日本本土決戦 米軍敗退の可能性
12 ：だつお：
>このように対空火力は皇軍は中国軍の１０倍以上だった。
議事録には次のようなイーカーの言葉が引用されている。
「日本にたいし航空兵力のみの使用を主張する者はきわめて重大な事実を見過ごして
います。それはつまり、航空機のみが敵と対決するときは、航空兵の死傷者数は決して
低下しないという事実です。現在の航空兵の死傷者数は一度の任務につきおよそ二パー
セントであり、一月当たりでは約三〇パーセントです」イーカーは続けた。
「時期を逸すれば、敵が有利になるだけです」
「日本殲滅 日本本土侵攻作戦の全貌」（Ｔ・アレン＆Ｎ・ボーマー著）
"GENERAL EAKER said that he agreed completely with the statements
made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared
for the President. He had just received a cable in which General
Arnold also <page 559> expressed complete agreement. He stated
that any blockade of Honshu was completely dependent upon airdromes
on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups
of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed
without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who
advocated the use against Japan of air power alone overlooked the
very impressive fact that air casualties are always much heavier
when the air faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never
fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. Present air
casualties are averaging 2 percent per mission, about 30 percent
per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay
favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.
http://tigger.uic.edu/~rjensen/invade.htm
CASUALTY PROJECTIONS FOR THE U.S. INVASIONS OF JAPAN,
1945-1946: PLANNING AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
議事録には次のようなイーカーの言葉が引用されている。
「日本にたいし航空兵力のみの使用を主張する者はきわめて重大な事実を見過ごして
います。それはつまり、航空機のみが敵と対決するときは、航空兵の死傷者数は決して
低下しないという事実です。現在の航空兵の死傷者数は一度の任務につきおよそ二パー
セントであり、一月当たりでは約三〇パーセントです」イーカーは続けた。
「時期を逸すれば、敵が有利になるだけです」
「日本殲滅 日本本土侵攻作戦の全貌」（Ｔ・アレン＆Ｎ・ボーマー著）
"GENERAL EAKER said that he agreed completely with the statements
made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared
for the President. He had just received a cable in which General
Arnold also <page 559> expressed complete agreement. He stated
that any blockade of Honshu was completely dependent upon airdromes
on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups
of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed
without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who
advocated the use against Japan of air power alone overlooked the
very impressive fact that air casualties are always much heavier
when the air faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never
fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. Present air
casualties are averaging 2 percent per mission, about 30 percent
per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay
favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.
http://tigger.uic.edu/~rjensen/invade.htm
CASUALTY PROJECTIONS FOR THE U.S. INVASIONS OF JAPAN,
1945-1946: PLANNING AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
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