Losses per theater Theater Dead % Africa 16.066 0,3 Balkans 103.693 1,9 North 30.165 0,6 West 339.957 6,4 Italy 150.660 2,8 Eastern Front (- Dec 1944) 2.742.909 51,6 Germany (1945) 1.230.045 23,1 Various 245.561 4,6 Total 4.859.056 http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3612
太平洋戦線でアメリカは27,000機もの航空機を失ったって知ってるか? 欧州戦では未生還機に廃棄処分機(lost or damaged beyond repair) を加えても18,000機なのに対し。
Aggregate United States plane losses during the course of the Pacific war, not including training losses in the United States, were approximately 27,000 planes. Of these losses 8,700 were on combat missions; the remainder were training, ferrying and other noncombat losses. Of the combat losses over 60 percent were to antiaircraft fire.
In the attack by Allied air power, almost 2,700,000 tons of bombs were dropped, more than 1,440,000 bomber sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties were flown. The number of combat planes reached a peak of some 28,000 and at the maximum 1,300,000 men were in combat commands. The number of men lost in air action was 79,265 Americans and 79,281 British. [Note: All RAF statistics are preliminary or tentative.] More than 18,000 American and 22,000 British planes were lost or damaged beyond repair.
In developing the first of these three points the memorandum which General Eisenhower prepared for the Chief of Staff first set out to demolish an argument which might plausibly be advanced against the principle of concentrating strength in the European theater. The memorandum pointed out that the "strategic axiom" of attacking the weaker force of a divided enemy did not lead to the conclusion that forces should be concentrated in the Far East, even though the European Axis was "stronger in total combat power" than Japan. According to Eisenhower's reasoning, Japan was at the time "relatively stronger" than Germany and Italy because of her geographical position and the greater force that the United Nations could bring to bear in Europe, at least as long as the Soviet Union remained in the war. This condition obtained primarily because it took three to four times as many ships to transport and maintain a force in the Pacific as across the Atlantic. Thus WPD's conclusion was that "logistic reasons, as well as strategic axiom, substantiate the soundness of the decision to concentrate against the European Axis."