most important advancements in the game-theoretical work on different aspects of the game are described. It becomes evident that changing any of the numerous parameters of the game will inevitably change the outcome; there is virtually no end to the IPD. Using experimental data from various taxa, the applicability of the IPD in nature is analysed and potential future developments in the area are discussed.