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In January's issue we are going to profile a company involved in the Hot Brazilian gaming industry. This company's st0ck is very much undervalued considering the potential of the industry and the position of the company. (The perfect time to get in) This small treasure is: Carnegie Cooke & Company, Inc. (CGKY) The st0ck is trading at only O.11 - O.13 cents and we expect it could hit $0.30 - $0.35 by late January. A Huge PR campaign is expected starting Wednesday and all next week so grab as much as you can up to $0.25 range. We all know it's the big announcements that make these small gems move. Carnegie Cooke & Company and Charlson Broadcast Technologies (CBT, LLC), introduces International Simulcast Signal to Brazil! St0ck Symbol: CGKY . pk
How will it react to being blasted onto investors radar screens starting this Wednesday!!
We expect the price to go to $O.18 in next 2-3 days We expect the price to go to $O.3O in next 3 weeks.
** Why we believe CGKY will be a good investment **
Carnegie Cooke is a media and distribution company in the Brazilian turf industry. The Brazilian Department of Agriculture reports that in 2003 turf/gaming industry revenues were in excess of US$400_milli0n, in local racing events, using un-mechanized facilities. Carnegie Cooke's Brazilian subsidiary has been granted the right by the Brazilian Association of Jockey Clubs and the endorsement of the Brazilian Government to mechanize Jockey Club facilities, and to implement international simulcast racing throughout Brazil.
Their philosophy is to identify an untapped and underutilized economic niche in the Brazilian turf betting community, therefore allowing the populace to enjoy the technological advantages associated with the domestic and international betting universe. This is done through the introduction of simulcasts of United States horse races and the ability to bet on them in the same fashion as if the bettors were actually at the American track.
By introducing this technology into the Brazilian revenue model, Carnegie Cooke will enhance the Brazilian turf industry thereby strengthening revenues. Carnegie Cooke intends to extend this philosophy to other areas of the Brazilian gaming community as opportunities arise in the dynamic Brazilian economy.
Carnegie Cooke & Company, Inc. (CGKY.PK) is in the process of acquiring two new locations in Niteroi, the island city adjoining Rio de Janeiro. Niteroi is one of the most affluent suburbs in Brazil. Its population is greater than 500,000 with a daily average of 300,000 commuters. These potential new locations are in addition to the existing domestic revenue generating OTB's currently being expanded in Campos and Macae. Carnegie Cooke recently signed a three year contract, with an option for three additional years, for exclusivity with the Jockey Club de Campos to operate both domestic and international simulcast signals related to the turf industry throughout the state of Rio de Janeiro.
With ownership of the Campos facility, the domestic betting signal allows access to forty existing accredited domestic simulcast signal OTB's within the state of Rio de Janeiro. Management is in the process of analyzing these sites for the inclusion into its expanding OTB network. Goto your favorite final website and read up on this company. How do u think this companies stock is going to react to thousands of investors viewing this same very thing? Is this companys stock ready to roll? We ThinK So! St0ck Symbol: CGKY . pk
Current Price: $0.10
We expect the price to go to $0.18 in next 2-3 days We expect the price to go to $0.30 in next 3 weeks. Please watch this one trade on Wednesday!
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Where others say NO, we say YES!!! Even if you have been turned down elsewhere, we can help!
Easy terms! Our mortgage referral service combines the highest quality loans with the most economical rates and the easiest qualifications!
Take just 2 minutes to complete the following form. There is no obligation, all information is kept strictly confidential, and you must be at least 18 years of age. Service is available within the United States only. This service is fast and free.
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UNIVERSITY DIPLOMAS OBTAIN A PROSPEROUS FUTURE, MONEY-EARNING POWER, AND THE PRESTIGE THAT COMES WITH THE DEGREE YOU HAVE ALWAYS DREAMED OF. NON-ACCREDITED UNIVERSITIES BASED ON YOUR PRESENT KNOWLEDGE AND LIFE EXPERIENCE. If you qualify, no tests, study, books or exams. We have Bachelor's, MBA's, Doctorate & PhD degrees available in your field. CONFIDENTIALITY ASSURED CALL NOW TO GET YOUR DIPLOMA WITHIN 2 WEEKS
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Me keqardhjen me te madhe morem lajmin se Imzot Mark Sopi, ipeshkev i Ipeshkvise se Kosoves nderroi jete nga nje goditje ne zemer, ne moshen 67-vjecare.
Bota shqiptare varferohet nga zhdukja e Imzot Mark Sopit, i cili me sjelljet e tija fisnike, fetare e patriotike, pasuroi dhe urtesoi shoqerine tone shqiptare shume te vuajtur. Ishte nje nder i madh per mua qe pata rastin ta takoja Imzot Sopin dhe te bisedoja ne disa raste per hallet tona.
Ne bisedat me Imzot Sopin, ai gjithmone fliste me nje fryme te natyrshme harmonizimi shoqeror e vellazerie kombetare. Imzot Sopi punoi shume edhe per pavaresine e Kosoves, te cilen ai e shihte si te vetmen zgjidhje te denje per ate popull te vuajtur.
"Lindja e Krishtit mund te krahasohet me lindjen e nje realiteti te ri (pavaresi) ne Kosove" tha Imzot Sopi gjate predikimit me rastin e Krishtlindjeve te fundit, dhe u beri thirrje besimtareve te luteshin per nje Kosove te pavarur, deklarate kjo qe beri Beogradin zyrtar te ankohej prane Vatikanit.
Drejte ketij qellimi Imzot Sopi vepronte e bashkpunonte ngushte edhe me udheheqesit politike te Kosoves, duke filluar nga Presidenti Rugova e te tjere. Mungesa e tij do jete shume e ndjeshme.
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No one is writing to a teacher When you have a team, let us say, football team, and you loose game after game, than or you need to change the players or you have to review team leaders’ work. This is a normal situation. But for the people who never played football, and for the people who never leaded something before, this situation represents tragedy. In such situation you learn some lessons:
(1) you do not continuously engage the same players with whom you are loose games, (2) the position of the team leader is not something that cannot be changed, (3) situation like this is normal because otherwise there is no development, etc. So the same lesson is valid for the educational filed/situation in Kosova. Many approaches have been used and changed in order to develop the educational field. But none of them functioned; due to different reasons
But the most tragic thing in this situation is that millions of Euros has been spending in these ‘educational approaches’. They remain money invested in nothing, money for nothing. But people, who proposed such actions, remain in the same positions, stay where they are. Nobody gave any accountability or responsibility. The way how MEST officials act is like nothing has happened, everything is normal, the work continuous. OK, you cannot ignore the work but what kind of work are they talking about, and who benefits from it?
Everybody benefits except educational system here: they have opened private school so they make money up to hundred of thousand Euros per year, if you get to know someone in MEST or UP you might just have yourfaculty done, someone works in more than three kind of jobs, somebody uses MEST more for personal beneficiary, and so on.
Such situation has nothing to do with the approach to development of education in Kosova. Such situation only destroys more this fragile educational field that we already have. Human being is not perfect. The same goes for the minister of MEST. But still, he is a minister; the first and the last man of the education in Kosova. He approves final decisions, no matter how they are.
There are many things that are missing in the educational system of Kosova. This is well known. But not every thing that misses is as a result of the Serbia, Russia, America or Asia or Europe engagement in Kosova. But the minister is the one who can stop these mistakes/lacks.
Not everything in Kosova is to through it away, and to start from the beginning. In principle, every time you talk about ‘new thing’ it means something good/positive, no matter the reality afterwards. So, education in Kosova should have been ‘something new’ after the confused period, including the years 90’.
The irony is that even now, in 2000’ years, the same situation continues, the confusion period of the development of the education in Kosova goes much deeper.
Once again, I’m talking about the approach towards development of the education in Kosova. Oratory of this approach is on of the best, no dilemma about it. But the reality, practicalities and implementation of the works is opposite to oratory.
Example: millions of Euros of the Government of Kosova, through the MEST, has been spend in different NGOs and ‘institutes’ concerning the development of curricula’s for the preschool, primary, secondary and university level of education.
But now/today it is so simple to evaluate these curricula’s, their results: they are nothing but half-translated documents. And for greater irony, not very long time ago, millions of euros are going to be spend/delivered for the same purpose. Except this, millions of euros have been spend these days on international organizations to review these curricula’s; when a farmer here in Kosova, whose priority is a tractor, can easily say that these curricula’s are not working / functioning.
No offence to farmers. Students, professors or technical / technological lacks are not to be blamed of that. Once more, this is money for nothing. If we were a normal society, people who recommended these initiatives would give accountability and responsibility.
Further more. It is well know that collaboration/cooperation is essential in achieving something positive. In this case, teacher’s experience, of every level, is un-avoided but welcomed. This does not mean that everything that they propose/recommend should be approved.
This is the situation/case where you start to build/establish collaboration, therefore communication between MEST - educational personnel, except other benefits that come from it. But the opposite happened.
None of the teachers, no matter their professional preparedness, was asked and they continue to be ignored, to use their practical experience of teaching. Teachers need to change their way of teaching / methodology, including other practicalities regarding to their positions and job description.
But the change of the working methods is not something that can be achieved only by MEST. Teachers are now aware they have to go through some changes; they can acquire these changes better if MEST includes them into this process of change.
Unfortunately, due to this situation, many of the teachers ‘change’ their working methods only because of their wage they expect to rise afterwards. Again, this is due to the lack of collaboration/cooperation MEST - teacher.
There is no normalization of the educational filed in Kosova in this way. In this way you can easily establish governmental ‘system corrupted’. The Albanian Dictionary of 1972 does not clarify ‘system corrupted’. I believe that MEST has to update this Dictionary, among other things they have to do.
The demarcation stones which run along Serbia's boundary with Kosovo divide many a ploughed field and backyard in the village of Mura, the southernmost village in Serbia. Back in the 1970's, Dragutin Cirkovic, now a 60-year-old pensioner from Mura, carved out many such rocks, which have stood the test of time, both good and bad.
If Kosovo Albanians get the statehood they demand, Serbs in the village of Mura may find their property- and even their houses - lying in two different states.
Albanian villagers in Kosovo living close to the border with Macedonia face the same dilemma - a new international border that slices through their property and their daily lives.
"I am really worried that Kosovo might be granted independence," Cirkovic says. People in Belgrade and the rest of Serbia don't really understand local problems, he maintains.
"Our village has no concrete roads and the television reception is so bad we can only just about watch it," he adds. "The state has invested precious little around here. Everything meant for these parts seems to end up in Presevo, where Albanian minority lives."
The United Nations has administered Kosovo since NATO intervened in 1999 to end the conflict between Serb and Albanian forces but it is still officially part of Serbia. Administrative border crossings were set up in 1999, controlled by international and local police and customs officers. Kosovo's status remains undefined ahead of the upcoming talks between Belgrade and Pristina, a cause of growing concern to people who live in border villages like Mura.
Many need to cross the border daily and they fear a two-state solution will greatly complicate their lives. Dragan, about 20 years younger than Dragutin Cirkovic, says part of the woods he owns lie on the Kosovo side of the border. To get a licence to chop down the trees he has to travel about 20 kilometres to Leposavic, a mainly Serbian village in northern Kosovo. However, his other administrative business has to be settled in Serbia.
Livestock, on the other hand, can be taken to pasture without any restrictions although there were fears about this when international peacekeepers first arrived in this area, which was then a buffer zone and with no army or police present.
Serb soldiers and police now regularly patrol Mura and Dragan says they reassure the local population. But constant uncertainty over Kosovo's independence, which he brands "psychological destruction," remains a nagging concern. "Independence for Kosovo would cause an exodus of [Kosovo] Serbs and if that happens the buffer zone ...would be gone," he says. "We would be completely exposed here."
Mura is not the only village whose inhabitants commute to Kosovo daily. A large part of Serbia's southern Raska region, including Mura and Rudnica and the town of Raska itself, is bound to Kosovo by business, education and trade.
Marko, a private entrepreneur who makes blankets in Raska and sells them across the border in Leposavic, has to pass through customs every day to take his goods into Kosovo, although it is officially part of the same country.
"The procedure is exactly the same as it would be for exporting goods to a foreign country," he says. Police on both side of the administrative border at Rudnica check the goods, which means matters can drag on for hours. Marko already views Kosovo as a separate state but adds that his business will carry on no matter how the situation is resolved.
"It makes no difference to me if Kosovo becomes independent or if it stays as it is because my goods are already treated as exports," he told Balkan Insight.
About 100 truckloads of goods cross daily from Serbia into Kosovo at Rudnica, according to sources. But goods travelling in the opposite direction from Kosovo to Serbia are not permitted to use the crossing at Rudnica. They have to pass through another border crossing, at Presevo.
The ban is unfortunate, as the extra traffic would help the impoverished town to support itself on the imports, transit and other spin-offs. There might be at least 50 more jobs in the transit business itself, which would then pave the way for the creation of other small businesses, such as petrol stations, cafes, motels, transport and vehicle insurance companies
At Rudnica there are special procedures for the people and vehicles who need to cross the administrative border daily. Ana Karanovic, a 17-year-old student from Rudnica, is one of many students who cross every day to attend classes in Lesak, in northern Kosovo. Most school pupils can cross without identification documents, though anyone over 18 must produce one.
"The control procedures can take up to half an hour on each side of the border," she says. "The police sometimes turn the whole bus inside out but they can also be really lazy when they feel like it." Close by the border, Slavisa Premovic, a farmer, works away at his fields. Many older men in the area have already turned their fields over to pasture, he says. They cannot look after them, as so many younger people have packed up and left.
For all the evident signs of decay and depopulation, Mr Premovic says there is still hope for the embattled Serbs on the southern border, as long as the Serbian negotiating team on Kosovo keeps a firm line. "I hope they don't buckle at a critical moment," he says, "though at the end of the day, it all depends on the international community and NATO." He adds. "Kosovo has always been part of Serbia and that's how it should stay."
Martti Ahtisaari, the man charged with leading talks on the future of Kosovo, has just completed his first tour of the region. Thus far his statements have been factual and neutral in tone. The former Finnish president has discussed the mechanics of the talks he is about to begin and has declined to say either how long they will last or what he thinks the outcome should be.
So far, so good. And of course all concerned hope that when the talks start in earnest they will somehow produce a result acceptable to all. In reality everyone knows that this will not be possible, for while Kosovo Albanians demand full independence, Serbia is sticking to its position that the province, now under UN jurisdiction, can have "more than autonomy but less than independence".
Western diplomats engaged with the issue hope the result of the talks will be some form of "conditional independence". That means breaking the sovereign link between Serbia and Kosovo and Kosovo becoming independent, albeit with qualifications. These could include restrictions on its sovereignty for years to come and a powerful role for a figure appointed by the international community, drawing in part on the model used in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As the talks look set to open, however, there is little optimism in diplomatic circles that they will proceed smoothly towards such conditional independence. Indeed, diplomats are seriously considering their options in case the negotiations run into the sand and what is being termed the "disaster scenario" unfolds.
Following Mr Ahtisaari's trip to the region, the most likely next step is the beginning of some form of proximity talks and consultations. In other words, there are to be no face-to-face talks in the immediate future. In theory, this would be good time to deal with those issues that the Serbian authorities and the Kosovo Albanian negotiators could conceivably agree on. These might include certain questions related to the economy.
But it remains to be seen how much common ground can be found on anything without an agreement on the "label" that will be attached to the future Kosovo - i.e. will it be independent or part of Serbia? If that is the case, then, according to one senior diplomatic source who deals with Kosovo, "it is quite possible that by February or March Ahtisaari will be stuck and then he will have to act. He will have to do so to prevent riots. He won't want to be held accountable for them, so he will have to compile a solution with experts and go to the big capitals and say: 'This is it, go to the United Nations Security Council and sell it.'" ^
Even if some form of conditional independence is imposed via the Security Council, which Russia and China would have to be induced into agreeing to, that still does not mean it will work, the same source warned. Without some measure of "under-the-table" agreement, it might be impossible to "impose implementation".
There could be huge disagreement, for example, over the question of decentralisation. If this were to give Serbian areas a very large degree of autonomy then, faced by major Albanian resistance, the "disaster scenario" could become a reality.
Other variations on the disaster theme include the Serbian government resigning after finding it is unable to prevent conditional independence, opening the way for the election of a government dominated by the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party.
The disaster could begin much earlier if peaceful demonstrations against the negotiations turn violent. Albin Kurti, leader of the Self Determination movement, which is campaigning against any talks on independence, said in London last week that while he was committed to non-violence, others in Kosovo were not.
Mr Kurti is against the talks because by their very nature they aim at compromise and he says that there can be none on the question of independence. He fears that any talks that begin with conditional independence could soon be whittled down to autonomy within Serbia.
If Mr Kurti were able to organise large demonstrations, diplomats fear that "by imposing the dynamics, the elite might follow". Possible outcomes include the Kosovo authorities creating a ministry of defence and declaring the Kosovo Protection Corps - currently, in theory, an unarmed civil defence force - the army.
The main focus for major potential violence in the case of a talks disaster are the Serb enclaves in central and southern Kosovo. These are believed to be home to some 60,000 out of 100,000 Serbs remaining in Kosovo.
Both Serbian and Albanian hardliners would have an interest in ethnically cleansing them. Some extreme nationalist Albanian groups just want all the Serbs out of Kosovo and might see attacks on the enclaves as a beginning.
On the other hand, some Serbian groups, seeing partition as the only realistic scenario for Kosovo, might also encourage, or force, Serbs to flee, just as the Bosnian Serb authorities forced the Serbs out of the suburbs of Sarajevo, after they were handed over to the Bosniak side as a result of the Dayton peace agreement in 1995.
The logic of this is simple. A resulting increase in the concentration of Serbs in the already overwhelmingly Serbian-dominated northern part of Kosovo would create a neater ethnic partition than the one that now exists. The hope of anyone behind such moves - inside or outside official Serbian structures - would be that it might pave the way for this region of Kosovo to declare independence from Kosovo and eventually be internationally recognised as a part of Serbia.
"Let us not make this the world's most difficult issue," Mr Ahtisaari urged in Pristina on November 23. There may indeed be more complex issues in the world but on this one the count-down has started and Mr Ahtisaari is racing against time.
I am pleased to announce my intention to appoint Ambassador Frank G. Wisner as my Special Representative to the Kosova Status Talks. Ambassador Wisner is a seasoned diplomat with more than 30 years of international experience. He served his country with distinction as Ambassador to India, the Philippines, Egypt and Zambia and as the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs and as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Ambassador Wisner will provide American support to the lead international negotiator, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, in his efforts to bring together Serbian and Kosovar leaders for discussions on Kosova’s future status. Members of the Contact Group have determined that resolution of this issue is key to ensuring stability in Southeast Europe.
The United States encourages the parties to engage in these talks in the spirit of good faith and with a willingness to reach agreement on a broad range of issues important to Kosova’s future. With our Contact Group partners and in support of the U.N. Special Envoy’s efforts, the United States will seek to secure a settlement on Kosova’s status that promotes security for all peoples of the Balkans and advances the region’s integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The go-ahead given by the United Nations administration in Kosovo, UNMIK, on December 20 for Kosovo government to establish new justice and interior ministries has caused a stir in political circles.
The prospect of Kosovo having its own interior ministry, in particular, has led to unprecedented behind-the-scenes fighting amongst the political parties in the ruling coalition over who will have a hand in running it.
The battle is feeding concerns already held by many local and international analysts that newly-established ministries could be used as tools in inter-party rivalries, rather than working impartially to serve Kosovo's population as a whole.
UNMIK spokesperson Neeraj Singh brought home the point during a regular press conference on December 21, during which he stressed that Pristina will have just three months to see if it can hire staff for the new structures capable of ensuring "the de-politicisation of the process".
At the heart of the problem are numerous shadowy political intelligence agencies who have long dominated matters of internal security in Kosovo. Though loyal to the major political parties, these organisations - whose existence is very much a public secret - are in fact ultimately accountable to no-one and often employ their underworld networks to pursue their own agendas.
The rivalry between these various groups traces back to the mid-Nineties, when Kosovo was still held in a tight grip by the former Yugoslav government in Belgrade. It has been at the root of a number of assassinations and intimidation campaigns against party defectors and political competitors in recent years.
In the wake of this week's announcement, however, Balkan Insight can reveal that the leaders of two groups who dominate the party intelligence sector are prepared to go public for the first time in an effort to clean up their reputation for underworld thuggery and secure a role in setting up formal security structures.
Crucially, each group sees this process as a way of legitimising its activities and winning the right to transform itself into an official intelligence agency in the future.
The moves from these organisations have sparked a debate about whether and how it might be possible to integrate them into a formal security structure without empowering the criminal elements with which they are associated.
With no clear consensus reached as to the best solution, UNMIK and the Kosovo government appear determined for the moment to ignore these organisations and exclude them from official discussions about the future set-up of Kosovo's internal security.
But they may not be able to do so for long. With talks set to begin in January on Kosovo's future political status, pressure is mounting for local leaders and their international counterparts to make important decisions about how to provide proper security both for its majority Albanian population and, crucially, for its Serb minority.
Mission-head Soeren Jessen-Petersen has insisted that UNMIK will not allow politicisation of the planned justice and interior ministries. In remarks which seemed to allude to the party-affiliated intelligence services, he has said that the new structures must function "in the interest of all Kosovo citizens and not only in the interest of the political parties".
Larry Rossin, Jessen-Petersen's deputy, appeared to have similar issues on his mind when he announced in a December 20 press release that candidates for the ministerial posts, "must be people who are willing and able to work professionally and impartially, and who can earn the trust of all people in Kosovo, and all communities in Kosovo."
Kosovo has been administered by the UN since the end of the NATO bombing campaign which drove Belgrade security forces from the protectorate in 1999. While key functions have gradually been transferred from UNMIK to local institutions, this is yet to happen in relation to internal security, defence, justice and diplomatic relations.
Speaking during the "Life in Kosovo" televised debate organised by BIRN on November 23, Lulzim Peci, head of the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, KIPRED, which has published a report on the security situation in Kosovo, explained that the party intelligence sector is currently dominated by two groups.
The KIPRED report suggests that the activities of these bodies "range from close protection of party officials to gathering information on, and intimidating, political opponents."
Amongst the acts of violence blamed on these organisations in recent years are a series of assassinations of LDK officials between 1999 and 2002, which created widespread fear amongst members of the party. Whilst nearly all these killings remain unsolved, they were generally attributed to groups associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, which fought Serb security forces before their withdrawal in 1999.
A report published by the international NGO Crisis Group in May this year lists the names of numerous victims of such murders, including a number of LDK activists and bodyguards, a member of parliament and a close advisor to president Ibrahim Rugova.
On the other hand, intelligence services loyal to the LDK are also known to have issued written threats to politicians who defected from the party. Edita Tahiri, who was a senior member of the LDK until she left to form her own party prior to the October 2004 parliamentary election, has been amongst those on the receiving end of such intimidation.
There was a renewed flood of threats and security incidents in April this year, after former prime minister Ramush Haradinaj resigned the post and handed himself over to the Hague tribunal to face war crimes charges. Both the SHIK and the IHPSO appeared to be deeply involved in efforts by their respective parties to make as much profit as possible from the period of political uncertainty that followed.
The roots of the IHPSO trace back to the defence and interior ministries formed by Kosovo's parallel government-in-exile in the Nineties. The organisation's chief, Rame Maraj, currently holds the official title of special security advisor to President Rugova.
In a conversation with this author before the "Life in Kosovo" debate, Maraj freely admitted that his IHPSO was an intelligence service linked to Rugova's LDK. "The time has come to demystify these intelligence structures and show we are real people and not monsters," he said.
Maraj was alluding to hostile media coverage that followed a May 10 police raid on IHPSO offices. The police involved were investigating the bombing of Rugova's motorcade on March 15, while the president was on his way to meet with European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana. Solana had travelled to Kosovo in order to urge Rugova to give the PDK a leading role in the government.
Crisis Group noted in its May report noted that, "UNMIK and the KPS [Kosovo Police Service] are increasingly drawn to the premise that elements within the LDK camp were responsible for the explosion." The suspicion is that the bomb, which damaged Rugova's car and injured a passer-by, was intended to provide the president with a pretext to avoid being pushed into broad coalition politics.
The SHIK, on the other hand, emerged from the Popular Movement of Kosovo, LPK, a group of activists and former political prisoners which later became part of the KLA.
The head of the SHIK, Kadri Veseli, was a member of the self-proclaimed Provisional Government of Kosovo, established by the KLA's leader, Hashim Thaci, in 1999. The SHIK continued to exist when the abortive governing body was abolished in February 2000.
Initially financed by funds left over from the war, particularly the "Homeland Calling" fund that financed the KLA, it has since relied on finances from local supporters.
Nowadays, the organisation is quite open about its activities. Veseli, who sits before a wall half covered by a huge reproduction of the SHIK's circular emblem, does not, even on the record, deny that he runs a full-blown intelligence gathering operation.
"We are in a process of transformation and have been so for the last five years," he told Balkan Insight, adding that the SHIK had hopes to play "a more active part" in Kosovo's future by "nationalising its capacities" in some way.
Both Veseli and Maraj insist that they have well-trained, professional staff who are fully capable of playing a part in whatever kind of official intelligence service might be established in Kosovo in the future.
The IHPSO is thought to number around 300 people, half of whom receive a regular salary of some 200 euro per month from the organisation. The other half are employed as municipal officials, or work in other public institutions.
Amongst those working at a high level within the IHPSO are a number of people who previously worked for the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, SUP, and State Security, DB.
A source close to the IHPSO, who wished to remain anonymous, told Balkan Insight that the organisation is partly financed by donations from Kosovo Albanians living abroad. It also receives a percentage of bribes paid to the LDK by local business people hoping to win tenders for reconstruction and other work, the source added.
The same source explained that the LDK originally decided to form its own intelligence wing immediately after the 1999 conflict, amid fears that the KLA would otherwise succeed in eliminating the party as part of its own efforts to dominate Kosovo politically.
But the organisation's main aim now, the source said, is to keep PDK-head Hashim Thaci out of government. A senior SHIK official told Balkan Insight that his own organisation is smaller than the IHPSO, with only some 80 to 120 people working exclusively for it.
Most are former KLA fighters who also worked in the Nineties for the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, KLMDNJ, a grass-roots NGO whose main focus was collecting evidence of human rights abuses by the Belgrade security forces.
The official explained that the SHIK comprises four directorates, one of which deals with anti-terrorism activities. Lulzim Peci of KIPRED confirmed that the existence of both the IHPSO and the SHIK has been tolerated so far, "partly thanks to their cooperation with American and other western intelligence agencies on supplying them information regarding terrorist activities in Kosovo."
The SHIK source said that the organisation's main activity, however, is to root out those who collaborate with the Serbian secret service. "When the SHIK discovers someone is working for the Serbs, we tell them we know and either tell them to stop, or let them continue playing a double game in which we get them to send incorrect information to the Serbs," the source explained.
A survey for the "Life in Kosovo" debate revealed that many ordinary people in Kosovo have real concerns about these party-affiliated security agencies and would like them to show themselves in public.
"Six years after the war, there is no needs for secrets anymore - these party intelligence services should become part of our official institutions," said Osman Ragipi, a 54-year-old engineer. Members of the SHIK and IHPSO argue that in the past they have had no option but to remain outside the system, since Kosovo has had no official intelligence service which they might otherwise have been able to join.
But amid the scrabble to gain influence within the new interior ministry, the leaders of both groups now seem prepared to come out in public for the first time in order to present themselves as viable candidates to set up an official internal security system.
"We realise we can't go on like this forever," said Kadri Veseli of the SHIK, in reference to his organisation's secretive past. "We are looking for models of how to integrate our structures into Kosovo's institutions," he added, "by offering our men in fair and open competition for jobs in some future Kosovo intelligence agency."
A consensus is yet to emerge as to whether and how it might be possible to integrate the party intelligence organisations into an official security structure whilst separating out their criminal elements. But the majority of observers agree that the solution lies somewhere between the two extremes of either legalising the organisations in their current form or dismantling them completely.
Representatives of the international community in Kosovo have called for heavy outside supervision in order to ensure that any future interior ministry does not end up being a tool to be used in party politics.
We understand that a politician needs to be appointed as a minister," said Ian Smailes, head of UNMIK's Advisory Unit on Security, which is in charge of the Internal Security Sector Review, ISSR, process in Kosovo. "But that figure needs to appoint staff on a basis of competence and meritocracy and not on the basis of political affiliation, if there is going to be a security service that serves the whole of Kosovo." "However, first and foremost," he added, "[the] public has to be educated about what [an] internal security sector review implies in the first place - I consider we have to educate society as a whole."
The ISSR started as a process of security recommendations drawn up by a group of 15 security consultants who came to Kosovo in April. Their work was funded by Britain's defence ministry, its Department for International Development and its Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The consultants' report, which was published on May 6 this year criticised the party intelligence bodies. "Parallel structures, both those instigated by Belgrade and intelligence structures affiliated to political parties, are significant in undermining confidence in security," it said.
But there are concerns that neither the government nor those behind the ISSR process appear willing to take the bull by the horns and start negotiating the future of these influential organisations. Smailes told Balkan Insight, "There will be a time and a place when all the relevant stakeholders will be incorporated in the internal security sector review - every organisation that can contribute to the security and safety of Kosovo will be eventually included."
When pressed about the bodies led by Maraj and Veseli, however, he said, "I know nothing of them - I know nothing as to who they are and how many people they have". Ramadan Qehaja, a security advisor to the government, was similarly vague during the "Life in Kosovo" debate. "I am too busy with other work on preparations for the [interior ministry] to preoccupy myself with these structures that allegedly exist," he said.
A Kosovo government advisor, who preferred not to be named, told Balkan Insight that he believed time would soon be called on such organisations. "When we establish our own security institutions, these structures know that there will be less and less of them and more and more of us, official structures," he said.
An advisor to Kosovo prime minister Bajram Kosumi, who also wished to remain anonymous, told Balkan Insight that he was convinced the international community would seek to shut down these services once official structures are created. "The internationals will say - now enough is enough, you were needed at some times and we used you - but tough luck, this is politics and now you have to stop your activities," the advisor said.
A source within the SHIK, whilst insisting that the organisation would obey such a request if it were made, warned of the risk that its members would then go underground. "We would shut down our offices for sure," he said, adding, "But then, it is better to have an address and let people know where to find us, than be without an address at all." In the meantime, Ylber Hysa, vice-president of a Kosovo parliament commission set up to deal with security matters, is keen to underline that the new interior ministry has not actually yet been given any mandate to establish or dismantle any intelligence services.
"It is not up to the ministry of internal affairs to create an intelligence service," said Hysaj. He added that, in his opinion, it would be better for Kosovo to have a system whereby the security service is accountable not to the interior ministry, but to the parliament, prime minister or president.
In fact, both the SHIK and the IHPSO agree that a future intelligence service should be separate from the interior ministry. The ISSR, whose job it is to answer such important questions, is coming under fierce criticism fore failing to properly include the views of locals stakeholders.
Florina Duli, a representative of the Republican Club, a local NGO involved in consultations which form part of the ISSR process, claims that it is not only unofficial party intelligence structures that are being snubbed during the decision-making, but actually the majority of local Kosovans. Duli told Balkan Insight that, as a result, "There is very little local ownership of the security process."
At the same time, most Kosovans interviewed by Balkan Insight believe that no future Kosovo intelligence service has any chance of survival unless it is closely supervised by internationals. "It is going to have to be. an outsider who will decide who will be hired, judging with professional criteria," said a member of one party intelligence service, adding, "If it was a local person, the process would be unfair."
Another such source went as far as to say that the head of any new security service ought not to come from the ranks of either party-affiliated structure. "We have a lot of resentment towards each other from the divisions during the war," he said. "Too much has happened to my generation to be able to pack it all up and not look back in anger."
In the end, however, members of both services still hope to play a significant role in Kosovo's future security structures. "We [parts of the LDK] are strongly lobbying for Rame Maraj as a future interior minister," said Genc Kelmendi, who advises Maraj. "You will see it happening in four weeks if internationals don't stop it."
"The SHIK will be the backbone of any future intelligence service because we have all the structures and professional capabilities needed," Balkan Insight's SHIK source agreed.
Lulzim Peci, of KIPRED, told Balkan Insight that it is naive to expect such a complex problem to be resolved overnight. It is not realistic, he said, "to expect any of these structures to disappear, or to be fully integrated into official structures."
A British foreign office diplomat, who wished to remained anonymous, suggested that the best solution might be to put off dealing with the formation of internal security structures "until Kosovo is ready for it". This might be sometime later in 2006, the diplomat said.
Indeed, delaying decisions on the future of the party intelligence structures currently appears to be the preferred tactic both of UNMIK and of the Kosovo government. But with talks due to get underway soon on Kosovo's political future, it will become increasingly difficult to ignore such fundamental issues.
In Zimbabwe, white farmers are still being defiant to the order issued by the government of President Robert Mugabe that they should vacate farm lands that government has targeted for take over. Others have decided to obey the order. Unfortunately, the issue of land re- distribution, or "seizure" as the foreign media would have us believe, has been the most misunderstood, to the extent that it has been lumped together with the politics of President Mugabe.
But the issue of politics in Zimbabwe, and ultimately that of Mugabe, should not be allowed to becloud the attempt by the country to the equitable re-distribution of land stolen by whites in the first instance without compensation to its rightful African owners.
While white farmers continue to shed crocodile tears, it is a matter of record that in a land of more than 11 million people, the whites who make up less than 2% of the population, control more than 60% of the arable land. It is also a matter of record that although 95% of the white farmers have received notice to quit the land, those whose land has been taken over have all received compensation, and of the 500 who have agreed to leave peacefully some have also already been paid.
It seems the height of hypocrisy that the world should be focused on the plight and non-payment of compensation to white farmers, without as much as a mention of the savagery with which the Black African owners were massacred and their lands seized without compensation.
The word Bulawayo, the second largest city in Zimbabwe, is an Ndebele word for "slaughter," and it refers to the savagery of the British settlers, including the infamous Cecil Rhodes who had crushed the attempt by the indigenes to fight back, leading King Lobengula to swallow poison rather than be captured. Or should we forget the savagery of the bestial Sir Frederick Carrington, who had publicly advocated that the entire Ndebele race should be forcefully removed or be exterminated.
Or that of profligate Ian Smith, who seized the government in 1965 and unilaterally declared the then Southern Rhodesia independent, when he refused to apologize for the atrocities he committed while he held office. In fact, he even boasted that he had no regrets about the estimated 30,000 Zimbabweans killed during his rule. Said Smith, "the more we killed, the happier we were."
As the Zimbabwe minister of industry and commerce, Nathan Shamuyarira once said, "The land we are talking about was occupied entirely by our people, the indigenous people of the country, until 1890.
The [the British] reserved the best resources - land, cattle, forestation, what have you - for themselves.... What the bill simply states is that Zimbabwe belongs to the indigenous people of Zimbabwe. It does not belong to anyone else."
It should also be remembered that in the early 1900s, African agriculture competed head to head with white settler farmers for the market of the growing towns and mining centers in the country.
However, in 1915, the Native Reserves Commission expropriated more of the high potential land and initiated a new form of taxation to suppress the indigenous competition.
By the 1930s, the corn purchasing board had established regulation which discriminated against African corn, while the state moved more Africans to the non-fertile communal lands.
The result of this was that the Africans who had wedged such c ompetition against the white settlers were rendered idle, and forced to indenture themselves as laborers to the white farmers.
As we noted earlier, despite all the vociferous claims of injustice by the white farmers, the fact is that most of those whose land has been seized have been compensated by the Zimbabwe government.
In point of fact, the new law passed by the Zimbabwe Parliament addresses the issue of some farmers having as many as 20 or more arable farms, some of which they have left fallow, while Africans are left with nothing.
Again, some of us, including this writer, have allowed our warped perception of Robert Mugabe's politics to becloud the other issue of compensating the white farmers.
Britain, which has been acting like the ostrich it is, giving the impression that it wants real solution to the land issue, should be held totally accountable for what is happening today in Zimbabwe.
As the Zimbabwe government has rightly contended, the responsibility for compensating the farmers lies with Britain, since the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had agreed to provide the funds as a condition of Mr. Mugabe signing the Lancaster House agreement, which finalized Zimbabwe's independence 22 years ago.
"That agreement," according to Shamuyarira, "was abruptly abandoned when the Blair government came to power. The British Minister, Mr. Cook, has now indicated that the British government would contribute to a resettlement program. That is a good change of position."
The agreement had further made it clear that if Britain failed to pay the compensation, then Zimbabwe had no obligation to pay for the land taken back for resettlement of landless Africans.
That agreement had barred the new Zimbabwe government of 1980 from grabbing privately-owned farmland for the first 10 years. For that guarantee, Britain had agreed that it would match a dollar for every dollar that this new independent Zimbabwean government would put as compensation to buy back the farms.
The British government of Tony Blair is now arguing that Zimbabwe had not put in place the mechanism for distributing land to the poor of Zimbabwe. "We agree," said the British government, "that there is a very strong case for land redistribution in Zimbabwe....
Those of us who have pointed accusing fingers at the politics of President Mugabe, should do our homework. Robbers and murderers should not be allowed to keep the fruits of their ill-gotten gains.
Zimbabwe belongs to Africans, even the whites who consider themselves Africans, but the land does not belong to murderers who savagely exterminated Black Africans and seized the land without compensation. That would be a great misapplication of justice.
Who remembers Ian Smith? Unless you are a graybeard, you may not know that Ian Smith was the (white) prime minister of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) when the country was a British colony. In 1964, Smith led an independence rebellion against Great Britain when it became apparent that the British were going to betray the white settlers and turn the country over to Marxist Robert Mugabe, who has proved to be even more of a thug than Smith predicted.
Among African lands, Zimbabwe was stable and prosperous by comparison. Mugabe inherited a rule of law, a successful agriculture, a manufacturing base and hard-currency export earnings. Mugabe has succeeded in destroying them all.
Mugabe unleashed murderous armed bands on the white farmers. Many were murdered. Their wives and daughters were raped. Farms were stolen, and agriculture collapsed.
Mugabe not only ignored Zimbabwe Supreme Court rulings against the illegal land seizures but also ordered the entire Supreme Court into forced retirement.
Mugabe's extraordinary attack on the rule of law angered blacks as well as whites. Widespread opposition almost toppled him, but he held onto power by using intimidation and force to steal the last election.
Opposition candidates were murdered by being doused with gasoline and set on fire. Mugabe's government recently bombed the independent newspaper and deported foreign correspondents.
Mugabe has committed as many atrocities against Zimbabweans as Milosovic is accused of committing in Kosovo in Serbia's attempt to hold on to the breakaway province.
A person might think that Mugabe would be a prime candidate for being bombed into submission and put on trial for human-rights abuses. Relatives of the murdered members of the opposition have filed suit in federal court in New York against Mugabe for crimes that violate international law.
Mugabe responded by demanding diplomatic immunity from the U.S. Department of State on grounds that he is the head of state. The relatives of Mugabe's victims are outraged that the U.S. government is considering granting Mugabe's request.
You can bet your bottom dollar that the British will not seize Mugabe and attempt to put him on trial the way they did Augusto Pinochet of Chile. Like Castro, Mugabe is protected by his icon status among left-leaning American and European intelligentsia.
Once again, we see the ideological application of human-rights laws. The laws are applied to the political right, but not to the political left. Mugabe, like Castro, will live out his life committing atrocities against his people.
Liberals need to come to terms with their dysfunctional approach to human rights and the rule of law. If "human rights" is to have real meaning, it must be more than a weapon wielded by left-wingers against politicians they dislike.
The left can get away with political murders because of the presumed morality of their goals. The ends justify the means as long as the policy -- land redistribution, for example -- meets with the intelligentsia's approval.
If the policy does not meet with the left-wing's approval -- such as Pinochet's privatization of Social Security and socialized industries -- the "human-rights" weapon is unsheathed.
When Britain and the United States handed Rhodesia over to Mugabe, many assurances were given that democracy was replacing minority white rule. This rhetoric was misleading, because Rhodesia was ruled by a rule of law. White Rhodesians were merely a vehicle for the rule of law.
Mugabe substituted personal rule for the rule of law. "Majority rule" existed only as long as Mugabe had no opposition. Once Mugabe was faced with a black opposition party, majority rule bit the dust along with the rule of law.
Under Ian Smith, blacks had jobs and were protected by "the rights of Englishmen," but blacks were considered to be oppressed. Under Mugabe, blacks have no jobs and no rights, but they are considered to be liberated and free.
The white Western politicians who put Mugabe in power are still around. As he is their man, they will continue to make excuses for him. With so many enablers covering his butt, don't be surprised if you read that Mugabe had the two white, two black and one Asian member of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court doused with gasoline and set on fire.
Heard from ordinary Zimbabweans about the terrible violations of our rights. I wish he could hear how Zimbabwe was recently paralyzed by a week-long mass stayaway that saw the closure throughout the country of some 98 percent of businesses--in spite of violence and intimidation by Mugabe's ruling Zanu PF party, which attempted to force businesses to reopen under threat of losing their trading licenses.
On the last day of the stayaway, I was at Unity Square (the capital Harare's main meeting place) to take part in the biggest march ever organized by the opposition party. But around the fountain of the square were arrayed--not peaceful demonstrators--but a gang of ruling party thugs wearing white T-shirts with the message "No to Mass Action.
" These were Mugabe's hired goons, disparagingly dubbed "Green Bombers" by civilians; terrorists who beat, torture and murder civilians when instructed to do so by their pay masters.
The march was predictably a non-event, with the army and police also blocking all major entrances to the city in an act of countrywide mass repression that cost the government an estimated two billion Zimbabwe tax dollars.
This week, sadly, the computer technician in my transport company had to take leave from work to attend the funeral of his brother-in-law --murdered by Zanu PF thugs.
Even with his face smashed and his teeth broken, this innocent twenty-six-year-old man might have lived, if only Harare Central Hospital had the required expertise, drugs, medicines and equipment to help him. But the ruling party's corruption and socialist policies had already destroyed the country's health delivery system, and all this critically injured man received was a drip.
His is not a lone case. Since the 1980s thousands of individuals have been displaced from their homes, beaten, tortured, raped or murdered. Recently, even Morgan Tsvangirai, head of the country's largest opposition party, was languishing in jail on charges of treason against the Zanu PF party, who are obliterating their opposition with twists of the law to validate beatings and arrests.
A commercial farmer in Zimbabwe could once make a fortune exporting coffee. But now the case of Roy Bennet, a coffee farmer from Melsetter/Chimanimani, is representative. He lost his farm to another group of Mugabe's thugs called "war veterans," who evicted him under threat of death and took his farm over, using the ruling party's "fast-track resettlement program.
As I write, Mr. Bennet's other leased farm in Ruwa is under invasion by a group of 200 war veterans. To date, more than 3,000 commercial farmers have been evicted from their farms, and at least seven have actually been murdered. Only 453 commercial farmers still operate fully in Zimbabwe--out of a total of 4,137 in 2000.
As a result, the country's maize production has fallen from 810,000 tons in 2000 to an estimated 80,000 tons today, while soybean production has fallen from 162,000 tons to 30,000 tons. Close to 8 million Zimbabweans are now facing starvation.
On behalf of the Zimbabweans who desire to live as human beings, free from the shackles of Mugabe's tyranny, I have a favor to ask of you, America. No, it is not a request for a check or some other handout. Nor is it a request to send over your 4th Infantry division to liberate us. Our suffering does not give us a right to your wealth or to the lives of y our brave soldiers.
No, the favor I have to ask is very different--and far simpler. America, stop apologizing for your greatness.
Stand up and proudly champion the principles that have enabled you to earn your wealth and power: capitalism and the individual's inalienable rights to life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness. Condemn every form of tyranny and tell the world that the political system created by your founders is the only noble system the world has ever seen. Tell every individual across the globe that no matter if he is black, white or Arab, the *only* path to freedom and prosperity i s through the ideas contained in your Constitution and Bill of Rights. To modify a saying from one of your great founders, George Washington: Proclaim a standard to which the wise and the just can repair.
To do so costs you nothing--and will achieve much.
You will give hope and inspiration to any individual in Zimbabwe, I ran, Hong Kong or elsewhere who is actually fighting for his liberty. You will earn the respect of freedom- loving people the world over --the only "world opinion" it could ever make sense to win. And by your moral certainty you will strike fear in the hearts of your enemies-- and any tyrant who dares to violate the rights of the individual.
America, when you refuse to speak out against evil--and worse, when you apologize for your virtues--you discourage those who love liberty and give hope to the Mugabes of the world. But when you proudly and guiltlessly stand up for the good, you help move the world toward your ideals.
America, your moral voice is at once your least costly and your most powerful weapon. A lonely individual from Zimbabwe asks of you only this: Won't you please use that voice?
They made us stand in a line when the President was walking down the corridor, and as we heard his steps and all shuffled into position, the producer and the cameramen and so on, I thought: I know exactly how this is going to go.
Robert Mugabe, in the middle of a crisis the like of which he hasn't come near to experiencing in all his years at the top, will stroll in, I imagined, and look straight through us. If he can't believe we actually thought we could compete for attention with his in-tray.
I threw a glance around the office we were in. Green wallpaper. A large desk. Mr Mugabe's working room - Zimbabwe's equivalent of the oval office. His press people had allowed us in early to set up lights and microphones, and we'd rearranged all his furniture, moved out tables, taken pictures down and closed the curtains.
And coming down the corridor, right now, it struck me, is a president who, ever since he took power in 1980, has seemed hell bent on stopping his world being turned upside down.
Mr Mugabe wants his tenure to go on forever despite everything, it sometimes appears. He will throw the biggest wobbly I have ever seen, I thought, when he comes through that door and finds a bunch of broadcasters have done what all the opposition parties in Zimbabwe have failed to do: forced him to clear his desk.
Robert Mugabe is 74 and something of an enigma. He's recently married a woman called Grace, who's 34 and who's born him his two children.
The president is heavily into family values and has given strident speeches attacking homosexuals.
He has not as yet made a speech attacking himself, despite the fact that his two children by Grace were born while his first wife Sally was still alive. She died after a long illness and remains something of a heroine in Zimbabwe; adored for her charity work and lack of pretension.
Grace, though, is not popular, something to do with a sense of self-importance and a lack of charity work, so Mr Mugabe is not j ust being blamed for his choice of economic policies, but for his choice of wife as well. The corridors of power can never have felt so lonely to him.
His steps drew closer, then he appeared at the door. And the first thing that happened was that the wobbly wasn't. There was no rage at the way his office had been dismantled, not even impatience - just a genial meaningless joke, in a quiet voice, something about "what have you done, I don't even recognise the place."
We sat down and I asked him questions: questions about his management of Zimbabwe, about why he'd not seen this economic collapse coming even though his profligate spending in the 80s was the main cause of questions about whether he appreciated that many of his compatriots wanted him out of the office we were sitting in, were disgusted at the rises in tax and prices, and thought he'd totally lost touch.
The president's composure was notable. But he may well be in denial.
Mr Mugabe is still as sharp as a razor, and you can see every syllable of every question being processed in the instant before he answers, but how extraordinary for him to say, when asked whether he knew how unpopular he'd become, that most people actually wanted him to stay - what they were really complaining about were his ministers, who'd brought in policies that he might now have to reserve or drop and how remarkable that when he was asked whether he would resign, after nearly 18 years at the head of what is effectively a one-party state, he replied:
He stressed the word. The point is, things have got that bad, and maybe the President's body language acknowledged it. Something of an enigma even after 18 years in powerAs he asked why on earth he should go, he pushed himself back into his office chair, slumping down slightly, and intertwining his fingers in front of his chest, as if subconsciously putting distance between himself and a response he must have known was otherworldly.
The guerrilla leader was here though: the man who staunchly refused to accept compromise agreements that would have seen the old Rhodesia only modified, not revolutionised.
Mr Mugabe's intransigence in the late 70s eventually got him everything he wanted, with the white minority regime of Ian Smith flushed down the wastepipe of history as independence came the president is showing that same intransigence now.
When I asked whether it hurt him to send troops against his own people, when they rioted in protest at the hardship they were suffering, he simply said, "No, why should it?"
The answer would be that the last time Mr Mugabe used armed forces it was to free his people, not tear gas them: but he is on a new agenda now, fighting for himself, staying in office despite his people, not for them, and however out of touch he may be, his is steely.
When we'd finished we slid the sofa in his office back into position and replaced the pictures and finally he was straightening up the items on his desk, before shaking us firmly by the hand and showing us out.
And then we were exiting down the corridor he'd entered from, and I wondered when Robert Mugabe would walk along it for the last time, and whether, sooner than he expects perhaps, that big desk will be cleared without his permission.
In Zimbabwe zijn blanke boeren aangehouden omdat ze hun land niet tijdig hebben verlaten zodat de vrijgekomen gronden verdeeld kunnen worden onder de grote meerderheid van zwarte landloze boeren. Afgelopen mei nam het Zimbabwaanse parlement een wet aan die 2.900 grote blanke boeren de opdracht gaf binnen 45 dagen het werk neer te leggen en binnen 90 dagen de boerderijen te verlaten.
De Zimbabwaanse president Robert Mugabe zei dat hij het verzet tegen de landhervorming zou breken als de blanke boeren niet voor 15 augustus hun boerderijen hadden ontruimd.
Getuigenissen van blanke boeren die klagen over het onrecht dat de 'verschrikkelijke Mugabe' hen aandoet vereenzelvigen zich met de arrogantie van kolonialen die menen recht te hebben op alle rijkdom en die het vanzelfsprekend vinden dat de zwarte boeren met minderwaardige en ongelijk verdeelde grond moeten vegeteren.
Tot op de dag van vandaag bezitten 4.000 blanke boeren de 11 miljoen hectare vruchtbaarste grond van het land. Twee miljoen zwarte boeren moeten het met 16 miljoen hectare minder vruchtbare gronden doen. Met de landhervorming wil Mugabe defintief breken met de koloniale periode. De vroegere, Britse koloniale naam van Zimbabwe is Rhodesi:
"Het Rhodesische regime van Ian Smith vermoordde duizenden zwarten. Maar dat feit is blijkbaar minder schadelijk en meer aanvaarbaar dan de verkozen Mugabe, want uiteindelijk werden er toch enkel zwarte mensen vermoord, nietwaar. Volgens dergelijke koppige en arrogante redeneringen moet de wereld altijd en overal geleid worden door blanken", waarschuwde de Zuid-Afrikaanse president Mbeki in ANC-today van 14 maart jl.
Mugabe verdedigde op 12 augustus zijn beslissing: "Het zijn enkel de hebzuchtigen die klagen. Alle oprechte en welmenende blanke boeren die een landbouwcarri†re willen voortzetten als loyale burgers van dit land, zullen land houden om dat te doen. Geen enkele boerenfamilie wordt volledig zonder land gezet. Aan degenen die menen dat ze dit land bezitten en kunnen beheren in naam van Groot-Brittanni, zeggen we: het spel is uit, ga daar waar jullie thuis horen. Er is hier geen plaats voor hebzuchtigen en overheersers.
Geen goud, geen zilver is kostbaar genoeg om onze soevereiniteit te kopen. Wij zijn niet te koop en Zimbabwe is niet te koop. Zimbabwe is voor de Zimbabwanen. We zijn niet voor de hoogste bieder uit Europa of vanwaar ook. Ons volk is de enige rechthebbende op dit land. We zullen ons niet laten afschrikken op dit ene vitale punt, het land. Dit land is van ons."
Toen Mugabe in 1980 aan de macht kwam, was Zimbabwe van de speerpunten van de anti-imperialistische strijd. Maar het revolutionaire enthousiasme brokkelde snel af. Gedurende 25 jaar heeft Mugabe door langzame hervormingen geprobeerd de koloniale structuren en bezittingen te breken.
Zonder resultaat. Mugabe verloor langzaam de steun van de arme boeren. Tot hij in februari 2000 het roer omgooide en terugkeerde naar de oorspronkelijke plannen voor onteigening. Met dit programma haalde hij een nipte meerderheid bij de voorbije verkiezingen.
Het enige wat men Mugabe kan verwijten is dat hij veel te lang wachtte met de doorvoering van de landhervorming. Maar wat voor de zwarte boeren vanzelfsprekende radicale democratische hervormingen zijn, zijn natuurlijk onuitstaanbare aantastingen van h et priva-bezit voor de koloniale heersers.
Mugabe lijkt deze keer niet van plan terug te krabbelen: "We naderen het einde van het programma voor de herverdeling van het land ten voordele van de gemarginaliseerde zwarte meerderheid. We hebben onszelf een deadline gesteld in augustus en we zullen ons aan deze deadline houden. We zullen geen weerstand toestaan en we zullen zeker geen uitstel meer verlenen. Degenen die nog een nieuwe oorlog wensen, zullen zich moeten bezinnen zolang ze dat nog kunnen."
Wanneer rijke bezitters hun voorrechten en bezittingen dreigen te verliezen dan is geen middel van economische en politieke oorlogsvoering te veel. Haast alle westerse kranten hebben het over de catastrofale hongersnood die zou veroorzaakt worden door de landhervorming.
"Op een ogenblik dat 13 miljoen mensen in Zuidelijk Afrika verhongeren, zeggen economisten en westerse diplomaten dat de uitvoering van de landhervorming ervoor gezorgd heeft dat Zimbabwe zichzelf niet langer kan bevoorraden met voedsel." (The Boston Globe, 13 augustus 2002). De hele "vrije" westerse pers neemt zo klakkeloos de leugens over van de Britse regering en van de blanke boeren in Zimbabwe.
Peter Haine, Buitenlandse Zaken in de regering Blair, schreef: "Harare mag dan wel beweren dat de hongersnood het gevolg is van droogte, iedereen weet dat het een tragedie is veroorzaakt door aan man." (The Times, 13 augustus 2002).
De waarheid is dat de landhervorming de enige weg is naar voedselveiligheid. Kleine boerderijen zullen immers eerder voedsel produceren voor de lokale markt dan voor de westerse warenhuizen. De Britse krant The Guardian moet toegeven: "Zeggen dat de landhervorming voornamelijk verantwoordelijk is voor de hongersnood is fantasie. Het is waar dat de 4.500 blanke boeren tweederde van het beste land bezitten, maar velen onder hen produceren geen voedsel maar tabak.
70 percent van de ma†steelt in het land wordt geteeld door kleine zwarte boeren die hard werken om in leven te blijven op de minder vruchtbare gronden die de blanken hen lieten." (The Guardian, 13 augustus 2002). Geen wonder dat de regering van Zimbabwe, waar ruim zes miljoen mensen aangewezen zijn op voedselhulp, toch maar besloten genetisch gemanipuleerde maaes uit de Verenigde Staten toe te laten. Een voorwaarde is wel dat de ma†s gemalen is of bij aankomst onmiddellijk wordt fijngemalen. Op die manier moet worden vermeden dat de ma†szaden in cultuur worden gebracht, wat zou kunnen leiden tot exportbeperkingen vanwege de Europese Unie.
Als Mugabe standhoudt en weerspannige boeren laat verdrijven zal het Westen opnieuw de mond vol hebben over "mensenrechten". Het Internationaal Monetair Fonds (IMF) en de Wereldhandelsorganisatie (WTO) hebben al een speciaal instrument in het leven geroepen om weerspannige Afrikaanse leiders in het gareel te dwingen en te houden.
In januari 2001 tekenden een aantal Afrikaanse leiders onder het waakzame oog van het IMF een gezamenlijk document onder de naam Nepad (New Partnership for Africa's development). De reacties op Mugabe's speech vorige week toonden duidelijk aan waarvoor Nepad zal dienen. De Britse minister Peter Haine: "Nepad geeft een visie op de toekomst van Afrika.
Deze visie erkent dat de donorgemeenschap gelijk heeft hulp te koppelen aan respect voor mensenrechten en democratie. Regimes zoals dat van Zimbabwe zullen niet op steun kunnen rekenen van de ontwikkelde wereld. De boodschap aan de buren van Zimbabwe is dat goed besturen belangrijk is. De hongerenden, de boeren, ze zijn allemaal slachtoffers van Mugabe's slecht beheer: zwart en blank, rijk en arm." (The Times, 13 augustus 2002).
Met andere woorden, zij die niet besturen zoals de westerse regeringen en de multinationals dat willen, zullen in naam van de Nepad worden geboycot en mogen zich verwachten aan grote campagnes om de eigen bevolking op te roepen tot burgeroorlog. Maar Haine voegt nog iets anders toe: "Het is een tragedie dat er geen Afrikaanse oplossing was voor dit Afrikaans probleem."
Haine steekt hiermee het vingertje uit naar de leiders van de Afrikaanse regeringen die geweigerd hebben om samen met Europa en de Verenigde Staten aan te sturen op een burgeroorlog in Zimbabwe na de verkiezingen die Mugabe in de lente won. Nepad zal dus ook dienen om de andere Afrikaanse landen onder druk te zetten en te dwingen om mee te werken aan de boycot en de oorlogsdreiging tegen 'opstandige' landen zoals Zimbabwe. Mugabe zal moeten vasthouden aan de radicale doorvoering van de landhervorming, wil hij de arme boerenmassa's voldoende mobiliseren en een basis hebben om de buitenlandse inmenging af te slaan.
De Verenigde Staten beschouwen Robert Mugabe niet als de legitieme leider van Zimbabwe. Zij werken met Zuid-Afrika, Botswana en Mozambique samen om hem te isoleren en de oppositie tegen zijn bewind te versterken. Dat heeft Walter Kansteiner, een hoge ambtenaar van het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken in Washington, dinsdag 20 augustus tegen journalisten gezegd. Na de presidentsverkiezingen van maart, waarbij Mugabe voor een nieuwe ambtstermijn werd gekozen, zei de Amerikaanse president Bush dat hij de uitslag niet aanvaardde omdat er volgens hem was geknoeid.
"De verkiezingen waren frauduleus. Ze waren niet vrij en eerlijk", aldus Kansteiner, die binnen het ministerie speciaal belast is met Afrika. De resultaten van de verkiezingen in Zimbabwe: president Robert Mugabe kreeg ruim 55 procent van de uitgebrachte stemmen, opposant Morgan Tsvangirai 42 procent. 55,4 procent van de stemgerechtigden kwam opdagen, ††n van de hoogste opkomsten sinds 22 jaar.
Maar zelf weet Bush natuurlijk alles over eerlijke verkiezingen. In januari 2001 legde hij de eed af als president, na een wekenlange vaudeville rond de stemmentellingen. Wat hem de titel "president select" opleverde. Reactie van de Zimbabwaanse minister van Informatie Jonathan Moyo toen: "Stel dat je een artikel leest over verkiezingen in een derdewereldland waar de kandidaat die zich uitroept tot overwinnaar (...) die overwinning te danken heeft aan het gefoefel met stembulletins in een district dat geleid wordt door zijn broer... dan zou niemand ook maar een halve seconde geloven dat deze verkiezing representatief is."
Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe wants the United Nations to play an active role in addressing the humanitarian crises in the country, said UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland after meeting the leader on Tuesday.
He also announced that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was considering visiting Zimbabwe next year.
Egeland told a press conference in the capital, Harare, that there was still "disagreement" around government's controversial clean-up campaign, Operation Murambatsvina, which has left 700,000 people homeless or without a livelihood after kicking off in mid-May.
He described his meeting with Mugabe as a "long, good and frank exchange", but noted, "There is disagreement on how to help those who were evicted; there has been some concern on how to reach food security," adding, "this is not the time to list all the points of disagreement".
The UN envoy, who is also the UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, remarked, "We're here to help - I explained to the president that we can be more effective if we get even better procedures for how to help. He says that he will certainly work on having these improved procedures, so that we can help Zimbabwe to get out of the situation where there have been declining standards of living of late, and into a better future."
Zimbabwe initially rejected UN offers of assistance to build temporary shelter for people affected by Murambatsvina, only to make an about- turn last month. Subject to funding, the UN will construct 2,500 housing units during the first phase of the programme.
Egeland said he had "reiterated our willingness to help with shelter material for those who have inadequate shelter - I could see them myself yesterday - after the eviction campaign". On Monday, the UN envoy visited two transit camps housing people left homeless after the clean-up operation in Harare.
Underlining the points of agreement with the Zimbabwean leader, Egeland said efforts had to be redoubled to effectively deal with the HIV/AIDS crisis in the country, which had more than a million AIDS orphans.
He also referred to the food crisis affecting millions of people. Last week, the UN launched an appeal for US $276 million humanitarian appeal for Zimbabwe, which included food aid for at least three million people.
The UN envoy was accompanied by the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Zimbabwe, Agostinho Zacarias, while Mugabe was joined by his foreign and defence ministers at the meeting.
Later on Tuesday, Egeland flew to Zimbabwe's second city, Bulawayo, where he met with the mayor, the governor of Matabeleland North province and church leaders. Due to inclement weather, he was unable to visit Matabeleland South, where he was scheduled to observe food distribution, among other things.
Egeland ends his five-day fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe on Wednesday, after which he will head to neighbouring South Africa for talks with the government on closer collaboration in humanitarian assistance, including raising resources for the proposed global Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).
The new CERF will probably be larger than the existing fund, established in 1992, which UN agencies can draw upon when responding to emergencies, provided they can identify how the money will be replenished.
ZIMBABWE'S president, Robert Mugabe, yesterday called top UN humanitarian envoy Jan Egeland a "damn hypocrite and a liar" after he criticised the country's brutal slum demolitions.
Speaking to thousands of ruling ZANU-PF party delegates gathered f or an annual conference near Esigodini in southern Zimbabwe, Mr Mugabe said the envoy had told "lies, utter lies".
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on Wednesday said the United States does not accept the results of Ukraine's presidential elections as legitimate, citing "credible reports of fraud and abuse."
The country's election commission has declared Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych the winner, beating opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko by three percentage points.
"If the Ukrainian government does not act immediately and responsibly there will be consequences for our relationship, for Ukraine's hopes for a Euro-Atlantic integration and for individuals responsible for perpetrating fraud," Powell said in a briefing at the State Department.
"We have been following developments very closely and are deeply disturbed by the extensive and credible reports of fraud in the election, " he added. "We call for a full review of the conduct of the election and the tallying of election results."
Powell said it is "still not too late" for the Ukrainian government to remedy the situation. He warned that the world is watching and urged it to "seize the moment."
The secretary said he spoke with outgoing Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma earlier Wednesday to urge him to take advantage of suggestions by the two candidates that there may be a way to resolve the controversy.
The State Department issued a public announcement Wednesday to U.S. citizens in or traveling to Ukraine, warning of the possibility of "civil unrest and disturbances" over the disputed election.
"American citizens resident in Ukraine have therefore been urged to avoid areas affected by demonstrations and political rallies and to exercise caution if within the vicinity of any demonstrations. Citizens have also been urged to assess the impact of these demonstrations might have on personal traffic and transportation needs," the department said.
Powell also cautioned Kuchma not to use any kind of force against the thousands of pro-Yushchenko demonstrators in Kiev. He repeated that concern to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in a separate phone call, he said.
"We call on all sides to work to achieve a fair and just outcome without the use of force. We remind the Ukrainian authorities that they bear a special responsibility not to use or incite violence," the secretary said.
Powell said he also spoke with European Commission President Jose Barroso and High Representative Javier Solana, and said the United States supports an offer from Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski to mediate in the situation.
"Tomorrow is the EU-Russian summit in Europe, and I'm confident this will be a subject of discussion between the EU leadership and the Russians," the secretary said.
I had the honor of being President Bush as personal representative for the November 21 presidential runoff election in Ukraine. As I approached this responsibility, I noted publicly that I was not an advocate of either candidate in the election. My focus was to stress free and fair election procedures that would strengthen worldwide respect for the legitimacy of the winning candidate.
The campaign for president in Ukraine had already been marked by widespread political intimidation and failure to give equal coverage to candidates in the media. Physical intimidation of voters and illegal use of governmental administrative and legal authorities had been evident and persistent.
President Bush wrote in a letter which I carried to President Kuchma: "You play a central role in ensuring that UkraineÅfs election is democratic and free of fraud and manipulation. A tarnished election, however, will lead us to review our relations with Ukraine." In thoughtful and careful representation of President Bush's words, I visited with President Kuchma and both candidates, with explicit requests for them to terminate any further campaign violations. I stated that I had come to celebrate the building of strong democratic institutions in Ukraine.
Unfortunately, a nationwide celebration of democratic election procedures at that point, was not to be. The government of President Kuchma allowed, or aided and abetted, wholesale fraud and abuse that changed the results of the election. It is clear that Prime Minister Yanukovich did not win this election despite erroneous election announcements and calls of congratulations from Moscow.
In 1986, I witnessed a democratic and diplomatic challenge in The Philippines. There too, I served as Co-Chairman, with Congressman Jack Murtha, of an observer group appointed by President Ronald Reagan. The parallels between the Philippine experience of 1986 and Ukraine today are interesting. President Marcos called a snap election and Corazon Aquino, the widow of an assassinated opposition leader, challenged Marcos.
While Marcos attempted to steal the election through fraud and abuse, the overwhelming support for Aquino led the government to falsify the vote count. Tens of thousands of Filipinos poured into the streets of Manila in support of Aquino. The international community was shocked by the enormity of the fraud and the popular EDSA revolution. Ultimately, the will of the people brought change and President MarcosÅf efforts to subvert freedoms failed.
President Bush has expressed his unequivocal support for democracy around the world. He has said: "I simply do not agree with those who either say overtly or believe that certain societies cannot be free. It's just not part of my thinking." I agree with the President.
The United States must be at the forefront of international efforts to secure individual freedom. Democracy must be at the core of our foreign policy. We must be prepared to play an active role in ensuring that democracy and basic freedoms are promoted and preserved around the world.
An election on December 26 that is free and fair will be a tribute to Ukraine's maturing democracy and will place Ukraine on a path to join the community of European democracies. A secure and democratic Ukraine is in the national security interests of the United States, NATO, the European Union, and Russia. A fraudulent and illegal election would leave Ukraine crippled. The new president would lack legitimacy with the Ukrainian people and the international community.
The U.S. Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, the Deputy Secretary of State Rich Armitage, former Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright and Henry Kissinger, and Congressional leaders have visited, written and called Ukrainian leaders to advocate a free and fair election process. Secretary of State Colin PowellÅfs leadership and the outstanding efforts of our Ambassador, John Herbst, have left no doubt of the impact an illegitimate election will have on the future of Ukraine and our relationship.
With the stakes so high, I applaud the thousands of election observers who were sent by the U.S. and European states through organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations. Most importantly, over 10,000 citizens of Ukraine were organized by the Committee of Voters of Ukraine to carefully observe individual polling stations.
These observers outlined an extensive list of serious procedural violations including:
†Illegal expulsions of opposition members of election commissions; †Inaccurate voter lists; †Evidence of students, government employees and private sector workers being forced by their deans and supervisors to vote for one candidate over another; †Busloads of people voting more than once with absentee ballots; †Representatives of the media being beaten and their equipment stolen or destroyed; and †Suspiciously large use of mobile voting.
Even in the face of these attempts to end any hope of a free and fair election, I was inspired by the willingness and courage of so many citizens of Ukraine to demonstrate their passion for free expression and the building of a truly democratic Ukraine. As corrupt authorities tried to disrupt, frighten and intimidate citizens, brave Ukrainians pushed back by continuing to do their best to keep the election on track and to prevent chaos.
President Kuchma pledged to Ukraine that there would be "Elections worthy of a 21st century European country." The day after the runoff election, I told the press and the people of Ukraine through a live television broadcast in Kiev that President Kuchma had the responsibility and the opportunity to produce even at that point an outcome that was fair and responsible.
I pointed out that he would enhance his legacy by prompt and decisive action which maximizes worldwide confidence in the presidency of Ukraine and the extraordinary potential future which lies ahead of his country. To date, President Kuchma has not met these responsibilities.
This morning we have learned from our embassy in Ukraine that an agreement was reached late last night between European mediators, President Kuchma, and the presidential candidates. Although not as sweeping as earlier reports of a compromise, the agreement reportedly has two elements.
The current Central Election Commission will be dismissed and replaced with new members to oversee the December 26th runoff. Secondly, a new election law has been agreed to by the parties in an effort to eliminate the fraud perpetrated in the previous rounds of voting.
These reports are promising but we will have to await the final outcome of the RadaÅfs deliberations, future rounds of negotiations, and President KuchmaÅfs signature before offering firm conclusions.
†the presence of Ukrainian and international observers must be increased to, ideally, observers in each of the 33,006 polling stations;
†the candidates must have equal time to present themselves and to broadcast their platforms to the Ukrainian people; and
†the domestic and international press must commit to monitor and to debate the electoral process in an open and transparent manner that fully illuminates illegal activities and conveys legitimacy to the rightful winner.
Absent vigorous attempts to meet these changes, I do not believe that the Ukrainian people will have confidence in the integrity of the election process. Worse yet, they may be doomed to witness a repeat of the fraud and abuse that were apparent in the previous rounds of voting.
I am pleased to report that the U.S. Department of State has notified Congress of their intent to supplement election monitoring and related assistance to support the December 26 runoff. This is critical and I urge the Department to provide the funds necessary, as quickly as possible, to assist the Ukrainian people in their goal of free and fair elections. Specifically funds will be used to support election observers, exit polling, parallel vote tabulations, training of election commissioners, and voter education programs.
I share the AdministrationÅfs strong objections to separatist initiatives and continue to urge all Ukrainians to resolve the situation through peaceful means. The future of the country rests with Ukrainian voters, but the United States and Europe must continue to support a foundation for democracy, rule of law, and a market economy, which will allow Ukraine to prosper and reach its full potential.
With democratic forces in retreat in neighboring Russia and Belarus, a free and fair election will be a turning point in Ukraine's history that could have widespread constructive effects beyond its borders and the region.
I have strong affection for the people of Ukraine and the bravery and determination they have shown since the fall of the Soviet Union.
I have good memories of suggesting an initial pledge of $175 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance to dismantle the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal. I carried the Ukrainian message to Secretary of State James Baker requesting a strong U.S. diplomatic presence when our representation consisted of a small consular office. The Secretary moved quickly to establish an embassy and to send a U.S. Ambassador to Kiev.
The United States has stood by Ukraine through difficult moments before and we must not fail to do so at this critical juncture. My presence in Ukraine during this important time was meant to underscore President BushÅfs support for the future of Ukraine. Free and fair elections in Ukraine embody our hope and goal of a Europe whole and free.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that Ukraine has dominated newspaper headlines and media broadcasts all over the world for the last sixteen days. In that time, extraordinary events have occurred. A free press has revolted against government intimidation and reasserted itself. An emerging middle class has found its political footing. A new generation has found its hope for the future. A society has rebelled against the illegal activities of its government. It is in our interests to recognize and protect these advances.
The European Union is exacerbating these problems by pressing Ukraine to prevent migrants from entering the European Union and to accept the return of those who do reach EU territory. Migration is expected to be high on the agenda of tomorrowÅfs summit in Kiev.
"Ukraine is failing every test when it comes to protecting migrants rights," said Holly Cartner, Europe and Central Asia director of Human Rights Watch. "Instead of pressuring Ukraine to take back more and more migrants, the European Union needs to help the Ukrainian government to address these serious problems."
The 77-page report, "On the Margins - Ukraine: Rights Violations Against Migrants and Asylum Seekers at the New Eastern Border of the European Union," documents the routine detention of migrants and asylum in appalling conditions, including severe overcrowding, frequently inadequate bedding and clothing, and little or no access to fresh air, exercise and medical treatment.
The report also documents the physical abuse, verbal harassment, robbery and extortion suffered by those in detention. Migrants and asylum seekers in detention often have no access to a lawyer and are unable to apply for release. The asylum system is barely functioning, leading to the forced return of people to countries where they face persecution or torture.
Moreover, Human Rights Watch also documented the use of return agreements between Ukraine and its EU neighbors to summarily return migrants and asylum seekers to Ukraine without first determining whether they need protection as refugees or on human rights grounds.
Asylum seekers from Chechnya are particularly vulnerable, both to abuse at the hands of the Ukrainian police and forced return to Russia, despite the risk of persecution they face in that country. Although Russian citizens do not require visas to enter Ukraine, Chechens are routinely denied access at the border unless they pay bribes.
Chechens detained in Ukraine trying to enter the European Union are denied access to asylum. In fact, no Chechen has been recognized as a refugee in Ukraine. A Chechen woman told Human Rights Watch, "They don't consider us human beings."
The EU enlargement in May 2004 extended the borders of the European Union to Ukraine. Ukraine is now confronted with pressure at both its eastern and western borders. Increasing numbers of migrants and asylum seekers attempt to reach EU territory from the east. At the same time, the Ukraine government faces pressure from the west.
The European Union is pressing Ukraine to accept ever larger numbers of migrants and failed asylum seekers from the European Union. This is set to increase once Ukraine and the European Union reach agreement on an EU-wide returns mechanism. The European Union is also pressing Ukraine to increase enforcement of their common border.
"Ukraine wants closer ties with the European Union, so it is naturally keen to cooperate on migration matters," said Cartner. "But this cooperation is exacerbating Ukraine's human rights record, making closer ties with the European Union less likely."
The report is based on interviews with more than 150 migrants and asylum seekers in Ukraine and its EU neighbors, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. It concludes that Ukraine cannot be considered a safe country for the purpose of returning migrants who are foreign nationals and failed asylum seekers unless Ukraine shows a significant improvement in its human rights and refugee- protection capacity. The European Union has a crucial role to play if those changes are to occur. The report makes key recommendations to the Ukrainian government and to the European Union:
††Condition the implementation of the EU-Ukraine return agreement on a clear set of benchmarks including access to asylum, legislative improvements and the upgrading of reception and detention conditions in Ukraine.
††Refrain from sending asylum seekers and migrants to Ukraine until there is enough evidence that these benchmarks are met.
††Ensure that any future EU initiative in relation with Ukraine is not used to justify the exclusion from the European Union of asylum seekers who transit through Ukraine or their summary removal from EU territory without first determining their protection needs.
The May 2004 enlargement of the European Union (E.U.) to the border of Ukraine brought the country to the frontline of international migration. Though traditionally a country of migration, Ukraine's location as a gateway between Europe and Asia, coupled with long, often un-demarcated borders and weak border enforcement capacity, make the Ukraine increasingly appealing as a transit country for people seeking to enter the E.U. clandestinely.
Ukraine is now confronted with pressure at both its eastern and western borders. Increasing numbers of migrants and asylum seekers attempt to reach E.U. territory from the east. At the same time, more and more migrants and failed asylum seekers are returned to Ukraine from Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary via bilateral r eturns agreements. Returns from the E.U. are set to increase once an E.U.-wide returns agreement is concluded.
Ukraine is already incapable of managing the migrants and asylum seekers on its territory. Migrants and asylum seekers are routinely detained in appalling conditions; subjected to violence, robbery, and extortion; denied legal assistance; and in some cases sent back to countries where they face persecution and torture. In the words of one detainee, if the police "feel like beating you, they'll beat you. Whatever they feel like, they'l do."
Many detention facilities are severely overcrowded. Detainees are frequently deprived of appropriate bedding and clothing, access to exercise, fresh air, natural light, adequate food, and proper access to medical services. Those in detention lack basic rights including access to counsel, doctors, and interpreters, the right to apply for release, and the ability to let loved ones know where they are.
Many of those interviewed by Human Rights Watch had no idea why they had been detained, or how long they were likely to be held. Detention time limits are not respected in many cases. A detainee interviewed by Human Rights Watch had not seen a lawyer or spoken to his family once during his eight-month detention.
Ukraine's system for dealing with asylum seekers and refugees is barely functioning. Ukrainian officials frequently refuse to recognize a UNHCR-issued document attesting that the bearer has applied, or is in the process of applying, for asylum. Migrants and asylum seekers face a significant risk of arbitrary detention. Protection against return to persecution is inadequate, especially for Chechens.
The reasons for Ukraine's poor record as a country of refuge are complex. Principal factors include: its lack of experience in managing migratory flows; an underdeveloped legal system; outdated institutional structures; limited financial resources to support refugees and asylum seekers; no tradition of asylum; and the lack of a human rights culture. Ukraine's inadequately functioning asylum system means that it cannot be considered a safe country of asylum.
In addition, the long periods of detention, combined with severely substandard conditions and limited rights, raise serious concerns that detention conditions in Ukraine for migrants amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, in violation of numerous international human rights treaties to which Ukraine is party. As a consequence, Ukraine cannot be considered a safe country for the purpose of returning foreign-national migrants and failed asylum seekers.
Increased numbers of migrants and asylum seekers in the E.U. are subject to accelerated deportation to Ukraine under bilateral return agreements (known as Ågreadmission agreementsÅh). Human Rights Watch research indicates that these agreements are being used by E.U. governments as a tool to transfer migrants and asylum seekers out of E.U. territory in violation of fundamental rights.
The agreements are frequently applied without adequate procedural safeguards such as individual deportation determinations, access to information regarding legal rights, access to interpreters and lawyers, or the opportunity to appeal a deportation decision.
Bilateral readmission agreements with Ukraine should be suspended until the country is capable of providing meaningful access to asylum, and until Ukraine significantly changes its law and practice on detaining asylum seekers and migrants, improves detention conditions, and allows those in detention to apply for release.
In light of the human rights violations taking place under current bilateral readmission agreements, Human Rights Watch is concerned that a similar agreement between the E.U. and Ukraine may be incompatible with international refugee and human rights law. In particular, there are doubts about whether the procedures under which returns from the E.U. to Ukraine are likely to take place contain sufficient safeguards.
Any readmission agreement negotiated between the E.U. and Ukraine must include guarantees that persons subject to the agreement will not be returned to Ukraine in violation of their basic human rights or the right to seek asylum in the E.U.
Such an agreement must take into consideration the resources and time needed to amend Ukrainian immigration and asylum legislation and procedures, and to upgrade its reception and detention conditions. The commencement of any such agreement should not take place until Ukraine is in full compliance with its international and regional human rights obligations.
Because of Ukraine's aspirations to join the E.U., and continuing pressure on Ukraine from the E.U. to assist in migration management and border enforcement, the government in Kyiv is likely to continue admitting in ever larger numbers persons sent back by E.U. member states.
However, Kyiv's acceptance of returnees will simply exacerbate its already poor treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. Positive encouragement and support from the European Union is a precondition for a significant improvement in Ukraine's human rights and refugee protection capacity. Until Ukraine is able to respect its international human rights obligations it will be impossible for the country to meet the criteria for closer ties to the E.U.
†Strengthen human rights protection by bringing legislation on migrants and asylum seekers, and its implementation, into compliance with international standards.
†Immediately make it possible for every asylum seeker to fairly present a claim, and have protection in safe and sanitary conditions pending the determination of that claim. Amend existing legislation to provide accessible mechanisms to allow access to asylum procedures, in particular, by providing a meaningful right to a lawyer, as well as establishing in law a transparent process for challenging a deportation order.
†Cease the routine detention of asylum seekers. Detention should be carried out only where a less restrictive alternative, or release, is shown in a particular case to be insufficient to achieve the stated, lawful and legitimate purpose. Migrants and asylum seekers should not be detained beyond the proscribed limits in Ukrainian law.
†Provide detainees with the right to apply for release.
†Bring conditions of immigration detention into line with minimum international standards.
†Condition the implementation of any future returns agreement on a clear set of benchmarks including legislative improvements and the upgrading of reception and detention conditions in Ukraine.
†Until those benchmarks are met, refrain from sending asylum seekers and migrants to Ukraine.
†Ensure that any future E.U. initiative in relation to Ukraine is not used to justify the exclusion from the E.U. of asylum seekers who transit through Ukraine, or their summary removal from E.U. territory, without first determining their protection needs.
†Ensure that the E.U. returns policy includes accountability for law enforcement and immigration officials who violate any safeguards aimed at protecting returneesÅf rights, particularly protection against return to torture or other ill-treatment.
†Encourage independent monitoring by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of points of entry into the E.U. (border check points, temporary reception centers, detention facilities for asylum seekers and migrants), in order to increase transparency, and in the interest of guaranteeing that the right to seek asylum is respected.
A Note on Methodology: Detention Facilities Visited
Human Rights Watch was provided broad access to detention facilities in Ukraine, including those to which Ukrainian NGOs have limited access. We visited four special detention centers for "vagrants" operated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in Russian priemniki- rasprediteli, or reception-distribution centers, also known as "vagabonds' centers") in Kyiv, Cernihiv (Cernigov), Lviv, and Uzghorod.
Human Rights Watch researchers were also given access to six detention facilities operated by the Border Guard Service of Ukraine: Boryspil-Kyiv international airport detention facility, Mukachevo center for women and children, Pavshino center for men, Lviv regional detention facility, Mostyska detention facility, and Rava Ruska border crossing short-term detention facility. We were unable to visit the Chop border guard detention facility, but conducted many interviews with former Chop detainees.1
Our researchers also visited several facilities in Slovakia, including the Se†ovce and Medvedov detention facilities, Sobrance and Vysne Nemecke border-guard facilities, and the Gabcikovo refugee center.
In Poland, our researchers visited deportation centers in Lublin and Bielsko-Biaca, the Warsaw Ok†cie border-guard detention facility, t he Lesznowola closed center, and the Debak and Siekierki refugee centers.
In the interests of the security of the individuals concerned, the names of all migrants and asylum seekers interviewed for this report have been disguised, through the use of pseudonyms or assigned initials. Where interviewees chose their own pseudonyms, quotation marks are used around the name. Other pseudonyms and initials were assigned by Human Rights Watch.
For further information on methodology, see the end of this report.
Today Ukraine is an important transit country for migration into the European Union. The May 2004 enlargement of the E.U. brought Ukraine to the edge of a new Europe. The country now borders three E.U. member states, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, making Ukraine one of the European Union's most significant neighbors.
Ukraine has traditionally been a source country for migration, first for people fleeing persecution during the Communist era and, after the collapse of Communism, for people moving west in search of work opportunities or to escape persecution.
In the early 1990s, Ukraine became a destination country for migration. During 1992 and 1994, large numbers of people fleeing the conflicts in Abkhazia and Transdniestria found refuge in Ukraine.2 Crimean Tatars, once the subject of repression and exile, were repatriated to Crimea.3
Immigration to Ukraine from non-former Soviet countries, particularly countries in the Middle East and Asia, also increased during the same period. Current estimates of the number of migrants in Ukraine range from 60,000 to 1.6 million, but the most common estimate is that there are 500,000 migrants in Ukraine.4
Ukraine is increasingly appealing as a transit country for asylum seekers trying to find refuge in the European Union and for migrants on their way west. Its strategic location between Europe and Asia, its long, often un-demarcated frontiers with lenient border controls in the north and east, and limited enforcement capacity, are among the key reasons for this trend.
The eastern border of Ukraine is particularly porous, as this was a part of the former internal Soviet border and there was no infrastructure developed in the area.
An increasing number of migrants and failed asylum seekers are returned to Ukraine from the E.U. These returns, mostly from Poland and Slovakia, are based on bilateral return agreements concluded in 1993, prior to those countries' entry into the E.U.
But the trend is being increased by E.U. asylum and migration management policies that shift the burden of processing and hosting migrants and asylum seekers from the E.U. to countries on its borders.
The growing importance of Ukraine as a transit route for migrants and asylum seekers comes at a time when the European Union is fundamentally reappraising its approach to immigration and asylum.
Recognizing that open internal borders require a common approach to these issues, there are two distinct dimensions to the E.U.'s common asylum and migration policy. First, within the borders of the Union, the emphasis is on harmonization of asylum standards and procedures, often based on the lowest common denominator among E.U. member states.
Second, in the external dimension, the focus is on securing the E.U.'s external borders, in part, by "externalizing" migration control in regions of origin and transit countries as more expedient places to hold and process refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers.5
The internal dimension of the E.U.'s approach links immigration and asylum policies with cooperation among member states on counterterrorism, crime, and border security. It is unsurprising therefore that it results in measures that are incompatible with the obligations of member states under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention)6 or the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR).7
Efforts to develop common minimum standards for the treatment of asylum seekers have frequently undermined rather than enhanced protection, and have been accompanied by increasingly restrictive measures at the national level.8
These include increased use of immigration detention, falling recognition rates for refugees, the withdrawal of social benefits from asylum seekers, and the lack of opportunities to challenge detention and deportation, resulting in increased cases of refoulement - the return of persons in need of human rights or refugee protection to places where they are at risk of being persecuted, or subject to torture and ill-treatment.9
The external dimension of E.U. asylum and migration policy currently has a number of components, including refusal of entry to E.U. territory of persons coming from countries labeled as safe countries of origin or transiting through countries deemed to be safe third countries;
interceptions at sea of persons attempting to reach E.U. territory; the return of persons who have already entered E.U. territory, for the purpose of asylum processing or migration management; and support to border enforcement and detention capacity in transit countries that border the E.U. The external dimension also emphasizes development as a mechanism of increasing the capacity of regions of origin to host refugees from the region - so-called "burden sharing" and utilizes political and aid conditionality as a means of securing the cooperation of countries outside the E.U.
This trend is epitomized by the proposals from several member states to ÅgoutsourceÅh refugee protection by establishing centers outside E.U. territory to process applications from those seeking to claim asylum in the E.U.11
Less controversial elements include proposals for a program to resettle in the E.U. people who have already been recognized as refugees in regions of origin,12 and the establishment of "regional protection programs" to enhance the capacity of developing countries to host refugees.
Regional protection programs aim to enhance the protection capacity of regions of origin through a coordinated approach, including general development and humanitarian assistance. It is too early to assess whether these mechanisms will increase protection capacity, but it is clear that they should not serve as a pretext for denying access to asylum in the E.U., or as a substitute for offering protection to those already inside the borders of the E.U. 13
Increasing emphasis is placed on the use of returns agreements, also referred to as "readmission agreements." They create a mechanism to facilitate the return of migrants and asylum seekers to countries outside the borders of the E.U.14
A readmission agreement between two states allows each state to return to the other any person who travels from one state to the other without permission.
Readmission agreements between the E.U. on behalf of its member states and a third state function in exactly the same way. In theory, readmission agreements are not designed to interfere with the right to seek asylum.15
In practice, not only irregular migrants and failed asylum seekers are returned under such agreements, but also asylum seekers whose claim for asylum and protection needs have yet to be determined.
The agreements are also used to refuse admission at the border to asylum seekers. These practices undermine the right to seek asylum, as enshrined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,16 by removing persons from the E.U. without first determining whether they are in need of protection as refugees.17
In the mid-1990s, the E.U. association and cooperation agreements with third countries began to include standard clauses on readmission, by which the third countries undertook to accept back any national of these countries present without permission in E.U. territory.
In most cases the agreements also recommended the negotiation of bilateral readmission agreements between individual E.U. member states and the country in question.18
In 1994 the European Council adopted an E.U. specimen bilateral readmission agreement and a recommendation concerning the adoption of a standard travel document to facilitate the expulsion of third country nationals (since migrants often lack travel documents).19
During the 1999 Tampere Summit, the European Council called for the conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries and for the insertion of readmission clauses in other agreements concluded between the European Community and third countries or groups of third countries.20
The practice of concluding readmission agreements has become so well established that the Seville European Council recommended that each future association or co-operation agreement include a clause on migration management and compulsory readmission in the event of irregular migration.21
While readmission agreements facilitate migrant returns, they also pose serious risks to basic human rights guarantees, including the right to seek asylum and protection against refoulement.
The research carried out by Human Rights Watch for this report indicates that these agreements are being used as a tool to transfer migrants and asylum seekers out of E.U. territory in violation of their basic rights.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has expressed concern about the impact of readmission agreements on the right to seek asylum.22
In particular, UNHCR has questioned whether persons subject to return under such agreements will have access to effective and durable protection in the country of return, and has expressed concern about the use of such agreements to return third country nationals, emphasizing that "transfers of responsibility for considering asylum applications should only be explored in cases where the applicant has a connection or close link with another State." 23
The European Union is Ukraine's biggest donor and has had a significant influence on the democratization and reform processes in Ukraine.24 Since 1998, relations between the E.U. and Ukraine have been based on a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement.25
Ukraine has never made a formal application for E.U. membership, but the new Ukrainian government clearly stated its European aspirations soon after President Viktor Yushchenko took office in early 2005.26
One of the first priorities identified under the ENP was cooperation in the area of justice and home (internal) affairs. The priorities for co-operation include: "readmission and migration, border management; [and] trafficking in human beings."27 The February 2005 E.U. Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairswith Ukraine further defined the areas for co-operation in this field.28
Ukraine was first mentioned by the United Kingdom as the location f or processing asylum applicants outside the E.U. in the context of the British "new vision proposal" in 2003.29 In September 2004, Ukraine was proposed during a meeting of Interior Ministers from Austria and the Baltic States as a potential location for camps to house refugees from Chechnya.30
A senior Ukrainian government official rejected the suggestion: "We are sovereign and independent state Ukraine. I'm very indignant that somebody decides something for Ukraine."31 E.U. officials distanced themselves from the proposal.32
Current E.U.-Ukraine cooperation in the area of asylum and migration is focused on the ratification of a readmission agreement and the development of a regional protection program that would cover Ukraine.33
Negotiations on a readmission agreement have begun under the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the E.U. Justice and Home Affairs Action Plan.34 Besides financial and technical incentives, the E.U. is also offering a regime to allow Ukrainians visa-free travel to Europe.35
The draft E.U.-Ukraine readmission agreement raises the same questions as readmission agreements in general. Is Ukraine capable of offering effective protection to refugees and of respecting the rights of migrants?36
UNHCR has made clear that at present Ukraine cannot be considered a safe first country of asylum. Will asylum seekers who transit through Ukraine be unjustly denied access to asylum in the E.U. and therefore risk being returned to persecution?
Ukraine already has long-standing bilateral readmission agreements with Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The three agreements cover not only own nationals, but also citizens of third countries and stateless persons.
The agreements lack a specific obligation to ensure that the returnees will have their asylum claims processed in a fair and effective manner upon readmission, do not include a prohibition of the return of asylum seekers, do not require effective remedies that would allow returnees to lodge their asylum applications, and do not commit the parties to observe the principle of nonrefoulement (protection against return) under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), and Article 3 of the ECHR.
Following their interception and arrest, the detainees are interviewed and processed within 48 hours (in Poland the procedure, in practice, takes 24 hours), followed by return to Ukraine.37 Border guards on each side of the border compile basic information, according to a protocol that one official described as "analogous with a protocol for the delivery/receipt of goods."38
The comparison was indeed accurate as Human Rights Watch research showed that there is no genuine effort to identify the names, origin and status of those apprehended. One of the officials interviewed told Human Rights Watch: "We just count them."39
Even if a legal remedy existed, in practice the returnees do not have access to minimal information about their rights, do not have any opportunity to contact a lawyer, NGOs providing legal counsel, or UNHCR, and do not have access to interpreters or the outside world.
Some of the detainees interviewed in Ukraine after being returned from Slovakia or Poland told Human Rights Watch that they had been ill-treated by Slovak and Polish border guards after interception, or by Ukrainian border guards after readmission, and that all their valuables and money had been seized without issuing a receipt.40
O.M., a Georgian detainee at Mostyska, stated: "The first [Polish border guard] hit my arms, the three of them kicked me. I told them that I had surgery five years ago and they stopped [hitting me].
" A.S.H., a Belarusian detainee, described his treatment by Polish border guards: "Three times they kicked me in the face. They insulted me when I was in Poland with bad wordsÅc this is not the right way to address a person."41
The readmission agreement with Slovakia was signed in 1993 and entered into force in April 1994. Most of the returnees interviewed in Ukraine after managing to cross to E.U. territory had been returned from Slovakia.
Since November 2004 Slovak border guards have handed back migrants and potential asylum seekers to their Ukrainian counterparts on a fast track without allowing them to undergo proper procedures in Slovakia.
In 2004, 832 third country nationals and twenty-two Ukrainians were returned to Ukraine. Ukrainian border guards complained in interviews with Human Rights Watch that Slovak border guards often return people who are seeking asylum in Slovakia.42
The Slovak officials interviewed acknowledged that there are no individual assessments of each returnee's identity and status, no interpreters present, no lawyers to counsel the returnees, and no way to challenge the decision to return.
They acknowledge that asylum seekers do not know in most cases that they have to say explicitly "asylum" in order to avoid being forcefully returned to Ukraine.
During interviews with Human Rights Watch, Slovak officials stated that apprehended asylum seekers are allowed in the country only if they specifically use the word "asylum."
Interviews conducted with people who sought to claim asylum in Slovakia indicate that even using the word "asylum" is not always enough to prevent summary removal from Slovakia. "Mohamed," a Palestinian asylum seeker, told Human Rights Watch:
I told them [the Slovak border guards] ten times [that] I want[ed] asylum and they sent me back. They took me to the forest but not to the way I came and they called the Ukrainian border guard soldiers and gave me back; at every five minutes they [the Ukrainian border guards] stopped and searched us and took everything, even the charger for the cell phone...
I told "asyl." It's the same in Slovak, English, Farsi, they [the Slovak border guards] should understand. I begged and told them that I don't want to go back. They said "OK, let's go." - They gave me water and said "let's take you to the forest." We spent three hours [there].
K.I., an Indian asylum seeker who was returned to Ukraine after crossing to Slovakia without proper documents, told Human Rights Watch how the Slovak police interrogated only two people in his group (of thirty-seven) because they were the only two who spoke English.44
A.M., a Pakistani detainee in Pavshino, told Human Rights Watch: "I spent six, seven hours in Slovakia, I didn't even have the time to tell them that I cannot go back [to my home country]."45
When Human Rights Watch visited Slovakia there were only six lawyers available to provide advice on asylum cases in that country. Approximately 11,000 asylum applications were lodged in Slovakia in 2004.
Polish officials told Human Rights Watch that before anyone is returned, a legal procedure ensures that each person is identified and that Poland fulfills its compliance with its nonrefoulement obligations.
When presented by Human Rights Watch with the cases of returnees who had been pushed back to Ukraine even after trying to seek asylum in Poland, Polish officials acknowledged the possibility of human error and the need to improve the control mechanisms to prevent such situations.49
Ukrainian lawyers in Lviv told Human Rights Watch that six of their clients, from Somalia, had been sent to Ukraine from Poland even though they had entered Poland from Belarus and not from Ukraine.
They were apprehended in southern Poland in a locality they could not identify but which was about a six-hour drive to Warsaw. They were detained in a location near Warsaw for twenty-five days.
From there they were transferred to Lviv vagabonds' center for a month, where women in the group were subjected to sexual harassment and guards took their belongings without receipt.
They had no information about what would happen to them in the future. After months in detention and having suffered repeated ill-treatment, many of them desperately wanted to return home.52
The main shortcoming is that the Hungarian lawyers working for NGOs providing free legal representation do not have access to the short-term detention facilities at the border crossings.55
In light of the human rights violations taking place under current readmission agreements, the new agreement between the E.U. and Ukraine raises concerns both regarding its content and its likely operation.
It remains unclear whether the agreement will include an effective mechanism to ensure that returnees will have their asylum claims processed in a fair and effective manner upon readmission, so as to avoid the risk of refugees being passed from state to state without ever having the merits of their claim heard (known as “Refugees in orbit“ situations).
The fairness and effectiveness of the accelerated procedures under which the returns take place remains unclear, including whether those subject to return would have the right to an appeal with suspensive effect against return on Refugee Convention grounds or other human rights grounds.
Given the importance to Ukraine of closer ties with the European Union, the government in Kyiv has a clear interest in cooperating with the E.U. on the management of migration and asylum flows.
That cooperation poses a major dilemma for Ukraine, however. Because it lacks the legal and policy framework and accommodation capacity to provide protection to refugees, process asylum seekers, and respect the rights of migrants, Ukraine runs the risk of becoming a center for refoulement for Europe's refugees, asylum seekers and migrants.
The European Union must share responsibility for this deficit, since it consistently prioritizes migration control over human rights and refugee protection in its relations with neighboring states.
Any readmission agreement negotiated between the E.U. and Ukraine must include language that guarantees that persons subject to the provisions of the agreement will not be readmitted to Ukraine in violation of their basic human rights or their right to seek asylum in the E.U.
Such an agreement must take into consideration the necessary resources and the timeframe required to amend Ukrainian migration and asylum legislation and procedures and to upgrade its reception and accommodation conditions.56
The commencement of any such agreement should not take place until Ukraine is in full compliance with its international and regional human rights obligations.57
The European Commission is currently devising a plan "with the intention of enhancing the protection capacity of the region - and better protecting the refugee population there by providing Durable Solutions."58
The Commission has already identified Western Newly Independent States (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) as the location for the first pilot project on the eastern rim of the E.U
According to the E.U., the goal of the so-called regional protection program (RPP) is to strengthen existing protection capacity, including: "the reinforcement of subsidiary protection, integration and registration as well as core protection activities relating to case consideration and reception."59
Though strengthening the protection capacity and improving access to durable solutions in the region are laudable goals, the RPP concept also raises concerns that it will be used as a pretext for burden shifting that will result in the premature designation of Ukraine as a safe third country.
It is critical that the RPP not be used as a pretext to return migrants and asylum seekers to Ukraine without adequate capacity to process and host those groups, or to undermine the right to seek asylum in the European Union.
[4] Olena Malynovska, "International migration in contemporary Ukraine: trends and policy," Global Migration Perspectives, vol. 14, October 2004, [online] ttp://www.gcim.org (retrieved November 24, 2004)
[5] These dimensions are set out fully in the Hague Programme, a comprehensive E.U. plan addressing cooperation among E.U. states on a range of internal matters including migration, counterterrorism, criminal and judicial cooperation, and human rights.
The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security And Justice In The European Union Annex I to The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (4/5 November 2004), Council of the European Union, Concl. 3, 14292/04, Brussels, November 5, 2004, p.21.
[7] European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European Treaty System No. 005, Rome, November 4, 1950, ratified by Ukraine on September 11, 1997. Hereinafter cited as European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
[8] For a critique of the draft asylum procedures directive and draft returns directive see ECRE, Renewing the Promise of Protection, Recommendations from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles to the Brussels European Council, 5 November 2004 on the Multi-Annual Program 'Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union' and recent proposals to establish camps in the Mediterranean region, [online]
[9] See Human Rights Watch, "Spain, Discretion Without Bounds: The Arbitrary Application of Spanish Immigration Law," A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 14, No. 6(D), July 2002, [online] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/spain2/;
"Spain, The Other Face Of The Canary Islands: Rights Violations Against Migrants and Asylum Seekers," A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 14, No. 1(D), February 2002, [online] http://hrw.org/reports/2002/spain/;
"Nowhere To Turn: State Abuses of Unaccompanied Migrant Children by Spain and Morocco," A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol.14, No. 4 (D), May 2002, [online] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/spain-morocco/;
and "The Netherlands, Fleeting Refuge: The Triumph of Efficiency over Protection in Dutch Asylum Policy," A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol.14, No.3(D), April 2003, [online] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/netherlands0403/
[10] In 2004, 900,000 undocumented immigrants were refused entry to the E.U., 380,000 were arrested in "unlawful" situations, and 200,000 were expelled, according to Justice, Freedom and Security Commissioner Franco Frattini.
Also "New International Approaches to Asylum Processing and Protection," Correspondence from H.E. Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to H.E. Costas Simitis, Prime Minister of Greece and President of the European Council, March 10, 2003, at para. (1)
(ii). German Interior Minister Otto Schily revived this proposal and suggested Libya as a possible location for processing centers. See also the analysis of the "Pacific solution" in "By Invitation Only: Australian Asylum Policy," A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 14, No. 10
For a critique of the recent E.U. proposals see, Human Rights Watch, "An Unjust 'Vision' for Europe's Refugees, Commentary on the U.K.'s 'New Vision' Proposal for the Establishment of Refugee Processing Centers Abroad," June 17, 2003, [online] http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/refugees0603/
[12] Commission's Communication of 1 September 2005, On Regional Protection Programs and Draft Council Conclusions on the Communication from the Commission on regional protection programs (doc. 11989/05 ASILE 14 RELEX 438), 12593/05, Sept 26, 2005.
The Commission communication on resettlement makes the point that resettlement cannot serve as a substitute for protection for those already in the E.U: "Any new approach should be complementary rather than substituting the Common European Asylum System..."
[13] UNHCR has welcomed the RPP proposal but emphasized "It is important that these measures do not prevent asylum seekers from entering the EU, and still provide full access for them, " Stefania Bianchi, "EU Plans to keep asylum seekers at bay," IPS, September 29, 2005, [online] http://www.ipsterraviva.net/Europe/article.aspx?id=2395 (retrieved October 14, 2005).
[14] See "Justice and Home Affairs Council Action Plan to Combat Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union" (Official Journal of the E.U., C 142, of 14.06.2002, [online] http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52002XG0614(02): EN:HTML (retrieved July, 16, 2005).
See, also Justice, Freedom and Security Commissioner Franco Frattini, Speech before the Bundestag, "The Commission's policy priorities in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice," SPEECH/05/93, Berlin, 14 February 2005.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from nonpolitical crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
[17] Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, (2003), Conclusion on the return of persons found not to be in need of international protection No. 96 (LIV) 2003.
[18] Readmission clauses have been inserted into agreements with Algeria, Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, ,Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Macedonia Morocco, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen.
[19] Council Recommendation concerning a specimen bilateral readmission agreement between a Member State and a third country (OJ C 274, 19 September 1996); Council Recommendation concerning the adoption of a standard travel document for the expulsion of third country nationals (OJ C 274, 19 September 1996).
[22] "UNHCR Position on the EC Readmission Agreements with Third Countries," UNHCR Brussels, April 2003. See also: Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme (2003), Conclusion on the return of persons found not to be in need of international protection No. 96 (LIV) : 2003.
[23] UNHCR Background Paper Number 3, "Inter-state Agreements for the Readmission of Third Country Nationals, Including Asylum Seekers, and for the Determination of the State Responsible for Examining the Substance of an Asylum Claim," UNHCR, May 2001.
UNHCR further clarified its position by stating that "a meaningful link or connection - would make it reasonable for an applicant to seek asylum in that State - Mere transit through a third country does not generally constitute such a meaningful link." "UNHCR Urges Caution as EU Negotiates "Safe Country" Concepts," UNHCR News, October 1, 2003.
This amount is supplemented by contributions from member states which reached $157 million in the period 1996 - 1999. "Commission Staff Working Paper, European Neighbourhood Policy, Country Report," Brussels, 12.5.2004, SEC(2004) 566, (COM(2004)373 final).
[25] Council and Commission Decision of 26 January 1998 on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, 98/149/EC, ECSC, Official Journal L 049, 19/02/1998 p. 0001.
[27] Commission of the European Communities, "Commission Staff Working Paper, European Neighbourhood Policy, Country Report," Brussels, 12.5.2004, SEC(2004) 566, (COM(2004)373 final), p.11.
[29] "New International Approaches to Asylum Processing and Protection," Correspondence from H.E. Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to H.E. Costas Simitis, Prime Minister of Greece and President of the European Council, March 10, 2003, para. (1) (ii).
[31] Gennady Moskal, head of the State Committee on Nationalities and Migration, quoted in "Ukraine dismisses notion of transit camps in the country," EU Observer, September 20, 2004, [online] http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/rtf/RP12aout-30sept04.rtf (retrieved October 15, 2005).
[33] Justice, Freedom and Security Commissioner Franco Frattini spoke in the following terms about the planned regional protection programs (RPPs): "The commission's RPPs will focus funding on relief, rehabilitation and regional development in a bid to build capacity in countries which can host large numbers of Europe bound refugees. RPPs will link support to measures such as providing protection for refugees, registration, cooperation on legal migration and agreement of returns of failed asylum seekers or illegal immigrants to countries outside the EU."
[35] Commission of the European Communities, "Commission Staff Working Paper, European Neighbourhood Policy, Country Report," Brussels, 12.5.2004, SEC(2004) 566, {COM(2004)373 final}, p. 5
[36] In her statement to the Executive Committee of UNHCR in October 2004, the Director of International Protection, Ms. Erika Feller, clarified that effective protection for refugees is that which, at a minimum, guarantees:
- pending a durable solution, stay is permitted under conditions which protect against arbitrary expulsion and deprivation of liberty and which provide for adequate and dignified means of subsistence;
- the unity and integrity of the family is ensured; and the specific protection needs of the affected persons, including those deriving from age and gender, are able to be identified and respected.
[37] Art. 6.1 of the Polish-Ukrainian Agreement states: "Each Party shall readmit citizens of third states or persons without citizenship who have illegally crossed the common state border from its territory. If less than 48 hours have elapsed from the time of the illegal crossing by this person of the common state border, the readmitting Party shall readmit such a person without prior notification and unnecessary formalities."
[40] Human Rights Watch interviews with "Mohamed," Palestinian from Lebanon, and "Aziz," Afghan, Gabcikovo, Slovakia, May 4, 2005; L.C.Y., X.X.L., and X.J.P., Chinese, Kyiv vagabonds' center, Ukraine, March 22, 2005; "Prabhat," Indian, Pavshino, Ukraine, March 28, 2005; and A.S., Belarusian, Mostyska detention facility, Ukraine, April 19, 2005. Article 41 of the Ukrainian Constitution protects citizens and non-citizens against being arbitrarily deprived of property and possessions.
[42] Human Rights Watch interview with Gen. Boris Marchenko and Maj. Serguey Luginchenko from the State Border Service of Ukraine, Kyiv, April 6, 2005.
[46] Services are currently provided by the Goodwill Society from Kosice and Human Rights League (Liga za ludska Prava). The latter began work in July 2005 after the dissolution of the Slovak Helsinki Committee's refugee program, which previously provided advice to asylum seekers in Slovakia.
The majority[3,397 (55 percent)]were Ukrainian nationals. Other groups of deportees to Ukraine with significant numbers were Moldovans (336), Chinese (120), Georgians (40), and Indians (46). Human Rights Watch correspondence with Andrzej Pilaszkiewicz, Office for Repatriation and Aliens, Poland, on file with Human Rights Watch.
[48] Article 89 of the Aliens Law states that in order to issue a deportation order, a hearing must be organized which includes an assessment of all documents, a discussion on entry, stay, merits for tolerated stay, and danger in country of origin or transit country if deported.